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THE WORK OF THE MISSOURI SUPREME COURT

FOR THE YEAR 1949
STATISTICAL SURVEY
JAMES E. RERVES*

This statistical survey is based upon cases heard in 1949 for which
opinions were delivered during that year. During 1949, the judges and commissioners wrote a total of 244 majority opinions. This total represents a
slight decrease from last year., Six of the opinions were originally written
as divisional opinions and later accepted as the opinion of the court en bane.
There were ten separate dissenting and two separate concurring opinions
handed down. There were no changes in the personnel of the court effective
during 1949.
Table I indicates the distribution of these opinions among the divisions
of the court.
TABLE I
NUMBER OF OPINIONS WRITTEN BY EACH DIVIsION

54
En Bane .........................................................................................
108
Division Number One -------------------------------------------82
Division Number Two ......................................................................
T otal ............................................................................................

244

Table II indicates the classification of the opinions handed down in
1949 according to their dominant issues. Many of the cases involved several
dominant issues and necessarily the figures are only an approximation due
to the fact that such cases have been classified in an arbitrary fashion.
*Chairman, Board of Student Editors.
1. Total majority opinions for the preceding six years are as follows: 1943,
306; 1944, 251; 1945, 197; 1946, 181; 1947, 244; 1948, 254.

(335)
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TABLE II
TOPICAL ANALYSIS OF DECISIONS

Adm inistrative Law .........................................................................
2
Adoption .............................................................................................
2
Appeal and Error .........................................................................
12
A ttorney and Client .......................................................................
4
C onstitutional L aw .........................................................................
3
C ontracts .........................................................................................
5
Corporations ........................................................................................
1
Counties ..................................
1
Courts ...............................................................................................
5
Crim inal Law .................................................................................
29
Divorce ................................................................................................
1
E lections ............................................................................................
2
E quity ...............................................................................................
4
Evidence .............................................................................................
5
Habeas Corpus .................................................................................
1
Insurance .................................................
3
Joint A dventure ................................................................................
1
Judgm ents ..........................................................................................
1
L andlord and Tenant .......................................................................
3
M andamus .......................................................................................
4
M aster and Servant ..........................................................................
1
M ortgages ..........................................................................................
6
M unicipal Corporations ....................................................................
4
Negligence (Automobiles) .........................................................
33
N egotiable Instrum ents ................................................................
1
Other N egligence ...........................................................................
21
Partnerships .....................................................................................
2
Pleading ............................................................................................
5
Practice and Procedure ...............................................................
14
Principal and Agent .......................................................................
3
Prohibition .......................................................................................
5
Quo Warranto .....................................
3
R eal Property ................................................................................
15
Specific Perform ance ..........................................................................
5
Statutes .................................................
2
Taxation ..........................................................................................
10
Torts (other than negligence) .....................................................
4
T rusts .................................................................................................
6
Wills and A dm inistration ............................................................
13
Workmen's Compensation ............................................................
2
r -+.) 1
aIJ

.....................................................
&
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Table III indicates the disposition of the 244 cases handled during
1949. The phrases used to indicate the disposition of the cases are those of
the judges and commissioners themselves, as far as such is practicable for
this purpose.
TABLE III
DisrosrroN oF LimciAioN

Attorney Reprimanded ....................................................................
1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Quashed ...................................
1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Permanent .................... 1
Alternative Writ of Mandamus Made Preemptory .................. 1
Appeal Dismissed ..............................................................................
1
Appeal Dismissed and Order Granting New Trial Affirmed ........ 1
Decree Affirmed .............................................................................
7
Decree Modified and Affirmed on Condition; Otherwise
Reversed and Cause Remanded with Direction .................. 1
Decree Reversed, and Cause Remanded with Directions ............ 1
Judgment Affirmed ............................................................................
107
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part and
Cause Remanded with Directions ........................................
1
Judgment Affirmed in Part and Reversed in Part ........................ 2
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded for Further
Proceedings ..............................................................................
3
Judgment Affirmed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 2
Judgment Affirmed on Condition of Remittitur ........................
9
Judgment Affirmed in Part, Reversed in Part and Remanded .... 3
Judgment Modified and Affirmed as Modified ..........................
2
Judgment Reversed ...................................................................
19
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded ............................ 27
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions ........ 22
Judgment Reversed and Cause Remanded for Retrial .............. 1
Judgment of Court of Appeals Quashed and Affirmed in Part .... 1
Order Affirmed ................................................................................
4
Order Affirmed and Cause Remanded ........................................
2
Order Granting New Trial Affirmed and Cause Remanded ..... 1
Order Modified and Affirmed as Modified ....................................
1
Order Reversed and Cause Remanded with Directions .............. 3
Order Suspending License to Practice Law ....................................
2
Preemptory Writ of Mandamus Issued ..........................................
1
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Discharged in Part and
M ade Absolute in Part ..............................................................
1
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Made Absolute ..........................
4
Provisional Rule in Prohibition Quashed ......................................
1
Transfer to Court of Appeals ........................................................
7
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Writ of Habeas Corpus Granted and Petitioner Remanded
to Custody of Sheriff for New Trial ............................
1
Writ of M andamus Denied ....................................
1
W rit of Ouster Denied .......................................
1

Total ................................................
244
Table IV indicates the disposition of those motions subsequent
to decision capable of determination from records now available. Cases
wherein rehearings were granted or which were transferred to the court
en barw are necessarily not included in this survey.
TABLE IV
MOTIONS SUBSEQUENT TO DECISION

Motion for Rehearing or to Transfer to Court En Banc
D enied ..............................................
42
Motion for Rehearing Denied ...................................
55
Motion to Transfer to Court En Banc Denied .........................
3
M otion to M odify Denied .....................................
1
M otion to M odify Granted ....................................
1
Opinion Modified on Court's Motion ..............................
3

T otal ................................................
105
APPELLATE PRACTICE
CHARLES V. GARNETr*

THE JURISDICTION OF THR SUPREME COURT

The most important decision of the year, in the field of appellate jurisdiction, is the majority opinion of the court en banc in City of St. Louis v.
Butler Company.1 In that case the City of St. Louis brought a condemnation suit to condemn for use as an alleged public street, a strip of land forming a cul-de-sac. The defendant filed an answer and a motion to dismiss,
alleging that the land in question was not subject to condemnation because
the proposed street would be solely for private use in violation of defendant's "constitutional rights under the constitution of the United States and
the State of Missouri." The trial court sustained the motion to dismiss and
the city appealed. By a unanimous vote, the court en banc held that the title
*Attorney, Kansas City. LL.B., Kansas City School of Law, 1912.
1. 219 S.W. 2d 372 (Mo. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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to real estate was not involved. In so holding the court overruled eleven
prior decisions listed in a footnote to the opinion, and declared the law
to be that in a condemnation suit the plaintiff "does not dispute the landowner's antecedent title, but, on the contrary affirms it; and, for that reason,
title is not in issue."
More important, however, is the view of the majority of the court that
the constitutional question, not having been properly raised, does not serve
to create appellate jurisdiction in the supreme court. In so holding, the
majority of the court overruled a long line of cases, which had previously
established the law to be that if the sole question involved necessarily requires construction of the constitution, the supreme court has inherent jurisdiction of the appeal. The court prescribes the formula for jurisdiction on
constitutional grounds as including the following four requirements: The
constitutional question must be raised at the first available opportunity;
the constitutional provision claimed to have been violated must be specifically designated by explicit reference to the article and section or by
quotations of the provision itself; the fact showing such violation must be
stated; and the constitutional question must be preserved throughout for
appellate review. The majority opinion lists a total of twenty-one opinions
in which the doctrine of inherency was, in some form, recognized. In overruling these decisions the majority opinion declares:
"We must have a workable legal rule in this state, on the enigmatic
doctrine of inherency and the only way to get it is to eliminate the
doctrine."
The late Judge Clark, in his dissenting opinion, stated:
"If an appeal cannot be decided without construing the constitution, the Supreme Court alone has jurisdiction to decide the case.
This court cannot rightfully vest a Court of Appeals with power to
decide a case which cannot be decided without construing the constitution."
It will be noted that, when the case was transferred to the court of
appeals, that court examined the merits of the appeal on constitutional
grounds. 2 The constitutional provision respecting the exclusive jurisdiction
of the supreme court covers "all cases involving the construction of the constitution." It would seem, therefore, that when a case cannot be decided
without construing the constitution the decision of such a case by a court
2. 223 S.W. 2d 831, 832 (Mo. 1949).

3. Mo. CoNsT. ART. V. §3 (1945).
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of appeals would be beyond the constitutional jurisdiction of that court, and
that it could not acquire jurisdiction by the failure of the parties to follow
a prescribed formula in preserving the question for review.
Whatever the true rule may be with respect to the doctrine of inhernecy, that is, cases where the sole question at issue is a constitutional question, it is, of course, well settled that the supreme court does not have appellate jurisdiction merely because a constitutional question, among others,
may be involved unless that constitutional question has been properly preserved and kept alive. In Good Motor Car Company v. Briner,4 an appeal
from a permanent injunction in a labor dispute, the court held that its jurisdiction had not been properly invoked and transferred the case to the court
of appeals because, although constitutional questions had been raised, they
had not been kept alive and were not presented specifically by the briefs on
appeal. The court again referred to the Butler Company opinion, supra, for
a statement of the requirements necessary to preserve the constitutional
question for review. The same result was reached in Hurtzen v. Gasche '
and also in Young v. Brassfield6 where the court again declares that the
constitutional question must be real and substantial and not merely colorable.
In Simmnons v. Friday7 an appeal from an order dismissing plaintiff's
petition, the court recognized- an exception to the general rule that where
appellate jurisdiction turns on the amount involved, such amount must be
affirmatively shown in the record, and that the allegations of the petition
would ordinarily control. The prayer .of the petition under consideration
was merely for a judgment in an indefinite amount for "reasonable and just
compensation," of the trustees who brought the suit. There were, however,
certain exhibits attached to the petition which, upon analysis, disclosed
the jurisdictional amount and the court retained jurisdiction, stating:
"However, to preserve the constitutional integrity of this court, we
pierce the shell of the pleadings, proof, record and judgment sufficiently far to determine that our proper jurisdiction was not infringed upon, or improper jurisdiction is not foisted upon us by mere
colorable amounts."
Thus it is clear that there is no set formula for an affirmative showing
no jurisdictional amounts, and that, where the amount involved is actually
within the jurisdiction of the suprme court, and that fact can be ascer4.
5.
6.
7.

224 S.W.
223 S.W.
223 S.W.
224 S.W.

2d
2d
2d
2d

73 (Mo. 1949).
493 (Mo. 1949).
491 (Mo. 1949).
90, 94 (Mo. 1949).
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tained from an examination of the entire record, appellate jurisdiction is
not made to depend upon the amount at issue as stated by the pleadings.
There must, however, be an affirmative showing in the record on the subject
of jurisdictional amounts, otherwise appellate jurisdiction is in the court of
appeals. For that reason the court transferred the case of Barksdale v.
Morris,8 a suit to construe a will, because the value in money of the relief
sought was not affirmatively shown and could not be determined from the
record. Abandoned claims cannot be considered in arriving at the jurisdictional amount. That is illustrated by the opinion in Jackson v. Merz8
where there was no affirmative showing of the monetary value of the right
of occupancy of the leasehold there in dispute, and where the amount of
damages sought equalled but did not exceed $7500.00. The fact that the
other party had also asked damages, within the jurisdictiofial amount, did
not preserve jurisdiction in the supreme court because the other party
did not appeal. The court, in transferring the case, stated the reason for
its definite rule that the amount must be affirmatively shown as follows:
"This plain and precise requirement of an affirmative showing is to
avoid deciding two controversies in every case; first, a decision on
the amount in dispute, and second, a decision on the merits. The
rule has worked well in practice, and has prevented confusion and
delay in appeal."
It is the well settled general rule that cases involving mortgages, deeds
of trust and other liens do not involve title to real estate in the jurisdictional
sense; but in Munaday v. Aitstin10 the court reviewed recent decisions on
the subject, and recognized the apparent exception to the rule, and declared
that "where the essential and inherent validity of the mortgage itself is in
dispute, title is involved. In other words, the mortgage is regarded as a
part or segment of the title, constituting a cloud on the title if it is invalid.
But if the dispute is merely over forclosure of the mortgage for the indebtedness secured thereby, it does not involve title." The decision in the
m"
Munday case was followed in the later decision of Cobble v. Garrison
However, in Simons v. Marron'12 the court held that where the action was
to set aside the release of a deed of trust and foreclose the deed of trust

8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

224
219
218
219
217

S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 320, 321 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 624 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 393 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 537 (Mo. 1949).
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itself, title to real estate is not involved, overruling the prior opinion of

Division One to the contrary in Medici v. Stitpec.13
QUESTIONS FOR REVIEW

In Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club" a verdict and
judgment for plaintiff in an action for damages for personal injuries was

set aside by the trial court upon defendant's motion for a directed verdict.
The supreme court took final jurisdiction of the appeal because of the importance of the procedural question involved. After the verdict and judgment defendant had filed its motion to set the same aside and have judgment entered in accordance with its motion for a directed verdict, and in
the alternative a motion for new trial in the event the motion to set aside
was not sustained. The court sustained the motion to set aside and entered
judgment for defendant and also overruled the motion for new trial. The
opinion points to the fact that the motion for new trial is the basic after
trial motion and that the trial court could have overruled the motion to set
aside the verdict and judgment and sustained the motion for a new trial
because of prejudicial errors at the trial. And that, when the court believes
that the motion to set aside should be sustained but also finds error in instructions, it is the better practice to sustain the motion to set aside and also
sustain the motion for new trial, making its ruling thereon in the alternative to be effective in the event its judgment entered on sustaining the
motion to set aside be reversed. The court also holds that when the motion to set aside is sustained and the motion for new trial overruled and
the plaintiff appeals, the defendant may in his brief allege error in instructions or other procedural matters raised in the motion for new trial, because
the appellate court may consider everything preserved in the record and has
complete authority to consider all questions and to decide them as it concludes the trial court should have decided them. "This" says the court,
"gives effect to the spirit of the Code, by construing 'it to secure just,
speedy and inexpensive determination of every action'."
In Fletcher v. North-Mehorney Furniture Company"5 the court applied
the so-called "plain error" rule' 6 and reviewed the evidence to determine
its sufficiency to support the verdict, notwithstanding the fact that the motion for a directed verdict was insufficient to preserve for review the error
13.
14.
15.
16.

335 Mo. 796, 73 S.W. 2d 998 (1934).
224 S.W. 2d 989 (Mo. 1949).
222 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1949).
Supreme Court Rule 3.27.
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in overruling it, citing the opinion in Odinaso v. Mellow1 as its authority
for that procedure.
In State ex rel Morton v. Cave,' a disbarment proceedings originally
decided by the court of appeals and brought to the supreme court on writ
of certiorari, the court en banc, by a divided vote, held that, because no
motion was filed for rehearing in the court of appeals, the only questions
before the supreme court were those raised upon the record proper, and
refused to consider any questions except the question of costs. The court
took the position that, because its Rule 2.06 provides that no case may be
transferred to the supreme court from a court of appeals unless a motion
for rehearing has been filed and overruled in the court of appeals, the failure
to file such a motion in the court of appeals resulted in leaving the case
before the supreme court only on the record proper and without juristion or authority to consider the case as it would have considered it if it
had reached the supreme court on an original appeal. The court draws an
analogy between the motion for rehearing and a motion for new trial.
Douglas J., in a dissenting opinion, argues that the lack of a motion for
rehearing is a pure procedural technicality and that the supreme court has
inherent jurisdiction, in disbarment proceedings, to review the entire record
when the case is brought to that court.
THE RIGHT OF APPEAL

In Bailey v. Interstate Airmotive, Inc. 9 the jury returned a verdict
for plaintiff. The trial court sustained defendant's motion for new trial
but overruled its motion to set aside the verdict and judgment and judgment for defendant in accordance with its motion for directed verdict.
Plaintiff appealed from the order granting the new trial and defendant
appealed from the order overruling its motion to set aside. The court
held that defendant's appeal must be dismissed because the order sustaining the motion for new trial did not finally dispose of the case, and,
while under the express provisions of the statute plaintiff had a right to
appeal from the order sustaining the motion for new trial, the defendant
was not aggrieved by any appealable order of the trial court adverse to it.
In White v. SieVers2 ° the court held that while the order of a trial
court dismissing a petition without any provision for the filing of an
17.
18.
19.
20.

356
220
219
221

Mo. 228, 201 S.W. 2d 365 (1947).
S.W. 2d 45 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 333 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 118 (Mo. 1949).
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amendment constitutes a dismissal of the action, and is an appealable
order, nevertheless, if the record shows that, at the time of entering the
order to dismiss, authority was granted to the plaintiff to file an amended
pleading such an order is not a final judgment and is not appealable. The
court distinguishes between the dismissal of an action and the dismissal
of a plading. So, also, in the case of In re Franz Estate,2' the court held
that the filing of a motion to set aside an order of dismissal is in the nature
of a motion for a new trial and postpones the time for making an appeal.
In England v. Poehlman22 the court held that an order of partial
distribution in a partition suit is not an appealable order because it does
not finally dispose of the issues in the case, and is not'the kind of an interlocutory order from which an appeal will lie. The final judgment in
a partition suit is held to be the order whereby the sale is approved and
distribution of the proceeds is provided for.
In Wormigton v. City of Monett 23 the court held that the Statutes
of Limitation against reviver of a judgment, which proceed upon the theory
that the judgment is conclusively presumed to have been paid and satisfied after the expiration of ten years from the date of the original rendition
thereof, is not tolled by the pendency of an appeal, and that where a
period of more than ten years elapsed between the date of the judgment
and the final proceedings on an appeal, the judgment cannot be revived.
RECORDS AND BRIEFS

The court continues to be lenient with those litigants whose counsel
fail to comply literally with the rules of court respecting the form and
content of their briefs. In Jackson v. Thompson2' the court again refused
to dismiss an appeal because of appellant's argumentative, repetitious
and unfair brief and statement of facts. The court comments:
"This court has been extremely liberal in the enforcement of its
rules in this regard. Perhaps we have been too liberal. The reason
is that we loathe to dismiss a case for failure to comply with the
rules. We prefer to decide the cases on their merits. However,
lawyers should not conclude in view of this liberalism that the rules
are to be disregarded."
So also in Bockting v. Bockting 5 although the court regarded ap21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

221 S.W. 2d 739 (Mo. 1949).
221 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. 1949).
218 S.W. 2d 586 (Mo. 1949).
218 S.W. 2d 97, 99 (Mo. 1949).
217 S.W. 2d 538 (Mo. 1949).
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pellant's statement of fact as being so argumentative and otherwise violative of its rule as to justify dismissing the appeal, the court states:
"We are reluctant to do so and will decide the case on the merits."
These comments of the court with respect to the violation of its rules
indicate that the day may come when dismissals for their violations will
be in order.
Where a case reaches the supreme court by transfer from a court of
appeals, the majority of the court is of the opinion that it is not necessary
for either of the parties to file a new brief in the supreme court.
In Krummeacer v. Western Auto Supply Company26 the opinion of
Tipton, J., concurred in only as to result by the remaining judges of the
court en banc, indicates that the failure of respondent to file a new brief
in the supreme court left him in a position where there was a failure to
comply with the rules with respect to briefs. The majority of the court,
however, concurred in a separate opinion by Clark, J., to the effect that
when a case is transferred from the court of appeals, failure to file additional
briefs in the supreme court is not a violation of its Rule 1.08 and is not
ground for dismissal of an appeal.
CRIMINAL LAW
H. REm*

CHARLEs

During the year 1949, the Supreme Court of Missouri passed on thirty
appeals, affirming the trial courts in twenty-four, remanding four and ordering the defendants discharged in two cases.
I. PROCEDURE BEFoRE TRIAL

A. Search and seizure
In the only case involving the admissibility of evidence obtained by
search and seizure conducted by an officer, the court held that where certain
incriminating evidence in the defendant's hand, recognized by officers for
what it was, was dropped by the defendant and picked up by police, it did
not constitute a search, for the evidence was not taken from the defendant.,
In the same case the court pointed out that where there is a lawful
arrest, the arresting officer may take from defendant articles of value as evi26. 217 S.W. 2d 473 (Mo. 1949).
*Prosecuting Attorney, Ste. Genevieve County, Mo. LL.B., University of
Missouri, 1939.
1. State v. Humphrey, 217 S.W. 2d 551 (Mo. 1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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dence, and the introduction of such articles in evidence violates no constitutional provision against self-incrimination.
B. Indictment and Information
In a case in which the defendant was charged with receiving "one hog
of the goods and chattels of one

...

,"

the supreme court in affirming the

conviction held there was a sufficient description of the hog. It is sufficient
to refer to an animal in an information by the name commonly applied to it
without further description.2
It is the general tendency to sustain informations which substantially
follow the language of the statute and are sufficient to appraise defendant of
the offense with which he is charged.8
In a prosecution under the habitual criminal statute, the information
need not state the date on which defendant was discharged from his previous
conviction. It need only allege that the second offense was committed subsequent to such discharge. Nor is it necessary for the information to allege
that defendant was actually imprisoned in the penitentiary.,
In State v. Staab,5 defendant was charged with having sold mortgaged
property without the written consent of the mortgagee and without informing the purchaser that the property was mortgaged. The information contained no allegation as to the value of the mortgaged property. The supreme
court, in sustaining a conviction, found the value of the property was sufficiently stated by an allegation as to the amount of the note ($400.00), given
for purchase, the payment of which was secured by the mortgage.
II.

JURISDICTION

When a regular circuit judge disqualifies himself and requests the judge
of another circuit to try the case, failure of the record to show that a copy of
the request was sent to the Chief Justice as required by Rule 11.03, does not
deprive the judge called in of jurisdiction. Mere forwarding of such request
is not a jurisdictional matter.6
In State v. Scott,7 the supreme court questioned the validity of §§ 4038

and 4040, Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939), since adoption of the 1945 Constitution.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.

State v. Hicklin, 218 S.W. 2d 564 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Miller, 221 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Harrison, 223 S.W. 2d 476 (Mo. 1949).
223 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Massey, 219 S.W. 2d 326 (Mo. 1949).
223 S.W. 2d 453 (Mo. 1949).
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In this case the regular judge was unable to hold court at the time the case
was docketed and called in another judge. Defendant filed for change of
venue from the second judge. A new judge was not called in, but the regular
judge reappeared, disqualified himself and requested the supreme court to
transfer another judge to hear the case. This was done and the defendant
challenged the transferred judge's authority to try the case, claiming that
under § 4040, it became the duty of the second judge to call in another judge.
The supreme court, in affirming the conviction, held that the section relied
on by defendant was out of harmony with the provision of the 1945 Constitution which provides for any circuit judge to sit in any other circuit at the
request of the judge thereof and for the supreme court to make transfers of
judicial personnel from one court to another and to establish rules with
respect thereto.
III. VENUE

In two cases during the year covered, the supreme court reaffirmed
earlier holdings that it is sufficient if venue can be reasonably inferred from
the facts and circumstances in the evidence, it not being essential that venue
be shown by direct evidence. 8
In determining the question of venue, the court will take judicial notice
of the location of the roads in the State Highway system and of distances
therealong, State v. Rackman,0 and that St. Louis is in Missouri, State v.
Cobb.10 In the Cobb case, neither the City of St. Louis or the State of Missouri was mentioned in any manner in the state's evidence in chief. The
supreme court, in affirming the conviction, held that the question of the
sufficiency of state's evidence was waived when defendant did not stand on
his request for a directed verdict but proceeded to offer evidence in his own
behalf. It was then shown that defendant's residence was in St. Louis, and
that if the offense took place anywhere, it was at defendant's residence.
IV. CONINUANCES

In three cases the supreme court reaffirmed the well established principle
that the granting or refusing to grant a continuance is within the discretion
of the trial court, and an abuse of that discretion must be shown to cause
the appellate court to interfere.
8. State v. Ruckman, 222 S.W. 2d 74 (Mo. 1949); State v. Cobb, 221 S.W.
2d 745 (Mo. 1949).
9. Supra, n. 8.
10. Supra, n. 8.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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Jones,1'

In State v.
the court's refusal to grant defendant's attorney
more time to prepare for trail was upheld.
In two other cases, the trial court's refusal to grant continuance because
of the absence of a witness was likewise approved. The court pointed out
that where a continuance for this reason is sought, the affidavit in support
therefore must allege facts showing use of diligence to secure the witness, not
12
a mere conclusion that diligence was used.
V. TRIAL
A. Voir dire
In the case of State v. Heickert,3 the supreme court found it was improper for state's counsel to inquire on voir dire if any of the panel had any
possible scruples against assessing "substantial" punishment, as the state had
no right to cause prospective jurors to pledge themselves or to speculate as
to their action in certain contingencies. A qualified, selected and instructed
juror, having been attentive to the argument of counsel and to the reasoning
of his fellows, should be freed to reach a conclusion satisfactory to him upon
the evidence introduced. As counsel was not permitted to pursue this line of
questioning, the appellate court found that the panel had not improperly
committed themselves and affirmed the conviction.
In another case of first degree murder, one juror, upon questioning by
the court, stated that he knew the defendant was guilty and should have to
spend the rest of his life on a rock pile. The supreme court held it was no
abuse of the trial court's discretion to refuse to discharge the panel, upon defendant's motion to do so."4 In this same case the supreme court ruled that
the failure of prospective jurors to disclose that one was a cousin of the
wife of deceased's brother and that another's wife's mother and deceased's
grandfather were cousins did not entitle defendant to a new trial.
B. Evidence
In over half of the criminal cases which were decided by the supreme
court during 1949, points involving the admissibility of evidence were raised.
1. Confessions and admissions
Neither the fact that the defendant is under arrest or in custody when
questioned about a crime, nor that irrelevant matter, background material,.
11.
12.
13.
14.

221 S.W. 2d 137 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Massey, supra, n. 6; State v. Cooley, 221 S.W. 2d 480 (Mo. 1949).
217 S.W. 2d 561 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Scott, 223 S.W. 2d 453 (Mo. 1949).
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history, etc., is not recorded within the written confession, renders such confession involuntary.15 Nor did fear that a sister would be arrested.16
If the jury finds that one defendant read and admitted as true a statement signed by a co-defendant, then such statement is admissible against
both defendants.17
In State v. Rackmn, 18 the court, in affirming defendant's conviction,
held that acts, conduct and declarations of a defendant occuring after the
commission of an alleged crime which are relevant and tend to show his
consciousness of guilt, or a desire or disposition to conceal a crime, are admissible.
Three times during the year covered herein, the supreme court reaffirmed the principle that a confession or admission cannot be used to establish the corpus delicti unless made in open court.. There must be independent
evidence.1"
2. Proof of other crimes
In one case in which defendant was prosecuted for cheating and defrauding by use of forged and false scale tickets, the state was permitted to
introduce evidence that defendant had committed, or attempted to commit,
similar frauds on two others a month or so after the one for which he was on
trial. 20 This is the rule where scienter or intent of the accused is a necessary
element of the charge, but the law has been held to be otherwise in rape
21
cases.
In another case defendant's wife was killed in a fire which destroyed
her home. The supreme court held that it was not error to permit the prosecution to show that there was another fire five days earlier at the same place
and that defendant was observed in the rear of the house and that his hair
was singed. Proof of the previous fire was appropriate as bearing upon de22
fendant's intent and that the second fire was incendiary.
In a prosecution for murder of a policeman, the court, in sustaining
the conviction, held that evidence as to the killing of three other officers
and wounding of other persons during a gun battle which followed the shoot15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
S.W. 2d
20.
21.
22.

State v. Bartlett, 224 S.W. 2d 100 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Cooley, supra, n. 12.
Ibid.
Supra, n. 8.
State v. Humphrey, 217 S.W. 2nd 551 (Mo. 1949); State v. Hicklin, 218
564 (Mo. 1949); State v. Miller, 221 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Hotsenpiller, 224 S.W. 2d 1014 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Palmberg, 199 Mo. 233, 97 S.W. S66 (1906).
State v. Smith, 221 S.W. 2d 158 (Mo. 1949).
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ing of a policeman was part of a continuous occurrence intimately connected
with the crime for which the defendant was being tried and constituted part
2
of the res gestae. 3
3. Photographs
In State v. Bil, 4 a first degree murder case, the court approved the
admission of a photograph of the dead officer and one of the scene of the
killing, finding that such photographs were material on the question of whether the officer was killed at the spot where his body was found.
4. Discretionary matters with trial court
The admission, exclusion and scope of certain testimony is to a large
degree discretionary with the trial court.
In State v. Scott,2 5 the defense was insanity, and it was held to be
within the discretion of the trial judge to admit testimony that deceased
was a small and thin woman; to permit the coroner to testify as to the course
of the bullet and character of the wound, and to admit the introduction
in evidence of the rifle and shells.
In one case in which defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated, after the defendant had rested the state was permitted to reopen
the case for the purpose of introducing the partly filled bottle of whiskey
found in defendant's car,2 0 while in another case defendant was refused
permission to reopen the case to call defendant's partner in the alleged
crime.27 In both cases the supreme court said it was a matter within the
discretion of the trial court.
Where the defense is one of insanity, the scope of the inquiry relating
to defendant's early life is within the discretion of the trial court. 28 This
is also the case in the granting or refusing to grant a new trial on the ground
20
of newly discovered evidence.
C. Cross-examination
80

In State v. Bell where the prosecutor was surprised and the witness
was plainly hostile to the state and contradicted previous statements and
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
S.W. 2d
30.

State v. Bell, 223 S.W. 2d 469 (Mo. 1949).
Ibid.
223 S.W. 2d 453 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Peacher, 216 S.W. 2d 66 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Massey, 219 S.W. 2d 326 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Linders, 224 S.W. 2d 386 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Jones, 221 S.W. 2d 137 (Mo. 1949); State v. Pittmann, 221
163 (Mo. 1949).
Supra, n. 23.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1

16

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1949
1950]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1949

351

testimony, the prosecutor was permitted to cross-examine this witness even
though called by the state.
While the cross-examination of a defendant is limited to matters referred
to in his examination in chief, the court held in State v. Cooley,"' that it
is not reversible error if the cross-examination is not so limited, when it
develops that answers given were not harmful and could not have prejudiced
the defendant.
If defendant's counsel on cross-examination brings out a line of evidence,
not otherwise admissible, he may not, at a later time, urge error in the ad32
mission of such testimony.
D. Instructions
An interesting point pertaining to instructions, encountered in a review
of the supreme court's work for 1949, was the many failures to preserve the
error for review or to properly present it for that purpose.
In State v. Harrison,33 no motion for a new trial was filed in the lower
court, and no bill of exceptions was filed, only the record proper. Defendant
attempted to submit the instructions for review by filing a copy of them.
The supreme court, in affirming the conviction, ruled that if the complaint
does not point out in what manner the instruction is confusing or ambiguous, the assignment is not sufficient to preserve the point. 4
In State v. Cobb,35 defendant complained of error in the trial court's
refusal to give an alibi instruction. The evidence on which such an instruction could have been based was not pointed out. In the motion for a
new trial, the refusal to give nine different instructions, including the one
dealing with alibi, was assigned as error. Such assignment was held to be
too general and indefinite to present any criticism of the lower court's action
for review. In this case the supreme court also held that error in the trial
court's failure to instruct on defendant's good character was not preserved
as the defendant in his motion for a new trial did not specifically complain
of this, but stated, "the court committed error in failing to instruct on all the
law of the case." This was not sufficient, nor was mere assignment that the
refusal of the instruction was error, followed by the quotation of the instruction in full.36
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.

221 S.W. 2d 480 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Massey, supra n. 27.
223 S.W. 2d 476 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Cooley, supra, n. 31.
221 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 1949).
State v. Heickert, 217 S.W. 2d 561 (Mo. 1949).
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The supreme court was called upon to reaffirm the logical proposition
that instructions must be based upon the evidence.,, Consequently, an
instruction which purports to cover the whole case and entirely ignores
a defense supported by evidence is erroneous and constitutes reversible
s
error.
E. Argument of counsel
Where defendant has taken the stand, the prosecutor is permitted to
refer to him in the closing argument as a "convicted felon.",,, In another
case, defendant did not take the stand and the state in its closing argument
said, "I want to say this in conclusion, there isn't any evidence, any denial
of it at all." The supreme court affirmed the conviction, finding that such
statement was not a comment on defendant's failure to testify in his own
behalf, 40 nor were words, "uncontradicted evidence." 4 '
In State v. Mer,42 the argument of counsel was improper, but defendant received the lightest punishment possible, and the court said such
improper argument did not necessitate a reversal.
In another case where the prosecutor made an improper statement to
the jury and the court, upon motion to do so, admonished the jury not to
consider such statement, but no motion to discharge the jury was made, the
supreme court affirmed the conviction as the trial judge did all that was
48
requested of him and there was nothing upon which to predicate error.
F. Verdict
The court ruled that under previous state decisions a jury's verdict
finding defendant "guilty as charged in the information" without specifying
4
the crime is sufficient if it continues on and fixes the punishment. '
VI.

SPECIFIC OFFENSES

In State v. Ruckma/n, the owner of a truck left it parked along a
highway for several days when the tire blew out. While it was so parked,
defendant took it. The court sustained a conviction of larceny of a motor
37. State v. Cobb, 221 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 1949); State v. Massey, 219 S.W.
2d 326 (Mo. 1949); State v. Bartlett, 224 S.W. 2d 100 (Mo. 1949).
38. State v. Daugherty, 216 S.W. 2d 467 (Mo. 1949).
39. State v. Jones, 221 S.W. 2d 137 (Mo. 1949).
40. State v. Hotsenpiller, 224 S.W. 2d 1014 (Mo. 1949).
41. State v. Butler, 221 S.W. 2d 160 (Mo. 1949).
42. 221 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo. 1949).
43. State v. Heickert, supra, n .36.
44. State v. Fly, 217 S.W. 2d 385 (Mo. 1949); State v. Staab, 223 S.W. 2d
496 (Mo. 1949).
45. 222 S.W. 2d 74 (Mo. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1

18

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1949

1950] . WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1949

353

vehicle, for although the owner was not exercising actual dominion over the
truck when it was parked, he had the power to deal with it as the owner to
the exclusion of other persons. It was in his custody to such an extent as
to render its unauthorized taking felonious and hence a larceny.
In sustaining a conviction of rape, the supreme court affirmed the
rule that corroboration is not essential to prove the act of sexual intercourse,
at least unless the testimony of the prosecutrix is contradictory and in
conflict with the physical facts, the surrounding circumstances and ordinary
experience." In another case in which defendant was charged with burglary
with intent to kidnap and to rape, the supreme court, in reversing the conviction and ordering the defendant discharged, reaffirmed the view that the
intent is an essential element of the offense of rape which must be established
beyond a reasonable doubt. The court found that the evidence did not
support the verdict of intent to rape or kidnap. For kidnapping there must
be a restraint of liberty against the will of the victim and to constitute
rape there must be force to such an extent as to overcome any resistance
by the victim. 47
In State v. Rasl, defendant was convicted of manslaughter. As a
means of proving its case, the state called defendant's son who related what
his father had told him about the fight . His testimony was not contradicted
or disputed in any detail, and the court found all the necessary elements of
self-defense in this testimony. After the state proved that the death resulted
from stab wounds its evidence went on to prove that the defendant inflicted
the wounds in self-defense, and the defendant is entitled to the benefit of any
matters of justification which appear in the evidence introduced by the state.
The state thus failed to prove that the death was the result of a criminal
agency, and the court reversed the conviction, ordering the defendant
discharged.
VII. SECOND OFFENDERS

In one case in which the so-called habitual criminal statute was before
the supreme court it was held that it is not necessary to allege and prove
imprisonment to make the act applicable. The act makes the previous conviction and a discharge therefrom the basis for the a3ded punishment. It
does not specifically require incarceration in the penitentiary but only that
defendant has been discharged from his conviction. It is not necessary to
46. State v. Weekly, 223 S.W. 2d 494 (Mo. 1949).
47. State v. Brown, 217 S.W. 2d 546 (Mo. 1949).
48. 221 S.W. 2d 124 (Mo. 1949).
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show that accused was imprisoned or that he served his sentence.49 In
another case defendant, because of his good behavior, was discharged after
serving three-fourths of the time for which he was sentenced, and the
supreme court in sustaining his conviction under this act held that one
released on conditional commutation is amenable to prosecution and punishment as an habitual criminal.5"
EVIDENCE
A. WRiGHT*

JACKSON

The questions of evidence discussed or passed upon by the Supreme
Court of Missouri in 1949 are in accord with established rules, and in only
twenty-one cases were questions presented worthy of note.
JUDICIAL NOTICE

In the following cases, the supreme court took judicial notice of facts
within the common knowledge of people. In Yeaman v. Storms,' the court
noted that reaction time is required for a motorist to apply brakes on an
automobile. That reaction time is normal was likewise noted in the case
of Turner v. College Amusement Co., 2 in which the court states that it is
common experience that one cannot see as well immediately upon entering
a dimly lighted theatre as after one's eyes have had a little time to react
to such a condition. The court also recognized that blind street intersections
are points of danger for the traveling public, 8 that a reasonable slant in
sidewalks for drainage purposes is common and necessary, 4 that gasoline
is an inflammable liquid,6 and that the standard guage of railroad tracks
is 4 feet 8% inches. 6
RELEVANCY, MATERIALITY AND COMPENTENCY

Competency in General
Pike v.

Menz7

was an action to determine title to land. The court

held that testimony by the plaintiff regarding a contract with the decedent
49. State v. Harrison, 223 S.W. 2d 476 (Mo. 1949).
50. State v. Montgomery, 223 S.W. 2d 463 (Mo. 1949).
*Attorney, Mexico. B.S., University of Missouri, 1940, LL.B., 1944.
1. 217 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1948, rehearing denied 1949).
2. 217 S.W. 2d .04 (Mo. 1949).

3. Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers, 221 S.W. 2d 831 (Mo. 1949).
4. Fletcher v. North Mehornay Furniture Co., 222 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1949).
5.

Dodson v. Maddox, 223 S.W. 2d 434 (Mo. 1949).

6. Hunt v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.R., 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
7.

218 S.W. 2d 575 (Mo. 1949).
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was competent, and could not be excluded by the defendant, where such
testimony, even though contrary to the dead man's statute, was elicited
from the witness on cross examination by the attorney for the defendant
and where the answers to the questions were responsive to the questions
asked.
In Hamilton v. Patton Creamery Co.,8 the plaintiff testified on a deposition contrary to his testimony at the trial. The court held that the
plaintiff was not bound by this testimony in the deposition, but, since there
was contrary testimony at the trial, it was a question for the jury. In the
same case, the court held that the admission of photographs in evidence
was competent evidence, even though the photographs were taken a year
after the collision in question had occurred. There was prior testimony
that the lay of the land was substantially the same as at the time of
the collision. Also, they held it was in the discretion of the trail court
to admit an engineer's plat of the lay of the land, and not prejudicial error
to exclude such plat where the evidence was clear, and there was no dispute
as to distances, width of the road, and lay of the land. Likewise, in Boulos
v. Kansas City Public Service Co.,9 the court held that the introduction of
photographs must, to a great extent, be left to the discretion of the trial
court. It held photographs were admissible, if relevant, to show the condition of a person at the particular time, the same as they can be admitted
to show the condition of inanimate objects. In this instance, the photographs were taken sometime prior to the time of the accident.

CRoss ExAMINATION
In a prosecution for murder, one Ora Belle Scott was called as a witness
for the State. She had previously given a statement to the prosecution,
and had testified in favor of the prosecution on a preliminary hearing.
However, on the stand during the trial, the witness changed her testimony.
The State claimed surprise, and was permitted to cross-examine. The court,
in State v. Bell,10 held that it was not error to permit such cross examination,
since the witness was plainly hostile, and the prosecution had shown
surprise.
ADMISSIONS AND CONFESSIONS
McComb v. Vaughn", involved an action by three plaintiffs, one for
8.
9.
10.
11.

222
223
223
218

S.W. 2d 713
S.W. 2d 446
S.W. 2d 469
S.W. 2d 548

(Mo. 1949).
(Mo. 1949).
(Mo. 1949).
(Mo. 1949).
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wrongful death of the deceased husband, one for personal injuries, and one
for property damage, against a defendant truck driver, whose truck had
collided with a motorcycle. There was a judgment for the plaintiffs and
the defendant appealed. The action arose out of an accident involving a
motorcycle ridden by decedent and a truck driven by the defendant. The
defendant offered evidence that the decedent, about forty-five minutes
prior to the time of the accident, had stated that he had been riding the
motorcycle without lights, and that the car lights on the highway were
blinding him. The trial court excluded said evidence, and the defendant
alleged the exclusion as error. The court discusses the difference between
"admissions" and "declarations against interest." The court states that an
admission is competent only when made by a party to an action or by someone identified in legal interest with a party to the action. It is admissible
although the party is available as a witness.
A declaration against interest, on the other hand, is secondary evidence,
and is an exception to the hearsay rule. It need not be made by a party to
the action or one in privity, but must be a statement adverse to a pecuniary
or proprietary, or penal interest possessed by the declarant at the time the
statement is made. Considering the statement in evidence, the court held
that the evidence was properly excluded, since the decedent was not a
party or in privity, and that the statement was not against the decedent's
pecuniary or proprietary interest at the time it was made. The court pointed
out that although it was against the penal interest of the decedent, it was
not error to exclude it because the statement would tend to show only that
the decedent had negligently operated the motorcycle some forty-five
minutes prior to the accident, and that such evidence of prior negligence was
12
collateral to the issues of the case.
Munday v. Aitstin18 was an action by an execution purchaser for an
injunction against foreclosure, and for the canceling of notes and deed of
trust on certain real estate, on the grounds that the notes and deed of trust
were without consideration, having been given as accommodation paper
only. The evidence of no consideration was in the form of sworn schedules
and testimony of the defendant-payee in notes in a prior bankruptcy proceeding, to the effect that the notes were without consideration and were
12. In this connection, see proposed Missouri Evidence Code (1948), Article
III, Admissions and Confessions, Section 301, and Article XI, Section 11.08, Hearsay
Evidence-Statements Against Interest.
13. 218 S.W. 2d 624 (Mo. 1949).
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given for accommodation. Defendant objected on the grounds that such
evidence was not sufficient to overcome the presumption of consideration.
The court states that such inventroies, schedules, and records in bankruptcy
constitute judicial admissions; that they may be introduced in evidence
even in other proceedings, where parties are not identical, and in other
courts. However, in such cases, the admissions are not conclusive, and may
be explained or contradicted, and sometimes are even incompetent. However, here they were uncontradicted, and since the defendant-payee and
the defendant-maker were in privity and acting together in the defense of
this suit, with the same counsel, and making the same defenses, and since
the defendant-maker did not seek to cross-examine the defendant-payee
and was shown to have been acting with the defendant-payee, the testimony
was binding upon both.
The question of admissions was again presented in the case of Harvey
v. Gardner,1 4 which was an action by Harvey against a bus line and two
railroads. The petition alleged negligence against the bus line in that the
driver failed to stop the bus before entering onto the railroad tracks. The
plaintiff settled the case against the bus line, and went to trial against the
railroads. The railroads introduced the plaintiff's petition in evidence, and
claimed that the plaintiff was bound conclusively by allegations of the petition regarding negligence of the bus driver, which defendants alleged showed
that the sole cause of the collision was the negligence of the bus driver. The
court held that there is a difference between admissions against interest in
pleadings, and their use as pleadings. The court states, "as a general rule,
multiple pleas may not be used as admissions upon another issue in the
same case because they do not possess the characteristics inherent in admissions against interest. If properly put in evidence, it is only evidence
to be considered by the jury with other evidence, and is not conclusive."
PRESUMPTIONS AND INFERENCES

1 5 which was an action under the Federal EmIn Grifflt v. Gardner,
ployer's Liability Act against a railroad, testimony was admitted that a
"wheel report," a record covering the train involved, had been destroyed
after the suit was filed. The court, in conformity with prior opinions, held
that where material evidence is destroyed by a party, an inference arises

14. 223 S.W. 2d 428 (Mo. 1949).
15. 217 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

23

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1950], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. is

unfavorable to the spoiler, and that the jury may infer that the destroyed
evidence would be unfavorable to him. Likewise, in Ewing v. McIntoslh,0
the court stated the rule to the effect that the failure of a party having
knowledge of the facts and circumstances vitally affecting the issues on trial
to testify in his own behalf, or to call witnesses, within his power to call,
who have knowledge of such facts and circumstances, raises a strong presumption and inference that the evidence of such persons, including himself,, would have been unfavorable.
PAROL EVIDEN CE RULE

Mitchell v. Philippi was a suit for compensation for services for producing a buyer for defendant's business. The plaintiff and defendant entered
into a written contract under which the plaintiff granted the defendant an
option to purchase the business for $50,000. Oral evidence was introduced
to show that the contract was for the plaintiff to sell the business, and that
plaintiff was to receive a commission of all over $50,000 received. Plaintiff
produced a buyer ready and willing to purchase, and brought suit for
commission. The defendant objected to the introduction of the testimony,
on the grounds that it violated the parol evidence rule, and that the written
contract must speak for itself. The court overruled this contention, stating,
"the general rule is well established that where parties have put their contract in writing, in the absence of fraud, accident or mistake, the law presumes that the writing embodies the agreement between them, and extrinsic evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the terms thereof.
But there are many exceptions to this rule which are as thoroughly established as the rule itself." The court then quotes Bowers v. Bell: "Among
these numerous exceptions is one, firmly established, to the effect that
even where a written contract exists between the parties touching the same
general subject-matter, extrinsic evidence may nevertheless be admissible
in proof of a prior or contemporaneous collateral parol agreement between
them, separate and distinct from that contained in the writing itself, and
not be inherently in conflict with the latter"'- Also, in Miller v. Haberrman,D
where relief was sought on the basis of mistake, parol evidence was admitted
to show the intention of the parties to the deed. In Tucker v. Holder,20 it
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

222 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1949).
223 S.W. 2d 441 (Mo. 1949).
193 Mo. App. 210, 218, 182 S.W. 1068, 1070 (1916).
224 S.W. 2d 1002 (Mo. 1949).
225 S.W. 2d 123 (Mo. 1949).
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was held that parol evidence was not admissible in construction of a deed
naming the grantees and the "heirs of the bodies of the grantees by their
marriage," since there was no ambiguity, and the deed as written created
a life estate in the grantees and a remainder in fee in the heirs-determinative upon the death of the surviving husband, so that no ambiguity existing,
no parol evidence could be admitted.
EXPERT AND OPINION EVIDENCE
Bristow,2' the court

In Norris v.
refers to the rule that lay witnesses,
testifying as to the sanity of a testator, must testify to facts upon which
such opinion is based. This rule is again affirmed in Vaughlb v. Vaughn, 2 in
which the court states that the testimony of such lay witnesses can be
excluded unless they testify to sufficient facts to qualify them to give
an opinion.
In Hyman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.,,2 the court held that
a supervising architect, who was shown to be familiar with construction
methods and materials in tile construction, and who had worked with such
tile construction over a period of twenty-five years, would not be considered
a lay witness, and was qualified to speak as an expert witness.
HEARSAY
The court pointed out in State v. Morris,2 4 that in administrative

hearings, although technical rules may be relaxed, hearsay evidence and
conclusions based upon hearsay evidence do not qualify as "competent and
substantial evidence upon the whole record" essential to the validity of a
final decision of an administrative officer or body, and that the basic rules
of evidence must be followed in such administrative proceedings.
THE HUMANITARIAN DOCTRINE
WILLiAr
H. BECKER, JR.*
It is believed by many that the general use of the term "humanitarian
doctrine" to designate the common law last clear chance rule, as well as the
true humanitarian rule, has contributed to the difficulties of the supreme
court in dealing with the humanitarian doctrine.
21. 219 S.W. 2d 367 (Mo. 1949).
22.

221

S.W. 2d 170 (Mo. 1949).

23. 225 S.W. 2d 734 (Mo. 1949).
24. 221 S.W. 2d 206 (Mo. 1949).

*Attorney, Columbia. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1932.
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There are three principal fact situations in which a plaintiff is permitted to recover at common law, despite contributory negligence.
These fact situations are restated as follows:
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 1:
The peril to plaintiff's person, property, or both results from physical
helplessness caused by plaintiff's lack of care. Defendant actually
discovers the peril in time, thereafter, with safety to himself, to
avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise of care. This is a simple
last clear chance case. The plaintiff may recover for personal injury
and property damage despite his negligence in practically all common law jurisdictions. This result is well settled in Missouri and
not expected to be challenged; but this is not a humanitarian negligence case.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 2:
The facts are the same as in Case 1, except that the defendant
does not actually discover the peril, but in the exercise of care he
should have discovered it in time to avoid damage, by the exercise
of care and with safety to himself. As in Case 1, a majority of
courts permit plaintiff to recover for personal injury or property
damage under the last clear chance rule. This is not a humanitarian
negligence case, and the rule is not expected to be challenged.
Common Law Last Clear Chance Case No. 3:
The peril to plaintiff's person, property or both, results from
plaintiff's negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness in Missouri judicial parlance). Defendant (as in Case 1) actually discovers the
peril, in time, thereafter to avoid damage to plaintiff by the exercise
of care. This is a last clear chance case. It is not a humanitarian
case. The rule that plaintiff may recover seems settled in Missouri
and elsewhere.
The true Missouri humanitarian doctrine goes further and permits recovery when both parties involved are oblivious or inattentive. It is here
illustrated as follows:
True HumanitarianCase, Case No. 4:
The injured person, his property, or both, are in a position of
imminent peril as a result of his negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness). The injured party could extricate himself from his peril
by his own efforts, if he were aware of his peril and used care. The
defendant or party against whom claim for damages is made does
not actually discover the peril of the injured party. Nevertheless,
in the exercise of care the party causing injury should have discovered the peril in time thereafter with safety to himself by the
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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use of care to have avoided injury to the plaintiff. In other words
the party causing injury is also inattentive (oblivious). The
Missouri courts permit recovery by the injured party in this case;
and in this respect are more liberal than courts of other jurisdictions.
The wide spread use of automobiles has caused much embarrassment
to the Missouri Supreme Court in applying its unique humanitarian rule.
When the doctrine was conceived in Missouri the usual case involved a
steam locomotive on the one hand and a pedestrian or person riding in a
comparatively flimsy horse-drawn vehicle on the other. The pedestrian or
occupant of the horse-drawn vehicle was ordinarily the only party sustaining personal injury and suing therefor, so it was not necessary to determine
whether any liability for the occurrence rested upon the injured person.
Now in the automobile age, two cars may approach each other headon or at an angle, collide and cause personal injures to both operators under
circumstances where each may make a submissible case under the humanitarian rule against the other. In such a case both operators are guilty of
negligent inattentiveness (obliviousness) and negligent failure to avoid the
collision by timely action. On a basis of relative fault there is nothing to
choose between the two operators on the issue of causation. No distinction
can be made between the effects of the negligence of the two operators.,
Under the circumstances set forth in the foregoing paragraph the logical
inconsistency of the Missouri humanitarian rule becomes apparent. For
example, suppose in the fact situation mentioned in the foregoing paragraph,
that one operator sues the other for damages resulting from personal injuries,
basing his claim for recovery on the humanitarian rule. Then suppose that
the other operator, defendant in the cause, files a counterclaim for damages
resulting from personal injuries an-l bases his counterclaim on the Missouri
humanitarian rule. May they recover from each other simultaneously?
May neither recover? Or does the first to file suit have the right of recovery
alone?
These are questions which must be determined eventually.
It is suggested that the problem involved in the true humanitarian cases
is causing a severe reaction and retrenchment in the administration of the
common law last clear chance rule. In other words the Supreme Court of
Missouri is becoming less liberal in the application of the common law last
1. The author of the annotation in 92 A. L. R. 47 advances the theory that
the last clear chance rule is really a rule of proximate cause.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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clear chance cases as an indirect result of the difficulties inherent in administration of the true humanitarian rule.
This conservative trend, or reactionary trend, in the application of
the common law last clear chance rule occurs in this way. The Bar and the
Bench in Missouri have loosely applied the term "humanitarian doctrine,"
not only to cases falling under the true humanitarian rule, but also to common last clear chance cases. As a result any criticism of the humanitarian
rule is usually interpreted as a criticism of the common law last clear chance
rule. Then, there are certain elements common to both last clear chance
cases and true humanitarian cases. Some of the common elements are:
"imminent peril" (its nature and extent); the time factor in the ability to
avoid injury; the space factor and the ability to avoid injury; the item of
constructive notice; and perhaps others. Concern over liability of the true
humanitarian doctrine has initiated a trend toward restricting the operation of the true humanitarian doctrine. This trend has taken the form of
limiting the zone and time when imminent peril exists; and of lowering the
standard of care required of machine operators in the avoiding of injury to
the party in peril. This process affects not only humanitarian cases, but
classic last clear chance cases having elements common to humanitarian
cases. If the true humanitarian case, it is narrowed in a common law last
clear chance case No. 3, supra.
If the constructive notice requirements are made more favorable to the
defendant in a true humanitarian case, these requirements are made more
favorable to the defendant in a common law last clear chance case No. 2.
On the broad front, in negligence cases there is a group interest in
doctrines of judicial liberality in permitting recovery. Some are motivated
by pecuniary interest, some by concepts of social welfare, and some by
"humanitarian" ideals. On the other hand opposing views are held by persons motivated by economic and pecuniary considerations, legal beliefs, and
by tradition.
The first group supports the humanitarian rule in Missouri on the basis
simply that it is humanitarian and permits the cost of catastrophe to be
passed on to some portion of the public. It is suggested here that those interested in liberal doctrines of damage recovery who advocate retention of
the present Missouri humanitarian doctrine are contributing to reaction in
the last clear chance cases, thwarting their general purpose.
No statistical count has been made, but it is suggested that a high percentage, perhaps 90%, of the total number of last clear chance and humanihttps://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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tarian cases c6mbined could be submitted under the common law last clear
chance rule. Usually the submitting instruction requires the jury to find
with respect to defendant's conduct that he saw or in the exercise of care
should have seen the plaintiff in a position of imminent peril. Where the peril
is caused by negligent inattentiveness of the plaintiff, this is a submission under the last clear chance rule (case No. 3, supra) and the humanitarian rule
in the alternative. If the true humanitarian rule were not available such a case
would be submitted under a requirement that the jury find that the defendant was actually aware of or saw the plaintiff in imminent peril. Opinions
may differ, but it is believed that ordinarily a jury would find for the plaintiff
under such a common law last clear chance rule and humanitarian doctrine
submission. If that is true, a great deal would be lost by revoking the
humanitarian doctrine in Missouri. On the other hand, it is suggested that
a great deal may eventually be lost to those interested in liberal doctrines of
recovery by the existing conservative trend covering last clear chance cases
as well as humanitarian cases.
The common law last clear chance rule goes far toward relieving some
of the harsh consequences of the rule of contributory negligence. If it is
desired to abolish the rule of contributory negligence would it not be better
to do so by statute substituting some doctrine of proportional fault, comparative negligence or other device making contributory negligence considerable only in mitigation of damages? If liability in negligence cases is
based upon fault, comparative or otherwise, causing injury, the Missouri
humanitarian rule does not fit the general picture.
During the year of 1949 the decisions of the Missouri Supreme Court
followed the trend observed toward restricting the application of the
humanitarian doctrine and more important toward restricting the application
of the common law last clear chance rule administered under the same name.
In other words it is getting harder in Missouri to make a submissible
plaintiff's case under the true humanitarian rule and under the common law
last clear chance rule. That is the result of the trend regardless of the intentions of the lawyers or of the judges.
The cases decided in 1949 are discussed immediately hereafter.
The Court Egn Banc
Claridge v.
is an example of the denial of recovery in a common law last clear chance case as a result of the conservative reaction origAnzolone2

2.

220 S.W. 2d 32 (Mo. 1949).
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inating from dissatisfaction with the humanitarian doctrine. As stated by
Judge Hyde in his dissent in this case, the court's decisions in the past, particularly in Gank v. Chicago, R. 1. & P. Ry. 3 would seem to support the view
that the plaintiff made a submissible case.
The Claridgecase arose out of a collision at a street intersection between.
a motorcycle operated by the plaintiff and a truck driven by the defendant's
employee. It is stated that the case went to the jury solely under the humanitarian rule. The streets intersected at right angles, one running north
and south and the other running east and west. Each street was over 36
feet wide from curb to curb. There were buildings along the sidewalk line
on all four corners and no warning or stop sign on either street. The collision occurred during daylight at a time when the weather was clear and the
pavement dry. Plaintiff was operating his motorcycle with sidecar north on
the east or righthand side of one street and the defendant's employee was
operating defendant's truck westwardly on the north side of the east-west
street. The collision occurred in the northeast quadrant of the intersection.
The evidence favorable to the plaintiff showed that the plaintiff was traveling 18 or 20 miles an hour and continued that speed until the moment of
collision; that the plaintiff when about 5 feet from entry into the intersection
saw defendant's truck 60 feet from entry into the intersection traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour and felt that he had plenty of time to cross
and proceeded across the intersection; that when plaintiff was about threefourths of the way across and saw that defendant's employee was.not going
to stop, he attempted to avoid the collision by turning to the left. The plaintiff testified that he kept his eye on the truck from the time he started across
the intersection and continued to think that the truck was going to stop or
slow down. He stated that the truck did not swerve or slacken its speed'
from the time he first saw it until the collision. The right front fender of the
truck struck the right rear side of the motorcycle. As is not uncommon,
plaintiff's estimate of the speed and distances could not be reconciled. The
plaintiff stated that he could have crossed safely by increasing the speed of
his motorcycle.
The court assumes that the defendant's truck driver was equally aware
of the movement of the two vehicles, concluding that each driver went on
his way without slackening speed. Treating the case as one considerably
under the humanitarian rule the court concluded that imminent peril arose
at the spot and after it became apparent that the plaintiff would cross the
3. 319 Mo. 214, 6 S.W. 2d 39 (Mo. 1928).
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center line of the east-west street and drive into the path of the truck, and
when it became apparent that under the existing speed he would not clear
the crossing before collision and did not intend to increase his speed. Ruling
from this premise, the court held that no humanitarian (last clear chance?)
case was made. It is stated that only by sheer speculation and conjecture,
and by dissecting a second of time into fractions and guessing at the space
between the vehicles, could a jury find that the truck driver could have
avoided the collision after the plaintiff, fully aware, drove into his path.
The case was reversed outright, although Judge Hyde dissented on the
ground that a submissible case could have been made, since the slightest
slackening or swerving by the truck driver might have permitted the motorcycle driver to have crossed.4
The Claridge case is not a true humanitarian case. On the facts as
stated in the opinion it is clear that neither the truck driver nor the plaintiff was oblivious to the approach of the other vehicle. The case is a common
law last clear chance case No. 2 or No. 3, supra. It seems to represent a restriction of the application of the common law last clear chance rule. This
seems to be a result of the conservative trend apparent for some time resulting from dissatisfaction with the true humanitarian formula. Particularly
emphatic is the special concurring opinion of Judge Conkling, dealing with
submission of cases for failure to act where only a second or split second is
available for action. Judge Conkling has earlier expressed a mild criticism
of the extension of the humanitariari doctrine far beyond its original concept.
Part of Judge Conkling's observations in the Claridge case are as
follows:
"It seems to me that view and contention contrary is but the
old story of being able to tell after the event what should have been
done, when the critics were not there and were confronted with
neither the emergency nor the problem of avoiding collision.
"It is not difficult for a litigant, his counsel, a witness or even
a juror to look at a situation through the eyes of Mr. Hindsight.
There is always a Mr. Hindsight. Sometimes he goes about humble
daily tasks. Sometimes he sits in his law office. Sometimes as
counsel he conducts the cause in court. Sometimes he testifies as a
4. In 1950 in a common law last clear chance case No. 2 ("inextricable discoverable peril" in the words of Judge Tipton) the liberal rule of the "almost
escaping" cases (Gann v. C. R. I. P. Ry., supra n. 3) is explained in an opinion of ther
court en banc. Hunt v. Chicago M. St. P. & P. RR., 225 S.W. 2d 738 (Mo. 1950).
As recognized by Judge Tipton in the court's opinion, the explanation may, in the
opinion of some, constitute a limitation of the rule of the Gann case.
5. Smith v. Siedhoff, 209 S.W. 2d 233, 236 (Mo. 1948).
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witness. Often he serves on the jury. He sees clearly and glibly
recites how a past occurrence could have been better managed, but,
much more likely, if the responsibility had been his, he would have
been worried sick and probably would not have done half as well."
Certainly these remarks deal with a question applicable to all negligence cases.
Could it not be true that, during a given period of time, in total numbers
far more primary negligence and last clear chance cases will be critically
affected by opinions such as this, than all the true humanitarian cases which
would occur?
Division Number One
Graham v. Consolidated Forwarding Co.6 was an action for personal
injuries arising out of a motor tractor (not farm tractor) and motorcycle
collision. The collision occurred at a street intersection in day light. The
motorcycle was being operated on a north-south street which had the rightof-way over traffic on the intersecting east-west street, by virtue of stop
signs on the east-west street at the intersection. The plaintiff was aware
at all times of the approach of the defendant's vehicle but expected defendant's vehicle to stop before entering the intersection, which plaintiff said it
did not. When it became apparent that defendant's tractor was not going
to stop, plaintiff's speed was such that he was unable to avoid the collision.
The defendant's driver testified that he did not see the motorcycle until
it passed in front of his tractor. The court held that a submissible case was
made and distinguished the case from Yeaman v. Storms,7 on the principle
ground that the plaintiff, rather than the defendant, in the case at bar had
the right-of-way, while in the Yeaman case the defendant had the right-ofway. This is really a last clear chance case No. 2 supra. The plaintiff was
in imminent peril and unable to extricate himself, although aware thereof.
The defendant was inattentive but in the exercise of care could have avoided
the injury after peril arose.
Division Number Two
Weis v. Melvin grew out of a collision between automobiles at a street
intersection on a clear day. The collision occurred on the southwest quadrant of the intersection 31 feet south of the point at 'vhich defendant's
6. 221 S.W. 2d 733 (Mo. 1949).
7. 217 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1948).
8. 219 S.W. 2d 310 (Mo. 1949).
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southbound automobile entered the intersection. The defendant approached
the intersection, slowed to five or six miles per hour, changed gears, and proceeded to cross the intersection traveling not over ten miles per hour; she
testified that she did not see plaintiff until the instant of the impact although
he was clearly approaching and entering the intersection at about 20 miles
per hour (plaintiff's testimony). It could be fairly inferred that the defendant did see plaintiff entering the intersection with plaintiff oblivious
to the approach of defendant's car and apparently intent on crossing the
intersection without stopping. "The defendant could have stopped her car
instantly," at five or six miles per hour. At any rate, she had the ability to
avoid the collision by stopping after the plaintiff came in a position of
imminent peril. The impact occurred after plaintiff's car had proceeded
at least 111/ feet into the intersection. Plaintiff testified that he saw defendant's automobile two or three car lengths prior to its entry into the
intersection, and thereafter was inattentive and oblivious to its further
approach, and considered the intersection clear as he started across. The
opinion states that the case was submitted on the "humanitarian theory."
The instructions submitting the case are not set forth or abstracted in the
opinion. This case was submissible as a common law last clear case, No. 3,
supra. It was also submissible as a true humanitarian case, No. 4. And as
the practice goes both theories could have been submitted in the alternative
with the principal instruction containing the phrase, "defendant saw or in
the exercise of the highest degree of care could have seen" the plaintiff in a
position of imminent peril caused obliviousness. The property of the submission of this case as a true humanitarian case was not discussed. The
jury's verdict was against the plaintiff. The trial court granted a new trial
on the ground that there was no evidence upon which to base a sole cause
instruction given at the request of the defendant. The order of the trial
court in granting a new trial was affirmed. The court held that the defendant's own testimony that defendant failed to keep a lookout laterally in
the direction from which plaintiff's car was approaching established that
she was not free from negligence contributing to the collision; therefore, the
giving of the sole cause instruction was error.
This case is one of the type constantly recurring where two inattentive
automobile operators drive their cars into collision with each possessing the
ability to avoid the collision after the peril of collision has arisen. If both
parties sustained personal injuries and had sued each other by petition and
counterclaim, each relying upon the true humanitarian doctrine the major
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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question in the administration of the humanitarian doctrine would have
been squarely presented.
Jarboe v. Kansas City Public Service Co." was an action by a trolley
bus passenger against the company operating the bus for personal injuries
sustained when the bus suddenly stopped at a street intersection to avoid
collision with an automobile whose operator failed to yield the right-of-way
belonging to the bus. It was the contention of the defendant bus company
that its operator was required to slacken the speed of the bus suddenly to
avoid collision with the automobile as the automobile passed a stop sign
without stopping and crossed in front of the bus at the street intersection.
The jury found for the bus company which defended on the ground that the
acts of the automobile operator constituted the sole cause of plaintiff's
injury.
The plaintiff's case was submitted upon the res ipsa loquitisr theory,
under which general negligence of the bus company predicated on the passenger-carrier relationship and the unusual occurrence was submitted. In
addition to the sole cause instruction the defendant gave an emergency instruction submitting the emergency caused by the automobile's preceeding
suddenly and directly in front of the bus, as a circumstance in determining whether the bus operator exercised the highest degree of care. A defendant's emergency instruction in a case submitted under the "humanitarian doctrine" was condemned in Teague v. Plaza Express Company.10 In
the Jarboe case, the giving of the emergency instruction and of the sole
cause instruction were assigned as error on appeal by the plaintiff. The
court held that no reversible error was committed assuming that a humanitarian case'- had been made by the plaintiff. It was held that the plaintiff
had the option of submitting his case under general negligence as a res ipsa
loquitur case or as a humanitarian case.1 2 It was further held that the failure of the plaintiff to request an instruction submitting the humanitarian
doctrine constituted an abandonment of the humanitarian doctrine as a
basis of liability. Therefore, it was held that the emergency instruction was
not error and that the evidence supported the submission of sole cause as a
defense.
9. 220 S.W. 2d 27 (Mo. 1949).
10. 190 S.W. 2d 254 (Mo. 1945).

11. Last clear chance case No. 3 since the defendant's evidence showed that
the operator was at all times aware of the approach of the automobile?
12. The court noted that a humanitarian case may be proved and submitted
under a plea of general negligence.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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This appears to have been really a last clear chance case No. 3 and
not a true humanitarian case. It directly holds that a passenger suing a
carrier for hire (1) may plead general negligence and submit the case to the
jury upon general negligence, (2) upon the "humanitarian doctrine" (including the last clear chance doctrine); and (3) that if it is submitted solely
upon general negligence the giving of an emergency instruction is not error.
Long recognized principles were applied in determining the propriety of the
defendant's sole cause instruction.
Liles v. Associated Transports,33 although denominated a humanitarian
case, was truly a last clear chance case No. 2. The fact situation was an
uncommon one. The defendant was operating a long tractor-trailer outfit in the same direction as the plaintiff was traveling in his automobile.
Plaintiff was following and overtaking defendant's tractor-trailer outfit.
Intending to turn to the left and across the open highway into a driveway,
the operator of the tractor-trailer outfit first drove onto the shoulder on his
right side before making the left turn across the highway. The plaintiff was
unaware of the driver's intention and proceeded to overtake the tractortrailer outfit at such a speed that, when the defendant turned the tractortrailer outfit to the left and headed across the highway, the plaintiff was unable to avoid the collision by his own efforts. This was a case where the
plaintiff is in peril and unable to extricate himself. On the other hand after
the situation of imminent peril developed, the oblivious defendant operating
the tractor-trailer outfit, could have avoided the collision by stopping or
swerving to the right. The court held that a submissible case of "humanitarian" negligence was made by the plaintiff and against the defendant.
In this case, the right to recover for plaintiff's property damage was
submitted separately by an assignee, plaintiff's insurer. Recovery was sustained. This was a common law last clear chance case No. 2. If this had
been a true humanitarian case the question of the assignees right to recover
property damage under the true humanitarian doctrine would have been
squarely presented.
Ayres v. Key 14 arose out of an automobile-pedestrian collision occurring
in daylight at the intersection of Grand Avenue and Lindell Boulevard in
St. Louis. The case was possibly submissible as a primary negligence case,
but the plaintiff submitted it under the humanitarian doctrine alone.
13. 220 S.W. 2d 36 (Mo. 1949).
14. 221 S.W. 2d 719 (Mo. 1949).
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When defendant's automobile struck plaintiff, it was proceeding in a
curved path making a right turn from Lindell into intersecting Grand Avenue. The plaintiff was crossing Lindell from south to north. Plaintiff was
aware of the approach of defendant's automobile but was unaware of defendant's intention to turn right and consequently was oblivious to his peril.
Defendant was aware of the presence of the group of pedestrians with whom
plaintiff was traveling. Defendant testified that plaintiff walked into the
side of his car but the jury found against him. So this is a case where both
parties admit being fully aware of the presence of the other. The plaintiff
is in peril because he does not know of the defendant's intention to turn in
his direction. The defendant knowing his own intention and of the presence
of the plaintiff is aware of plaintiff's peril but does not use care to avoid him.
This is a last clear chance case similar to last clear chance case No. 3, supra.
It is not a true humanitarian case. The court held that under the circumstances the plaintiff made a submissible case for failure to stop or to warn
or to swerve.
Harrellv. Berberic, 15 arose out of a collision at night at a street intersection between plaintiff's taxicab and defendant's delivery truck. The
collision occurred at Jefferson and Pine Streets, both of which are of the
same width. Plaintiff was proceeding north on Jefferson and the defendant
traveling west on Pine. The collision occurred in the northeast quadrant of
the intersection. The plaintiff testified that he drove his automobile into
the intersection while the signal light was in his favor and that he did not
see the defendant's truck until about the time of collision. Defendant's
truck was traveling at a speed of 20 to 25 miles per hour and the plaintiff
was traveling at a speed of 15 miles per hour. It was held in this case (1)
that the plaintiff was not bound by the testimony of a bystander witness
called by him, but could make use, in submitting his case, of defendant's
testimony in conflict with the bystander's testimony; (2) that in determining whether plaintiff was oblivious to the approach of defendant's truck and
whether such obliviousness was apparent to the defendant that the favorable
automatic traffic signal could be considered as a circumstance. Again the
case of Yeaman v. Storms,"6 was distinguished and not applied because the
traffic signal favored the plaintiff as he entered the intersection. It is not
clear from the opinion whether the defendant was aware of the approach
of plaintiff's automobile at all times. If so, this was a common last clear
15. 222 S.W. 2d 733 (Mo. 1949).
16. 358 Mo. 774, 217 S.W. 2d 495 (Mo. 1948).
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chance case No. 3. If not, it was a true humanitarian case. It would seem
that a case of this character would be submitted under a primary negligence
submission charging the defendant with failure to observe the stop sign.
It seems unnecessary to invoke the last clear chance or humanitarian rule to
sustain recovery. The central issue in this case certainly must have been
whether or not the defendant disobeyed the automatic traffic signal.
Schaller v. St. Louis Public Service Co. 1 7 involves a collision at night

between defendant's streetcar and an automobile in which the plaintiff was
riding. Defendant's streetcar tracks ran parallel with, and about 20 feet
north of the highway upon which plaintiff's husband was driving the car in
which plaintiff was riding. The streetcar struck the car in which plaintiff
was riding near its right rear fender after it turned north off of the parallel
highway and was proceeding across defendant's streetcar tracks. The operator of the automobile was unaware of the approach of the streetcar until the
front end of the automobile had reached the streetcar tracks; he was unable
to get across the tracks before the collision by increasing his speed. Defendant's streetcar operator testified that he saw the car in which plaintiff was
riding as it traveled on the parallel highway and as it turned toward the
tracks. The court found that the plaintiff had made a case of negligence for
failure to warn, failure to slacken the speed, and failure to stop. Since the
streetcar operator was aware of the approach of the automobile in which
plaintiff was riding, this is a last clear chance case No. 3. It may be significant that Judge Westhues in writing the opinion at no time described the
case as a humanitarian case, using the word "humanitarian" only in describing appellant's assignments of error.
Chenowetlk v. McBurney 8 involved the collision of two meeting vehicles
upon a highway bridge during daylight. The court directed a verdict against
the plaintiff. Plaintiff's evidence showed that plaintiff's automobile, when
1000 feet away from defendant's oncoming car and about 565 feet from the
bridge was required to drive in the lefthand lane of a 20 foot highway in
order to pass a farm tractor and wheat drill. Plaintiff was then traveling
about 50 miles an hour. When plaintiff was 100 feet from the bridge he
"cut quickly" over to his right and into his righthand traffic lane. After he
was in his own lane, he lost control of the truck and struck the end of the
side wall of the bridge causing his vehicle to be projected directly in front
17. 223 S.W. 2d 409 (Mo. 1949).
18. 224 S.W. 2d 114 (Mo. 1949).
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of defendant's oncoming- automobile. The vehicles collided at about the
center of the bridge which was 67 feet long. The court held that plaintiff was
not in imminent peril when his vehicle was 1000 feet away as was demonstrated by his successful return to his own righthand lane, after which he
lost control of his car and came into a position of imminent peril. It was
further held that there was no evidence that after defendant lost control
of his car and struck the bridge side wall the defendant could have stopped
and thereby have averted the collision. There was no issue of swerving
because of the presence of side walls on the bridge.
In the view taken by the court, the true humanitarian doctrine was not
involved. The problem was whether or not a last clear chance case was
made since plaintiff was aware of his peril and unable to extricate himself
therefrom.
Pritt v. Terminal R. R. Ass'n of St. Louis9 was a death case arising

out of the death of plaintiff's intestate when run over by defendant's locomotive on the Eads Bridge. The deceased was a business invitee working
on the bridge for an employer other than defendant. The evidence was
scanty, contradictory in some respects and unclear but did establish that the
deceased was standing in the path of defendant's locomotive oblivious to his
danger and in imminent peril for a sufficient length of time for the defendant
to have warned him and thereby have averted the injury. The exact length
of time available after imminent peril arose does not appear from the
opinion. Consequently, it is not apparent whether this case is in line with
recent conservative decisions refusing to approve submission of cases requiring action in a second or a fraction of a second. This case might be
submitted as a last clear chance case No. 3 or a true humanitarian case No.
4 or both, depending upon whether it is found that the defendant's engineer
was actually aware of the plaintiff's peril or had constructive notice thereof.
Martin v. Effreiq2 ° was an action for damages for personal injuries sustained by the plaintiff, a pedestrian, when he was struck by defendant's
automobile at night. Defendant's automobile was proceeding south on a
concrete highway. The plaintiff was walking north on the highway in the
west lane with his head down and the visor of his cap pulled down. He was
oblivious to his peril. The extreme right part of defendant's front fender
and hood struck the plaintiff. The defendant's horn was not sounded. The
19. 224 S.W. 2d 119 (Mo. 1949).
20. 225 S.W. 2d 775 (Mo. 1949).
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case was submitted solely on the defendant's "humanitarian *negligence" in
failing to stop, swerve or warn of the approach of his automobile. Defendant's
testimony was that defendant saw plaintiff as reflected by his headlights 200
or 300 feet away in the line of traffic of the automobile; that the defendant
changed the course of his automobile so as to pass to the plaintiff's right;
that when defendant's automobile was about 20 feet from plaintiff, plaintiff
suddenly staggered or stumbled into the path of defendant's automobile
after which time it was impossible to avoid striking plaintiff. The jury's
verdict was for the defendant. The court approved an instruction submitting
defendant's theory that plaintiff's condition of imminent peril did not arise
until the plaintiff changed his course and moved toward the center of the
roadway and into the path of defendant's automobile as plaintiff staggered
or stumbled to his right. The instruction was a converse last clear chance
instruction based upon defendant's version of the evidence. Since the plaintiff's peril, on his testimony, arose from his obliviousness and defendant
admittedly was aware of plaintiff's presence on the highway, this was not a
true humanitarian case but was a common law last clear chance case No. 3.
The opinion contains a form of defense instruction approved by Division
No. 2.
INSURANCE
ROBERT

E.

SEILER*

In 1949, the supreme court handed down four decisions (fewer than
-usual) on insurance questions. One touches the matter of waiver, one the
'construction of a settlement agreement attached to life policies, and one
shows another unsuccessful effort to join a liability insurance company as a
-codefendant in an action against the insured tort-feasor.
Randolph v. Supreme Liberty Life Insurance Compan.y,' while an
action on an insurance policy, turns primarily on questions of evidence and
practice. The court held it was not error to refuse defendant's instruction to
the effect that "the question of waiving the proof of death of the insured is
an affirmative fact which the plaintiff in this case was bound to establish by
the preponderance . . . of the credible evidence in this case . . ." Waiver
is a question of law, and all the defendant was entitled to was an instruction
*Attorney, Joplin, Missouri. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1935.
1. 221 S.W. 2d 155 (Mo. 1949); 215 S.W. 2d 82 (Mo. App. 1948).
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concerning burden of proof on facts properly hypothesized on which waiver
may be based.
Central Surety & Insurance Corporation v. New Amsterdam Casualty
Company2 involved a dispute among three liability insurers as to their
respective liability to contribute to payment of a $4400.00 judgment obtained for personal injuries and property damages against the insured, resuiting when plaintiff's automobile collided with the left rear wheel of a
road grader. The road grader was chained to the rear end of a semi-trailer.
The semi-trailer was in turn attached to a truck or tractor, which was furnishing the motive power. The collision occurred on a public highway and
not on premises owned or controlled by the insured.
The Central Surety policy covered claims "caused by accident and
arising out of the ownership, maintenance or use" of the tractor and semitrailer. The New Amsterdam policy covered all sums which the insured
"shall become obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed upon him by
law" for injuries, etc., "caused by accident," but specifically excluded
"ownership, maintenance or use . . . of . . . automobiles while away from
such premises or the ways immediately adjoining." The Employers Mutual
policy covered liability "caused by accident and arising out of the hazard"
defined as "ownership, maintenance or use of the premises, and all operations
during the policy period which are necessary or incidental thereto" but
excluded coverage "to automobiles while away from the premises owned,
rented or controlled by the named insured."
Each policy contained a clause limiting the liability of the insurer
to a proportion of the loss not to exceed that which the applicable limit of

its liability bore to the applicable limit of all. The Kansas City Court of
Appeals held all three policies covered the claim and that each insurer
owned its proportional part of the judgment.
The supreme court first held that the New Amsterdam exclusion clause
was not ambiguous and that it did not cover a road grader attached to a
truck away from the premises any more than it did the truck itself under
such circumstnces (the court of appeals had held that the accident was due
to the operation of the grader and refused to accept the argument that the
accident was, in reality, due to the negligence of the driver of the truck
which was towing the grader). The Supreme Court also held that the
clause in the Employers Mutual policy defining "automobiles" was plain
2.

222 S.W. 2d 76 (Mo. 1949); 216 S.W. 2d 527 (Mo. App. 1948).
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and unambiguous (the court of appeals had held this clause either did not
expressly include the type of road grader involved, or that the clause was
ambiguous) and included a grader being towed by an automobile, and hence
there was no coverage, as the accident occurred off the premises of the
insured.
Woodson v. Woodson' was a contest between the executrix of the
estate of a deceased son (John) and a living brother (Samuel, Jr.) over the
proceeds of life insurance policies on the deceased father. The father,
Samuel, Sr., died in 1945. The son, John, died in May, 1947. The father's
widow, Ariel, died in October, 1947. The special settlement agreement
executed by the insured provided for monthly payments to the widow for
life and then an apportionment to the two named sons "if living, in equal
shares to each, the share of either not then surviving to be paid to such
deceased son's executors."
The court held that the rights of the beneficiaries were fixed upon
the death of the insured and that each claimant was entitled to one-half,
according to the plain provisions of the settlement agreement.
State ex rel. Anderson v. Dinwiddie4 is another interesting, but futile,
attempt by the plaintiff in a damage suit for negligence (a fatal airplane
crash) to join the liability insurance company as a defendant along with the
tort-feasor's administratrix. This time joinder of the liability company was
claimed to be proper under Sections 15, 16, 37, and particularly 38 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. The court held that irrespective of whether Sectiori
38 is broad enough to authorize the inclusion of third parties as defendants,
so far as insurance is concerned, the situation is controlled by Section 6010,
Mo. Rev. Stat. (1939). This statute is substantive, becomes a part of
every insurance contract within its scope, applies to cases involving bodily
injury or death, and requires a final judgment against the insured before
proceeding against the insurance company. Furthermore, under the standard provisions of the policy the insurance company expressly denied the
right of any person to join the insurance company as a co-defendant, and
hence the insurance company had not waivea the provisions of Section
6010.
Thus, the 1949 effort to join the insurance company as a co-defendant
3. 224 S.W. 2d 978 (Mo. 1949).
4. 224 S.W. 2d 985 (Mo. 1949)
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was unsuccessful, as was the 1948 effort, Haines v. Harrison., It is beginning to appear that it will take an act of the legislature to achieve this
happy or unhappy (depending on the point of view) end.

PROPERTY
WILLARD L. ECKHARDT*
TAX TITLES

A. Jotnes-Minger Act
Strohn v. Boden involved in a tax sale of land worth $2500 for $28.70
(slightly over 1% of the market value), the amount of the taxes, penalties
and costs. The court held the sale price was grossly inadequate, but under
the particular circumstances of the case refused to set aside the tax deed
and in lieu thereof allowed money damages.
In Liese v. Sackbauer,2 the court set aside a tax deed where a lot worth
$1500 was sold in 1934 for $12.33 (slightly less than 1% of the market
value), the amount of taxes, penalty, interest and costs for the year 1929,
but not covering delinquent taxes for four years, 1930-1933. The court held
that the price was so shockingly inadequate as to constitute fraud in law.
Harrisonv. Coombes Realty & Investment Co.8 was an action to set
aside a tax deed to a forty acre tract on the ground that the sale price
was so inadequate and unconscionable as to constitute fraud in law. Plaintiff's witnesses placed the reasonable market value of the land at the time
of the sale from $175 to $500 per acre, an average of $270 per acre. Defendant's witnesses placed the reasonable market value of the land at the
time of the sale from nothing to $75 per acre, an average of $42 per acre.
The sale price was $14 per acre, the sum of the taxes, interest, and costs.
The trial court took the value to be that estimated by defendant's witnesses
(one-third of the market value). The court held the price was not so inadequate as to constitute a fraud in law, and refused to set aside the tax deed.
5. 357 Mo. 956, 211. SW. 2d 489 (1948), discussed in 14 Mo. L. Rav. 368
(1949).
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. B.S., University of Illinois, 1935,
LL.B., 1937; Sterling Fellow, Yale University, 1937-1938.
1. 222 S.W. 2d 772 (Mo. 1949).
2. 222 S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. 1949).
3. 224 S.W. 2d 63 (Mo. 1949).
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B. Land Tax Collection Act (Jackson Conty)
It is still open to doubt whether the Land Tax-Collection Act,4 will be
effective in assuring to the purchaser at a tax sale a merchantable title,
without the running of the statute of limitations and a suit to quiet title
as is generally necessary under the Jones-Munger Act.5
The Land Tax Collection Act was considered generally by the court in
Spitcaufsky v. Hatten,6 an action for a declaratory judgment as to the
constitutionality of the act. In that case, the court said: "The main objectives of the legislature are summarily to foreclose long standing tax
delinquencies on real estate, and to convey a marketable title by judicial
decree, excluding any right of redemption and collateral attack." The court
also stated that the proceedings to foreclose were equitable and in rem with
notice by publication directed solely against the tax-delinquent lands.
Modern Home Investment Co. v. Boyle7 was a suit to set aside a
sheriff's deed executed pursuant to a foreclosure proceeding under the Land
Tax Collection Act. Foreclosure proceedings were started in 1945, and the
land was sold to the defendant in 1946 for $151, a sum sufficient to pay all
taxes and costs. In 1947, the trial court, after hearing evidence as to the
value of the land as required by Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11201.28, determined that adequate consideration had been paid, and confirmed the sale;
the sheriff executed a deed conveying the land to the defendant. Apparently
the appraisers appointed by the trial court viewed vacant land by mistake,
instead of viewing the improved land in question; one of the appraisers had
placed a value of $100 on the land (less than the $151 price). In the instant
suit to set aside the sheriff's deed, the plaintiff's evidence was that the
market value of the land was $2000; one of the appraisers who originally
had viewed the wrong land appriased the property at $1550 (the sale price
of $151 thus being from 7ya% to 10%o of the market value). The court
set aside the tax deed: "In this case, it is clear that if the deed is not set
aside plaintiff's property has been confiscated." The court emphasized that
in a foreclosure proceeding instituted and carried out pursuant to the Land
Tax Collection Act, the purchaser at the sale obtains a title not subject to
redemption by the former owner. But here there was in fact no appraisal,

4. Mo. Laws 1943, p. 1029, §§ 1-52, as amended; Mo. REv.

11201.1-11201.53 (Supp. 1950).

STAT. ANN.

§§

5. Mo. Laws 933, p. 426; Mo. REv. STAT. §§ 11124-11175 (1939).
6. 353 Mo. 94, 182 S.W. 2d 86, 160 A. L. R. 990 (1944).
7. 219 S.W. 2d 346 (Mo. 1949).
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and hence no compliance with Mo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 11201.28 for confirmation of a sale. While there may not be a suit to redeem, there may be a suit
to cancel a tax deed on the ground a necessary step in the proceedings
was in fact omitted.
Apparently to meet the challenge of the principal case, the legislature
in 1949 enacted with an emergency clause an act" to make a sheriff's deed
given pursuant to the provisions of the Land Tax Collection Act presumptive
evidence that the suit and all proceedings therein and all proceedings prior
thereto from and including assessment of the lands affected thereby and
all notices required by law were regular and in accordance with all provisions of the law relating thereto; after two years from the date of the
recording of such sheriff's deed, the presumtion shall be conclusive; and no
suit to set aside or to attack the validity of any such sheriff's deed shall
be commenced or maintained unless the suit is filed prior to the time that
the presumption becomes conclusive. It remains to be seen whether this
section will be effective to carry out (with the additional two year period)
what the court said was the main objective of the legislature in the original
act, viz., to give the purchaser at a tax sale a maketable title excluding any
right of redemption and collateral attack.
Section 28 of the Land Tax Collection Act9 provides (emphasis added):
"After the sheriff sells any parcel of real estate, the court shall, upon its own
motion or upon motion of any interested party, set the cause down for
hearing to confirm the foreclosure sale thereof .. . at the time of such
hearing ... the court shall hear evidence of the value of the property...

and shall forthwith determine whether an adequate consideration has been
paid ....

If the court finds that the consideration paid is inadequate, the

purchaser may increase his bid to such amount as the court may deem to
be adequate, whereupon the court may confirm the sale. If, however, the
purchaser declines to increase his bid and make such additional payment,
then the sale shall be disapproved. . .

."

The court in Hatten v. Parcels of

Land,10

considers the meaning of "value" and "adequate consideration" as
used in this section. Land was sold pursuant to the Land Tax Collection
Act for $1750. The owner's witnesses estimated the value of the property
at $5500 to $6356. The purchaser's witnesses estimated the market value
8. Mo. Laws 1949, p. 611, § 47.1; Mo. REV. STAT.
1950).
9. Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 11201.28 (Supp. 1950).

ANN.

§ 11201. 4 7a (Supp.

10. 217 S.W. 2d 511 (Mo. 1949).
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at $2000. The trial judge detrmined the value to be $4000. The purchaser
increased his bid to $2000 only, and the trial court disapproved the sale.
On appeal, the court observed that under the Jones-Munger Law mere inadequacy of consideration is insufficient to justify a court of equity in setting aside a sale. Only when the price is so shockingly inadequate as to
amount to constructive fraud is the sale set aside. [It would seem that in
the principal case the price, $1750, was not shockingly inadequate, and had
the sale been under the Jones-Munger Law, it would niot have been set
aside.] On the other hand the legislature in the Land Tax Collection Act
had expressly provided that inadequacy of consideration was ground for disapproval of a sale. The court went on to say, however, that "adequate
consideration" did not mean "full value" or "market value." The court
said: "We believe 'adequate consideration' as the term is used in the Act
was intended by the legislature to mean such an amount as the court is
satisfied is substantial, and fairly and reasonably commensurate with the
value of the land in the circumstances of a forced-tax sale in a proceeding
wherein, the sale having been confirmed, the purchaser procures a marketable title. Such a consideration would be adequate, it would seem, although
it be less than the 'full value' of the property-sufficiently less to yet induce
bidders, and facilitate the sales and the collection of the long-delinquent
taxes." The court held that the value of $4000 as found by the trial judge
was proper.
EJECTmENT OR TRnsPAss As DETERMINING TITLE

Cantrell v. City of Caruthersvile11 holds that a judgment in an action
of ejectment is conclusive as to the title between the parties. In 1947, the
city filed a conventional petition in ejectment against Cantrell in the Court
of Common Pleas of Cape Girardeau County on change of venue from
Pemiscot County. The land was described as part of a public alley. Cantrell's answer raised the defenses of the statute of limitations [adverse
possession] and estoppel, but did not ask for any affirmative relief. Seven
months later, while the ejectment action was still pending, Cantrell (defendant in the original ejectment action) filed a petition to try and determine
title against the city in the Circuit Court of Pemiscot County; this petition
alleged the statute of limitations and estoppel, as well as some additional
matters. On motion of the city, the trial court dismissed the petition and
11. 221 S.W. 2d 471 (Mo. 1949).
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abated the cause, on the ground that the subject matter of Cantrell's action
to try and determine title was the same as the subject matter of the earlier
and pending ejectment action.
The common law rule, as well as what many considered to be the Missouri view, was stated by way of dictum in Sutton v. Dameron12 as follows:
"Actions of ejectment, though between the same parties, having the same
defenses, concerning the same title and possessions, and in all respects similar in their facts, may be maintained ad infinitum."
On the other hand, it was well settled that a plaintiff could join in one
action a claim for possession (ejectment) and a claim to establish title (to
try and determine title or quiet title), wherein the judgment would be conclusive. Further, if the plaintiff's action was simple ejectment, the defendant
nevertheless could ask for affirmative relief by way of a judgment or decree
determining or quieting title, where the judgment would be conclusive.
Assuming that prior to the 1943 Missouri Code for Civil Procedure a
judgment in simple ejectment was not conclusive, the qustion in the principal case was whether such a judgment was conclusive after the 1943 Code.
The issue turned on two sections of the Code. Section 401 provides (emphasis added): "In a pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set
forth affirmatively [here are enumerated twenty specific defenses] and
any other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Sec-

tion 7314 provides (emphasis added): "A pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim, not the subject of a pending action, which at the time of
filing the pleading the pleader has against any opposing party, if it arises
out of the transaction or occurrances that is the subject matter of the op-

posing party's claim and does not require for its adjudication the presence
of third parties of whom the court cannot acquire jurisdiction." In an
exhaustive opinion by Van Osdol, C., the court concluded that a judgment
in the statutory action of ejectment is conclusive between the parties.
However the court gave prospective effect only to the decision: "It may be
the views herein expressed are not those heretofore entertained by our
fellow members of the Missouri Bar, including the judges of courts, and
consequently titles to or possession of lands may yet be considered as depending (although actions in ejectment for possession of such lands have
12. 100 Mo. 141, 149, 13 S.W. 497, 499 (1890).
13.

Mo. Laws 1943, p. 370; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.40 (Supp. 1950).

14. Mo. Laws 1943, p. 377; Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 847.73 (Supp. 1950).
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been tried) upon a future but conclusive judgment in ejectment or in an
action to try and determine or quiet title, as seems to be the opinion of
appellants' counsel of the title to the land involved in the instant action.
Consequently, the effect of this decision is prospective." Therefore, the
cause was remanded to the trial court. It is hoped that the appellate courts
will use this technique more frequently, doing justice in a particular case
by following what was erroneously conceived to be the rule, but improving
the administration of justice in future cases by declaring a better rule.
The same day that Division No. 1 decided Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, supra, it also decided Hoelmer v. Heiskell." That was an action
in the nature of trespass on land, for entering plaintiffs' land, damaging
fences, and cutting and carrying away timber. Defendant had undisputed
record title to the land. Plaintiffs' rights depended on adverse possession
for forty years. The trial court rendered judgment for the plaintiffs for $50,
and further adjudged that "plaintiffs are the owners of the land . . . described and that said defendant has no right, title or interest in and to said
land or any part thereof and has no lien thereon." The court affirmed
the judgment for damages, but held the adjudication of title was coram
non judice and void. The court said (emphasis added): "It has been held
that possession is sufficient to maintain an action in trespass. But a defendant may dispute a plaintiff's possessory right by showing the title and the
possessory right are in himself ... In the instant case, defendant's record
title was not disputed. It was necessary that plaintiffs prove they were
rightfully in possession as against defendant at the time the alleged unlawPlaintiffs' claim being based on the possessory
ful entry was committed ....
right and its violation and defendant having the record title by grant,
plaintiffs endeavored to prove their ownership and right to possession against
defendant by demonstrating they had acquired title by adverse possessionas defendant's counsel expressed to the trial court during the progress of
the trial, ownership 'is a fact to be determined in this case.' While ownership including the necessary right was a fact to be determined, title, evidencing ownership, was but incidentally involved and neither of the parties,
plaintiffs nor defendants, sought the relief of an adjudication of title. So it
must be held the trial court's judgment in so far as it adjudicated title wa
coram non judice and void. . . . But plaintiffs' title by adverse possession
was nevertheless the evidentary issue essential in supporting plaintiff's' own15.

221 S.W. 2d 142 (Mo. 1949).
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erskip and possessory right and claim, the violation of the possessory right
being the gist of plaintiffs' claim."
The court in the principal case relied on Brown v. Wilson10 where the
plaintiff brought an action of ejectment; the defense was adverse possession.
Judgment in the trial court was for the defendant: "... . that defendant is
the owner of and entitled to possession of the above described real estate,
and that plaintiff has no interest in said real estate. . . ." In affirming the
judgment the court of appeals said: "All the evidence in the case was
directed to the preliminary issue of who actually owned the disputed tract,
and in its judgment the court found that ownership was vested in defendant, not with the idea of adjudicating title as such, but rather for the purpose of determining the prime issue of right of possession, which, under the
pleadings, was solely dependent upon the question of ownership. Consequently the judgment rendered by the court was in all respects responsive
to the issues in the case, and is not to be disturbed by this court for the
reason urged by plaintiff [coram non judice]." The supreme court held that
the latter part of the judgment, that defendant is the owner, was not responsive to the issues raised by the pleadings, was coram non judice,
and void.
In view of the holding in Cantrell v,City of Caruthersville,supra, that
the 1943 Missouri Code of Civil Procedure makes the judgment in simple
ejectment conclusive of the issues raised or which might have been raised,
it is submitted that the court today might well take a different view as to
whether a trial court's judgment in ejectment that a party, was owner is
coram non judice, and therefore Brown v. Wilson, supra is probably not
good authority today.
The court in Hoelmer v. Heiskell, the principal case, a trespass action,
does not refer to Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville decided the same day,
but it would seem that the 1943 Missouri Code of Civil Procedure should
make a judgment in trespass conclusive under the same sections that make
a judgment in ejectment conclusive. The distinction made by the court in
Hoelmer v. Heiskell between ownership or title as a "fact" necessary to be
determined, and "title, evidencing ownership" as only incidentally involved,
does not seem too clear. The source of the trouble is probably the problem
16. 131 S.W. 2d 848 (Mo. App. 1939); State ex rel. Brown v. Hughes, 345 Mo.
958, 137 S.W. 2d 544 (1940); Brown v. Wilson, 348 Mo. 667, 155 S.W. 2d 184
(1941).
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of appellate jurisdiction-the supreme court having jurisdiction if "title"
is directly involved, the courts of appeal having jurisdiction if "title" is only
incidentally involved. In the jurisdictional sense "title" may be quite
different from title in other senses, and the fact that title is not involved in
the sense of appellate jurisdiction does not necessarily mean that a judgment
as to title in the trial court would be erroneous in either ejectment or trespass. Sed quaere whether the supreme oourt has jurisdiction in an appeal
in ejectment after the decision in Cantrell v. City of Carutkersville.
ADVERSE POSSESSION
7

Hoehler v. Heiskell, considered above as to another issue, was an
action of trespass to which plaintiff claimed title by adverse possession. The
area in controversy consisted of two acres of pasture and timber land, which
had been the subject of an oral gift from defendant's predecessor to plaintiff's predecessor forty years previously. It was clear that the plaintiff and
his predecessor had been in actual, open and notorious, exclusive, and
continuous possession for forty years. As to the requirement that the
possession be hostile or adverse and under claim of right, the court held
that fencing the area, using it for pasture, and cutting timber tended to
show that possession was adverse. The court held that possession pursuant
to an oral gift is adverse from its inception. On the other hand, the fact
that the possessor did not pay taxes tends to show that possession was not
under claim of ownership. The court affirmed the trial court's judgment
as to the sufficiency of adverse possession.
CONSTRUCTION OF LIMITATIONS, AND RELATED PROBLEMS

A. Deed or Will?
1 s

Barker v. Barker dealt with the troublesome problem whether an
instrument in the form of a deed was a deed presently conveying a future
interest, or a will. The instrument was the conventional warranty deed form.
After the description was the following clause (emphasis added): "I hereby
reserve a life interest in the property described in this deed, and said deed
shall-be effective and in full force from and after my decease." Delivery
during the life of the grantor was proved, but the deed was not recorded
until after the grantor's death. The court held the instrument effective as
17. 221 S.W. 2d 142 (Mo. 1949).
18. 219 S.W. 2d 391 (Mo. 1949).
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a deed, a present grant of a future interest with enjoyment of possession
postponed, rather than void as an improperly executed will.
The court relied on Dawson v. Taylor'9 where the clause in question in
a "deed" was as follows (emphisis added): "The grantors herein reserve
unto themselves a life estate in and to the lands above described and the
possession thereof, and the rents, use, enjoyment, and emoluments of the
same, during their natural lives, and it is hereby declared to be the intention of the grantors herein that this deed shall not take effect in its full
entirety until after the death of both of said grantors." The court held the

instrument effective as a deed, and construed the words, "this deed shall
not take effect in its full entirety until after the death of both grantors,"
to refer to enjoyment in possession and not to title or interest.
0
On the other hand, in Thorp v. Daniel"
the clause in question in a
"deed" was as follows (emphasis added): "Reserving however to the party
of the first part a life interest in the above described land. It being the in-

tention that this deed shall not take effect till the death of the party of the

first part. The party of the first part further stipulates that in case the
party of the second part shall die without children that the land herein
described shall pass by this deed to the grandchildren equally of the party
of the first part." The court held the instrument was not effective as a deed
but was testamentary in nature. In the opinion by Hyde, C., the court said:
"We think that this instrument clearly 'discloses the grantor's intention to
be that no estate or interest is to pass until the death of the grantor.' It
positively states that it is the grantor's 'intention that this deed shall not
take effect till the death of the (grantor) party of the first part.' Could
any words have been used that should have stated such an intention more
clearly or more emphatically? It is true that a provision for a life estate
to the grantor, in an instrument purporting to convey a fee title, is strong
evidence to show an intention that it should take immediate effect as a
present conveyance of a future estate, because if it did not the reservation
of a life estate would be useless. Here, the provision, 'reserving however to
the party of the first part, a life interest in the above described land,' standing alone, would have created a life estate in the grantor, and, if there had
been nothing more, this deed would not have been considered testamentary,
but would have been construed as conveying a present interest to the
19. 214 S.W. 852 (Mo. 1919).
20. 339 Mo. 763, 99 S.W. 2d 42 (1936).
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grantee. However, the provision in this deed is not as clear and definite
as it might be, and it was immediately followed by the positive statement
'that this deed shall not take effect till the death of the party of the first
part.' It would seem that, by this, it was made clear that what the grantor
meant by reserving 'a life interest' was that she intended to keep the whole
title until her death. An intent that no title should pass to anyone until her
death seems further shown by the last sentence quoted above, namely: 'that
in case the party of the described shall pass by this deed to the grandchildren equally of the party of the first part.' Does this not show the intent
that, when the deed did take effect .(when the grantor died), if the grantee
had previously died without surviving children, the title should then pass
directly from her to these grandchildren 'by this deed' without any estate
or interest ever having vested in the original grantee?" The court distinguishes Dawson v. Taylor, supra, on the ground that there the words were
"shall not take effect in its full entirety until after the [grantor's] death,"
while in Thorp v. Daniel the words were "shall not take effect till the
[grantor's] death."
The language in the principal case, Barker v. Barker, is: "said deed
shall be effective and in full force from and after my decease." Using a matching techniqe, "shall be effective" would seem to be equivalent to "shall not
take effect till" and points to a will construction (Thorp v. Daniel). On
the other hand, "in full force" may be equivalent to "in its full entirety"
and points to a deed (Dawson v. Taylor).
As the court points out in Thorpe v. Daniel, if there is only a simple
reservation of a life estate in a "deed" no trouble is encountered. Trouble
arises where the draftsman begins to explain what he means, particularly
if he explains his meaning by using "shall not vest" or "shall not take
effect" or similar phrases. The draftsman has failed to distinguish vesting
in interest from vesting in enjoyment or possession.
Two other techniques are available in the case where A wishes, to
convey and reserve a life estate. One technique is for A to convey the fee
simple absolute to B; by separate deed B conveys to A for life, leaving a
reversion in B. Another technique is for A to convey the fee simple absolute
to a straw party; by separate deed the straw party conveys to A for life,
with vested remainder in fee to B. Use of either of these techniques should
have the added advantage of minimizing an effective resort to parol evidence
to prove that there was no delivery, or that there were collateral parol
agreements with reference to power in the grantor to revoke, devise, etc.
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Although an owner may effectively convey a legal future interest,
retaining a legal life estate, the wisdom of doing so is quite another question.
The advantage generally claimed are to avoid probate and administration
and to avoid inheritance or estate taxes. On the other hand, in the case of
moderate sized estate, the grantor may be left with a life estate the income
from which will be insufficient to support him in the event of inflation or
in case of large expenditures for serious illnesses. A life estate in $100,000 is
worth approximately $3000 annually, at present interest rates. Instead of
creating a legal life estate and legal remainder, serious consideration should
be given to a trust where the principal may be made available to the
life tenant.
B. Escrow, Final Delivery at Deatk
Another technique- for conveying a "remainder" while retaining a life
estate is for the owner to place a fully executed deed in escrow with a
direction that the instrument be delivered to the grantee after the death
of the grantor. Here the basic problem is one of delivery, and although the
grantor's directions to the escrow holder need not be in writing where the
final delivery is to be made at the grantor's death, the absence of written
instructions may make it difficult to prove that there was in fact any
delivery. In Reasor v. Marshall" the decedent, Wright, and plaintiff, Reasor,
in1936 executed a document whereby Wright "hereby conveys to [Reasor
any interest That he may have in said Land [equitable title] ...The said
W. L. Wright retains all his interest in said Land during His life time."
The instrument was prepared by one Martin (apparently not a lawyer) and
signed by Wright and Reasor. With reference to delivery the only testimony
was by Martin to the effect that after the contract was signed "Mr. Wright
and Mr. Reasor .. . asked me to keep the contract .... They just asked me

to keep it." Martin kept the instrument in a lock-box, and after Wright's
death in 1942 and pursuant to a request by Reasor handed the instrument
to Reasor. The court held that the plaintiff, Reasor, had failed to sustain
the burden of proving delivery. The court pointed out that there were no
instructions by Wright to Martin to deliver to Reasor after Wright's death.
The court also considered certain subsequent acts of Wright indicating that
he considered he was still the absolute owner, and certain subsequent conduct of Reasor in his relations with Wright indicating that he (Reasor)
did not consider himself a remainderman.
21.

221 S.W. 2d 111 (Mo. 1949).
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C. Survivorship-ClassGift or Gift to Individals
Jennings v. Newman 2 turned on whether a residuary clause was a gift
to a class, or a gift to two named individuals with consequent lapse as to
one-half. Frank M. Jennings executed a will in 1909, providing as follows:
"Second: I give and devise to my wife Addie Jennings all of my property
both real and personal and where ever situate to be held by her during her
natural life time and at her death to be divided equally between her two
children Albert M. Laswell and Fred L. Laswell." The named remaindermen were stepsons of the testator. One stepson, Albert M. Laswell predeceased the testator; the testator's wife and his other stepson, Fred L. Laswell, survived the widow, then died devising his interest to the defendantrespondent. Plaintiffs-appellants were heirs at law of the testator, and
claimed that Albert M. Laswell had been given one-half of the remainder,
and that this interest lapsed when he predeceased the testator and went
by intestate descent to the heirs of the testator. The court held that this
was a class gift to the stepsons and when one class member survived the
testator there was no lapse but the surviviing class member took the whole.
23
The court relies principally on Crecelius v. Horst.

The serious problem is whether this is a class gift. The court assumes
that it is. Had the devise been simply to "her children" it clearly would
be a class gift. Had the gift been simply to Albert M. Laswell and Fred L.
Laswell, it would be two individual gifts. A gift to "her two children," or as
here to "her two children Albert M. Laswell and Fred L. Laswell," is much
harder to classify. The court rejected the contention of the appellant that
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3504 (1939) which provides that "every interest in real
estate granted or devised to two or more persons, other than executors and
trustees and husband and wife, shall be a tenancy in common, unless expressly declared, in such grant or devise, to be in joint tenancy" was applicable. The court points out that this section is not applicable where a
class member predeceases the testator.
D. Survivorship-Implied as to Contingent Remainder?-Contingent
Remainder or Defeasible Vested Remainder?
Tapley v. Dill24 involved an interesting problem of will construction,
in an able opinion by Bohling, C. The testator, Valentine Tapley, died in
22. 221 S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1949).
23. 9 Mo. App. 51 (1880), affirmed in 78 Mo. 566 (1883).
24. 217 S.W. 2d 369 (Mo. 1949).
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1910, devising one-half of his estate absolutely to his son, Joe. The other
one-half was devised to three grandchildren, children of a deceased daughter.
He gave $100 to his granddaughter, Caroline M. Dill. He provided for his
grandson, Harry R. Mitchell, as follows: "IV. I hereby will and bequeath
to my son Joe Tapley, as trustee, in trust for the use and benefit of my
grandson Harry R. Mitchell ... and his bodily heirs one-fourth ( 1/) of all
my estate, both real and personal, less the sum of fifty dollars . . . and I

direct that my said son Joe Tapley pay to my said Grandson HarryR.Mitchell
the net annual rents derived from the real estate and the net annual interest derived from the personal property to my said grandson Harry R.
Mitchell, each year during his natural life and should the said Harry R.
Mitchell die without leaving bodily heirs, the trust estate hereby created
shall become a part of the trust estate of my granddaughter Mary R. Mitchell
*

.

. as hereinafter created subject to all the conditions of said trust estate

and in case at that time the said Mary R. Mitchell should be dead then
the trust estate shall go to and become the property of my son Joe Tapley."
There was a substantially identical provision in favor of his grandaughter,
Mary R. Mitchell. There was no additional residuary clause. The testator
was survived by his son, Joe, and the three grandchildren. The son, Joe,
died in 1915, without bodily heirs, and bequeathing and devising his estate
to his widow, Mary H. Hapley, appellant. The granddaughter, Mary R.
Mitchell, died in 1921, without bodily heirs and intestate; consequently her
interest fell into Clause IV for disposition. Harry R. Mitchell, the grandson,
died in 1944, without bodily heirs and intestate. Thereafter this action was
brought to quiet and determine title and for partition, with reference to
the one-half of the estate (less $100) under the testamentary trusts.
The trial court held that the granddaughter, Caroline M. Dill, was the
sole owner in fee, "as the sole and only heir at law of her deceased grandfather, the said Valentine Tapley," on the theory that there was a residuum
or reversion not disposed of by the will, which went to her by intestate
descent [implicit is the assumption that the testator's heirs are determined
as of the time the grandson, Harry R. Mitchell, died]. With reference to
this theory the supreme court pointed out that if there was a reversion, it
went by descent to heirs determined at the time of the testator's death; that
Joe would inherit one-half of the reversion; and that this interest in turn
would go to Joe's widow by devise.
Joe's widow, appellant, argued that Clause IV created a defeasible
vested remainder in Joe Tapley, subject to an executory devise in favor of
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Harry's bodily heirs; and because there were no bodily heirs, Joe's remainder
became indefeasible, and went to her by Joe's devise.
Caroline M. Dill, respondent, argued that Clause IV created a contingent remainder in Joe, with an implied condition of surviving the life tenant,
and because he predeceased the life tenant his remainder failed.
The supreme court adopted the analysis that the fee-tail limitation gave
Harry a life estate, with a contingent remainder in his surviving bodily
heirs. Mary R. Mitchell had an alternative contingent remainder, expressly
conditioned on Harry not being survived by issue and on Mary surviving
Harry. Joe had a second alternative contingent remainder, expressly conditioned on Harry not being survived by issue and on Mary predeceasing Harry,
but not expressly conditioned on Joe himself surviving the life tenant, Harry.
The court held that there was no implied condition of surviving the life
tenant. The court examined and distinguished a number of earlier Missouri
cases. The court also relied on the internal evidence in Clause IV and the
will as whole; the fact that Mary's contingent remainder was expressly conditioned on survival indicates that Joe's contingent remainder which was
not expressly so conditioned was not impliedly so conditioned. The court
also found an intention that Joe should take the bulk of the estates as the
principal object of the testator's beneficence.
E. Survivorsi p-of Testatrix, Administration or Her Estate?
Hogg v. Falk2l presents a curious situation as to what the court really
held, and also a curious situation as to the editing of the case in the Southwestern Reporter. The will of Agnes R. Hogg, executed in 1939 [1931?] included the following provisions (emphasis added):
"Item 2. I give and bequeath to my husband, Arthur W.
Hogg, one-half of my estate, other than the specific bequests hereinafter set forth, and after item one is executed [payment of
debts], according to his dower right as surviving widower under
the laws of Missouri. If said Arthur W. Hogg should die before
this will is executed, his dower and bequest shall remain a part of
my estate and be disposed of as hereinafter directed."
"Item 4. For my niece and namesake Agnes Hays Ferguson,
I direct my executors to pay for her one five-hundred-fifty-dollar
($550.00) promissory note of hers held by the Hannibal National
Bank, and bearing my signature as security. If the above said note
25. 225 S.W. 2d 756 (Mo. 1949).
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shall have been paid before this will is executed, then I direct my
executors to give her the above amount of the note in cash ......
"Item 6. If any legatee or devisee herein die before my death,
then in the absence of any other provision, I give the legacy or bequest intended for him or her to his or her heirs at law, except the
legacy as stated in item two (2) and item four (4)."
"Item 8. After the payment of all items and bequests hereinabove set out, I direct the rest and residue of my estate, if any,
be given to my niece, Bess Conn Falk.
"Item 9. [Husband, Arthur W. Hogg, and niece, Bess Conn
Falk, 'appointed trustees, and executor and executrix, with direction to sell real estate and convert into personality.]
"Item 10. [Direction as to time of payment of legacies, with
stipulation that real estate shall be sold and doctrine of equitable
conversion shall apply.]"
The husband, Arthur W. Hogg, survived his wife by nine months, and
during that period acted as executor of the will. Necessarily administration
of the estate had not been completed at his death. The heirs of the husband brought a suit for partition of certain land decedent owned; the niece,
defendant, claimed the entire estate. The trial court denied partition, but
ruled that the land should be sold anZ the proceeds equally divided. The
judgment was affirmed.
Item 2 provided that if the husband "should die before this will is
executed" his dower and bequest should fall into the residue going to the
niece. "Executed" might refer to three points of time: (1) the date when
the will was signed and witnessed (1939); (2) the date when the testatrix
died; or (3) the date when the estate was fully administered and distribution made. The court correctly rejected the first possibility, inasmuch as
the husband was living at that time and was named executor.
The principal opinion by Bradley, C., Van Osdol, C., concurring, Dalton, C., dissenting, was adopted as the opinion of Division 1. This opinion is
bottomed on the conclusion that "executed" refers to the time when the
estate is fully administered. Inasmuch as the husband did not survive to
this point of time, that leaves four other quesions to be answered, viz.:
"(2) Under the rule of equitable conversion, did the realty, except the
specific devises, upon the death of testatrix, become personal property for
the purposes of the will? [Yes.] That is, did testatrix devise any realty to
her husband? [No.] (3) Is that part of item 2 void which directs that if
Mr. Hogg should die before the will was executed the devise [legacy?]
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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therein to him would go to the residuary estate? [Yes.] (4) If said direction in item 2 is not void, was Mr. Hogg required to renounce the will?
[No.] and if he did not renounce the will would the devise [legacy?] to him,
should he die before the will was executed, go the residuary estate? [No.]
and (5) Did the fact that Mr. Hogg, as executor under the will, entered
upon the administration of the estate and accepted compensation for ser-

vices as executor deprive him of his statutory rights as the widower? [No.]"
The court concluded that the heirs of the husband were entitled to
one-half.
The report of the case in the Southwestern Reporter has no headnotes
relating to this principal opinion by Bradley, C., and consequently none of
the points appear in the American Digest System.

Clark, P.J., wrote a separate opinion, in which Conklin, J., concurred.
Hyde, J., wrote a separate opinion, in which Douglas, J., concurred. Both
of these opinions concur in the result of the principal opinion by Bradley, C.,
that the heirs of the husband are entitled to one-half, but both are bottomed
on the proposition that "executed" refers to the date of the testatrix' death
and the husband survived this point of time. These concurring opinions
differ chiefly in that Clark and Conklin, JJ., agree with the reasoning of the
principal opinion as to the secondary issues if they are incorrect as to their
conclusion on the main issue, but Hyde and Douglass, JJ., do not express
any opinion as to the secondary issues.
The report of the case in the Southwestern Reporter has two headnotes
relating to the opinion written by Clark, P.J., but has no headnotes relating
to the opinion written by Hyde, J.
Thus we have this curious situation. The principal opinion by Bradley,
C., adopted Per Curiam by Division 1, takes the view that "executed" refers
to the time when the estate is fully administered. On the other hand, all
four judges of Division 1 in separate opinions take the contrary view that
"executed" refers to the time when the testatrix died. The latter view is the
only one indicated in the headnotes in the Southwestern Reporter. Dalton,
C., who dissented without opinion from the principal opinion by Bradley, C.,
has since succeeded Douglas, J., as a judge of the court. The case of Hogg v.
Falk would seem to be of doubtful value as precedent.
All of the opinions consider the meaning of "executed" in item 4 of the
will, and the meaning of "executed" the second time it is used in item 2.
None of the opinions refer to the first use of "executed" in item 2, viz.:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

57

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1950], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 15

"after item one is executed." Item 1 refers to payment of debts, and the
phrase "after item one is executed" could refer only to a point of time after
the death of the testatrix and after the estate has been at least partially
administered. None of the opinions analyze item 6 for any light it may
throw on the problem. It provides: "If any legatee or devisee herein die
before my death, then in the absence of any other provision, I give the
legacy or bequest intended for him or her to his or her heirs at law, except
the legacy as stated in item two (2) and item (4)." In this paragraph the
testatrix indicates that she considers dying before the will is executed, in
items 2 and 4, as generic with predeceasing the testatrix.
F. Life Estates-Powerof Life Tenant to Draw on Principal
Smit

v. Smitk 26 involved the construction of the residuary clause of

a will. This clause provided as follows (emphasis added): "And lastly, all
the rest, residue and remainder of my estate ... I give, devise and bequeath

to my beloved wife, Dora Smith, to have and to hold the same during her
naturallife, with full power and authority to sell any part, or all of the real
estate and execute a deed or deeds for the same at any time during her life,
if she thinks best to do so, and use then unrestricted for her own use and
support." The residue was worth about $62,000, the greater portion consisting of cash, stocks, and bonds. The widow was appointed executrix with
a direction that she should not be required to give bond. The court rejected
the contention of the heirs-at-law, collateral relatives, that the widow was
limited to income and had no power to diminish or consume the corpus. The
court held that she had a life estate, with a power to consume the corpus
for her own use and support; on the other hand she could not waste, dispose
of, or diminsh the corpus by gift, bequest, or devise. This left a defeasible
reversion which went by intestate descent to the heirs-at-law. The court
recognized that simply giving the "use" of the corpus to the life tenant does
not give the life tenant power to consume the corpus. But in this case the
life tenant was authorized to "use them unrestricted for her own use and
support." The failure of the testator to limit a remainder after the life
estate strengthens the conclusion that the life tenant should have the power
to consume the principal. The court further held that under the facts of
the case a forthcoming bond should not be required of the life tenant for the
benefit of the reversioners.
26. 220 S.W. 2d 10 (Mo. 1949).
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G. Deeds-Conflict Between Granting and Other Clauses
Pike v. Men 2 7 presents an instructive lesson on how not to draft a
deed. The instrument was the usual printed form of warranty deed, with
blanks filled in by typewriter, and with an additional clause typed below
the description and above the habendum. The deed, in part, was as follows,
with typewritten parts in italics:
"This indenture.., and William Pike, Maggie Elizabeth Dunning and Essie Hutson, . . . parties of the second part:
"Witnesseth . . . grant, bargain and sell, convey and confirm,
unto the said parties of the second part and their heirs and assigns
the following described lots ...
"The above land is hereby granted in fee simple to William
Pike but if he die before Maggie Elizabeth Dunning, his grandmother, then to her for life and then in fee simple to Essie Hutson,
the mother of William Pike.
"To have and to hold . . . unto the said parties of the second
part, and unto their heirs and assigns, forever . . . warrant and
defend the title to the said premises unto the said parties of the
second part, and unto their heirs and assigns, forever ......
The granting clause and the habendum standing alone would create a
tenancy in common in fee between the three named grantees. The inserted
clause standing alone would create a defeasible fee simple (fee simple subject
to a condition subsequent) in William Pike, subject to shifting uses in favor
of the other two named grantees; and inasmuch as William Pike survived
Maggie Elizabeth Dunning, his fee simple defeasible became indefeasible.
The trial court adopted the former construction (tenancy in common), but
on appeal the latter construction (defeasible fee with shifting uses) was
adopted. The court recognized that the inserted clause could not be reconciled with the balance of the deed, but held that the inserted clause prevailed. The opinion would seem to be correct.
The case demonstrates rather clearly the hazard of using the usual
printed form to limit present and future interests. The printed form is suitable for conveying a fee simple absolute to one person, a tenancy by the
entireties between husband and wife, and a tenancy in common between
strangers. With some striking out and interlineation it may be adapted to
create the simplest of successive interests, but generally an instrument
drafted to meet the particular problem is essential when icreating successive
27. 218 S.W. 2d 575 (Mo. 1949).
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interests, or concurrent interests other than those listed above. The hazards
of using the printed form are fully considered in a previous number of the
28
Missouri Law Review.
H. Adopted Child as Pretermitted Heir
Robertson v. Cornett29 was a case of first impression. In 1927 the plaintiff, Roscoe Robertson, was adopted by Harry L. Robertson, who subsequently died in 1943. Edgar M. Robertson, the father of Harry L. Robertson, and the adoptive grandfatherof Roscoe Robertson, died in 1945, testate,
giving his property to the defendants, collateral heirs. The plaintiff, the
adoptive grandchild, was not mentioned in the will. The plaintiff claimed
the entire estate, as a pretermitted heir of his adoptive grandfather, under
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 526 (1939)0 and the trial court so ruled. The supreme
court, in holding plaintiff was the pretermitted heir of his adoptive grandfather, relied on Mo. Rev. Stat. § 9614 (1939)31 which provides in part:
" . . Said [adopted] child shall thereafter be deemed and held to be for
every purpose, the child of its parents or parents by adoption, as fully as
though born to them in lawful wedlock. Said child . . . shall be capable of
inheriting from, and as the child of said parents as fully as though born to
them in lawful wedlock. . . ." The .court rejected the contention of the
defendants that such a holding would violate the constitutional provisions
as to due process. The court does not mention a line of argument which
would support its view that there is no violation of due process, viz., that
the decedent could have disinherited the plaintiff simply by mentioning him,
and therefore the court's view does not necessarily limit a decedent in the
disposition of his property.

28. Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 1945-Property, 11
Mo. LAw REv. 378, 380-383 (1946).

29. 225 S.W. 2d 780 (Mo. 1949).
30. "If any person make his last will, and die, leaving a child or children, or
descendants of such child or children in case of their death, not named or. provided for in such will, although born after the making of such will, or the death of
the testator, every such testator, so far as shall regard any such child or children,

or their descendants, not provided for, shall be deemed to die intestate; and such
child or children, or their descendants, shall be entitled to such proportion of the
testator, real and personal, as if he had died interstate, and the same shall be assigned to them, and all the other heirs, devisees and legatees shall refund their proportional part."
31. Subsequently amended, Mo. Laws 1947, p. 217. See Eckhardt, Work of
Missouri Supreme Court for 1948-Property, 14 Mo. LAw REv. 371, 372-373
(1949).
case.

The amendment would tend to support the court's view in the principal
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I. Lawful Issue
Bernheimer v. First National Bank of Kansas City

2

involved a testa-

mentary trust in favor of Earle J. Bernheimer, Sr., for life, with remainder
to the "lawful issue of the body" of the life tenant. Earle J. Bernheimer, Jr.,
brought suit for declaratory judgment to establish his status as "lawful issue
of the body." Bernheimer, Sr., was still married to, although separated
from, his third wife in May, 1941, when one Verone Odegard became pregnant by Bernheimer, Sr. In January, 1942, Bernheimer, Sr., received a
Mexican decree of divorce from his third wife. Thereafter Bernheimer, Sr.,
and Verone participated in a ceremonial marriage in Nevada, Verone believing in good faith that the marriage was valid. Four days later their
child, Bernheimer, Jr., was born. The court held that the meaning of "lawful issue of the body" should be determined by the law of Missouri, the
domicile of the testatrix. The court held that the Mexican divorce decree was
void, and therefore the Nevada marriage was void. Consequently, until there
was a valid divorce and marriage, Bernheimer, Jr., could not be held legitimate under Mo. Rev. Stat.§ 315 (1939): "If a man, having by a wom5n a child
or children, shall afterward intermarry with her, and shall recognize such
child or children to be his, they shall thereby be legitimated." Nevertheless,
the court held that Bernheimer, Jr., was legitimate under Mo. Rev. Stat.
§ 316 (1939): "The issue of all marriages decreed null in law, or dissolved
by divorce, shall be legitimate." The court ruled that under this section it
is not necessary that the child in question be conceived as well as born in
the void marriage, and it is not necessary that both parties believed the void
marriage to be legal. Consequently it was sufficient that Bernheimer, Jr., be
born in the void marriage which his mother believed to be valid. The court
ruled that he was "lawful issue of the body."
JuDGMrNT AS To TiTLE-SET AsmE FOR FRAUD

Jones v. Arnold"3 was an unusual case where a 1927 decree reforming
a deed, the record upon its face being regular, was set aside twenty years
later for fraud in the procurement of the decree. One J. H. Arnold died
intestate in 1914, owning the Missouri land in question. All of his heirs
conveyed to his widow, and pursuant to an agreement his widow conveyed
32. 225 S.W. 2d 745 (Mo. 1949).
33. 221 S.W. 2d 187 (Mo. 1949).
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the land by deed to her son, Frank Arnold, and his bodily heirs. 4 [The
effect of this limitation was to create an estate for life only in Frank Arnold,
a contingent remainder in fee in his surviving issue, and a reversion in the
widow.] In 1922 and 1924 the widow quitclaimed to her son. In 1925 the
widow conveyed the land by warranty deed to her son in fee simple absolute,
the deed reciting that it was made to correct the 1915 deed to carry out the
original intent and purpose of conveying to Frank Arnold the fee simple
absolute, and to relinquish all rights and establish in Frank Arnold a fee
simple absolute. Six months later, in July, 1925, Frank Arnold conveyed to
one Montgomery, who knew of the defect in title. In 1927 Arnold and his
three minor children, ages 14 to 18, were living in Oklahoma. Montgomery,
a frequent visitor at the Arnold home, told Arnold that title was defective
and "a friendly suit" to straighten out the title would be necessary. Montgomery then brought suit in Missouri for reformation of the 1915 deed (to
convey to Arnold a fee simple absolute instead of a life estate, and to cut
out the contingent remainder in fee in favor of Arnold's issue). Service by
publication was had on the Arnold children. An attorney-at-law was
appointed guardian ad litem, but his answer was merely that he was unfamiliar with the facts and asked the court to require strict proof. The attorney
did not communicate with the Arnold children. A decree of reformation
was entered from which no appeal was taken. Neither Arnold nor Montgomery had notified the Arnold children of the pending suit. In 1947 the
plaintiff, one Jones, claiming through mesne conveyances from Montgomery,
brought a suit to quiet title against the Arnold children and grandchildren.
The defendants filed a cross-action to vacate the 1927 reformation decree
for fraud in its procurement, and to establish their interest as contingent
remaindermen. The reply to this cross-action did not raise any issue concerning the statute of limitations [the original life tenant, Arnold, was still
alive], and there was no pleading or proof as to whether Jones was a bona
fide purchaser for value. The court held that the 1915 deed correctly represented the intention of the parties, and that the Arnold children in fact had a
meritorious defense to the 1927 reformation suit. The court further held
that the 1927 decree had been procured by fraud, in that there was fraud
and collusion by Montgomery and Arnold in purposely keeping the minor
defendants from knowing anything about the pending suit; under the cir34. There were two parcels involved. As to one of the parcels the widow
reserved a life estate. To simplify the statement of the case this reservation of a
life estate has been disregarded.
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cumstances of the case there was a duty on Montgomery to disclose to the
children. The court quieted title to the contingent remainder in the Arnold
issue. The opinion does not indicate what result would be reached if Jones
were a bona fide purchaser for value.
CONTINGENT REMAINDERS-DESTRUCTIBILITY

Although the problem is not mentioned nor discussed by the court in

Jones v. Arnold,5 the decision on the facts holds that a contingent remainder is not destructible by merger.36 The fee tail limitation in the 1915 deed
created a life estate in Arnold, a contingent remainder in fee in his surviving
issue, and a reversion in the widow. By the 1922, 1924, or 1925 deeds the
widow conveyed her reversion to Arnold, the life tenant. Thus the life estate
and the reversion could merge, destroying the intervening contingent remainder, if the doctrine of destructibility is law in Missouri. The holding of
the case is that the contingent remainder is still an outstanding interest in
the land, and therefore it must not have been destructble37
EASEMENTS, EqUITABLD SERvITUDEs, AND RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS

A. Racial Restrictions
8

Shelley v. Kraemer" held that a restriction against occupancy by a
Negro could not be enforced by injunction requiring the removal of the pur35. 221 S.W. 2d 187 (Mo. 1949). This case is discussed from another point of
view supra.
36. See Eckhardt, The Destructibility of Contingent Remainders In Missouri,
6 Mo. LAw REv. 268-296 (1941).
37. As to the other tract in which the limitation was the same, except that
the widow reserved a life estate, the problem is more difficult. The usual analysis
is that the deed created a life estate in the widow, a vested remainder for life
in Arnold, a contingent remainder in fee in his surviving issue, and a reversion in
the widow. By the 1922, 1924, or 1925 deeds the widow conveyed her life estate
and reversion to Arnold, who already had a vested remainder for life. Thus the life
estates and reversion could merge, destroying the interviewing contingent remainder,
if the doctrine of destructibility is law in Missouri. The holding of the case is
that the contingent remainder is still an outstanding interest in this tract, and
therefore it must not have been destructible.
On the other hand, it should be noticed that where a grantor "reserves" a life
estate, the limitation may be analyzed as leaving a defeasible fee in the grantor,
and creating springing uses in the grantees. Admittedly springing uses are not destructible. In most cases it is not material whether a court adopts the life estateremainder analysis, or the defeasible fee-springing use analysis, but the basic analysis becomes material where the problem is one of destructibility.
The holding on the facts of the principal case that a contingent remainder is
not destructible might be limited to the case of a contingent remainder created by
the fee tail statute, Mo. REv. STAT. § 3498, and might not extend to other contingent remainders.
38. 334 U. S. 1, 68 Sup. Ct.836, 3 A. L. R. 2d,441 (1948), reversing 335 Mo814, 198 S.W. 2d 679 (1946). See Betz, Note, 12 Mo. LAw REV. 221 (1947);
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chaser, a member of the excluded race, for the reason that judicial enforcement of such a restriction was state action denying equal protection of the
laws within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Shelley v. Kraemer
recognized that the restrictive agreements as such were valid.
The first reported case to consider whether an action for damages will
lie by a party to the restrictive agreement against another party to the
restrictive agreement who violates the agreement is Weiss v. Leao.8 9 The
Missouri Supreme Court held, in a per curiam decision, that such an action
would lie. The case is considered in a recent issue of the Missouri Law
*o
Review.
It does not appear in the opinion whether the defendant was the original
covenantor: "Plaintiffs and defendants Leaon are parties under the agreement either as original makers or as their successors in interest." It thus
does not appear whether Missouri would limit liability for damages to the
original convenantor, on the theory the covenant was personal, or would
extend liability for damages for breach by subsequent owners on the theory
that the covenant ran with the land at law. Establishing privity between
owners in fee at law (damages) is much more difficult than establishing
privity between owners in fee in equity (injunction). If the covenant runs
with the land as to burden, it would mean that while a grantee who was a
member of the excluded race could not be compelled by a state court to
remove from the land and probably would not be liable for damages for the
conveyance to him, he would be liable in damages if he in turn conveys to a
member of the excluded race.
Another case as yet undecided is where there is in the grantor a right of
entry for condition broken or a possibility of reverter, i.e., forfeiture of title
in the event there is a breach of the covenant. It would seem clear that
under Shelley v. Kraemer the courts could not enforce such a right of entry
or possibility of reverter where the grantor seeks the assistance of a court in
recovering possession. But if the grantor re-enters by self-help pursuant to
his right of entry or possibility of reverter (taking his chances as to tort
Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 1946-Property, 12 Mo. LAW
REv. 405, 413 (1947); Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 1948Property, 14 Mo. LAW REv. 371 (1949).

39. 225 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).

40. Hoelscher, Note, 15 Mo. LAw REv. 313 (1950). The use of options to

effect indirectly the purpose of a racial restriction is discussed in Hoelscher, Use of

Options to Purchase Land to Control Occupancy, 15 Mo. LAW REV. 77 (1950);
Eckhardt, Work of the Missouri Supreme Court for 1948, 14 Mo. LAw REv. 371,
372 (1949).
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liability for injuries to persons or personal property) is there any way by
which the occupant evicted by self-help could recover possession? Until
these questions are answered it would seem that title in the member of the
excluded race or his successor is certainly unmarketable and possibly is not
good.
B. Easements by Reservation-Words of Inheritance-Novel Easements
Williams v. DiedeiczA'- presented an interesting problem with respect
to "exclusive boating and fishing privileges." The pertinent facts were that
in 1905 the defendant's predecessor conveyed to a railroad 2.6 acres out of
a larger tract. The deed contained the following clause: "It is further understood that C. F. Knepel [grantor] and R. C. Matson [grantor of 17.5 acres
by another deed] shall have the exclusive boating and fishing privileges on
any reservoir which the said Railway Company may construct on the land
covered by this deed with equal rights to each." Defendant's fishing and
boating rights in the 2.6 acres depended on this deed in which Knepel was
the grantor. At the same time one Matson also conveyed to the railroad
17.5 acres out of a larger tract; the deed contained a similar clause with
respect to fishing and boating rights in the grantor and Knepel. Defendant's
fishing and boating rights in the 17.5 acres depended on this deed, in which
Knepel was neither grantor nor a named grantee as such, but in which
Knepel was named in the reservation clause. In 1920 the original grantor
sold and assigned his boating and fishing rights, and through mesne assignments they were acquired by defendant. The defendant also owns the land
out of which the 2.6 acres was carved. The original grantor had been dead
for many years at the time the case arose. In 1935 the railroad leased the
reservoir to the plaintiff. A controversy having arisen as to whether defendant had boating and fishing rights, plaintiff, the lessee of the reservoir,
brought an action to determine title. The trial court held that defendant
had no rights, and this judgment was affirmed.
The defendant argued that the 1905 reservation created an exclusive
profit in gross (benefit in an individual and not appurtenant to any dominant land) which was assignable and inheritable. In the alternative, it was
argued that the 1905 reservation created an easement appurtenant to the
retained land, and that as owner of the retained land defendant had an
easement.
41.

223 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. 1949).
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The court held that the 1905 reservation gave the grantor an exclusive
privilege to boat and fish, but that this privilege was personal to the grantor,
and was neither assignable nor inheritable. While not in issue under the
facts, the court indicates the privilege was not assignable even during the
lifetime of the grantor. The court emphasizes that neither "heirs" nor
"assigns" were used in the reservation, and the court does not find any other
language from which it might be inferred that the interest was to be assignable or inheritable.
The reason given by the court, absence of words of inheritance or assignability, is not mentioned in either brief. At common law words of inheritance
were not necessary in the case of an exception proper, because the grantor
was excluding from his conveyance something in which he already had an
inheritable interest. On the other hand a reservation proper was a newly
created interest, and unless words of inheritance were used the reservation
was of interest for life only.42 In 1835 the common law rule requiring words

or inheritance to create a fee was changed by statute and there was created
a presumption that the grantor intends to convey a fee. 43 This statute does
not expressly cover interests in the nature of easements or profits, but it
would seem that the same principle should apply. It is to be hoped that the
principal case will not be taken as raising a presumption of an interest for
life only in the case of the grant or reservation of an easement or profit,
where words of inheritance and assignability are not used. The matter is
especially importantoin the case of a reservation of a right-of-way across
granted land in favor of retained land.
Whatever may be the presumption or rule of law, the principal case
re-emphasizes that it is important in drafting a reservation that the duration
be set forth expressly, as inheritable and assignable, or for life or years only.
Furthermore it is important that the interest be stated expressly to be in
gross, or as appurtenant to a particularly described dominant estate.
Another interesting point, not raised or discussed in the case, is whether
there can be easement of boating for pleasure (as distinguished from fishing
rights). In 1834, Lord Chancellor Brougham stated: "There are certain
42. See Stotzenberger v. Perkins, 332 Mo. 391, 400, 58 S.W. 2d 983, 986 (1933).
43. Mo. Ray. STAT. p. 119, § 2 (1835). With some minor changes in wording
the current statute, Mo. REv. STAT. § 3496 (1939), is the same: "The term 'heirs,'
or other words of inheritance, shall not be necessary to create or convey an estate
in fee simple, and every conveyance of real estate shall pass all the estate of the
grantor therein, unless the intent to pass a less estate shall expressly appear, or be
necessarily implied in the terms of the grant."
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known incidents to property and its enjoyment; among others, certain burthens wherewith it may be effected, or rights which may be created and
enjoyed over it by parties other than the owner; all which incidents are
recognized by the law.... But it must not therefore be supposed that incidents of a novel kind can be devised and attached to property at the fancy
or caprice of any owner.""4 This doctrine was applied to invalidate an
attempted grant of the exclusive right of pleasure boating by a canal company in a canal. Pollack, C.B., said: "It is argued that, as the owner of an estate may grant a right to cut turves, or to fish or hunt, there is no reason why
he may not grant such a right as that now claimed by the plaintiff. The
answer is, that the law will not allow it.... A new species of incorporeal
hereditament cannot be created at the will and pleasure of the owner of
property; but he must be content to accept the estate and dispose of it
subject to the law as settled by decisions or controlled by Act of Parliament." Martin, B., said: "To admit the right would lead to the creation
of an infinite variety of interests in land, and an indefinite increase of possible estates." The validity of novel easements in the United States has
been fully examined in a recent article.46
TAXATION
PAUL G. OCHTERBECK*

The cases decided by the Supreme Court of Missouri during the year
1949 in the field of Taxation are discussed under the following topics: IBonds Issued by Public Corporations and Political Subdivisions; II-Corporation Franchise Taxes; III-Exemption from Taxation; IV-Library
Taxes; V-Sales and Use Taxes; VI-School Taxes; VII-Tax Sales and
Titles.

I. BONDS ISSUED BY PUBLIC CORPORATIONS AM
PoLITICAL SUBDIVISIONS

In Bader Realty and Inv. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority,' it was
held that the bonds issued by the St. Louis Housing Authority were not an
indebtedness of the City of St. Louis.
44. Keppell v. Bailey, 2 Myl. & K. 517, 535, 39 Eng. Rep. 1042, 1049 (1834).
45. Hill v. Tupper, 2 Hurl. &C. 121, 127-128, 159 Eng. Rep. 51, 53 (1863).
46. Conard, Easement Novelties, 30 CALIF. L. REv. 125 (1942).
*Attorney, St. Louis. LL.B., University of Missouri, 1931.
1. 358 Mo. 747, 217 S.W. 2d 489 (1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

67

Missouri
Law Review,
Vol. 15,
Iss. 4 [1950], Art. 1
MISSOURI
LAW
REVIEW

402

[Vol. 15

Holmes,2

only 19 days' published
I, State ex rel. City of Berkeley v.
notice of a special bond issue election was given instead of the not less
than 21 days' published notice required by statute. This defect was held to
render the bonds invalid.
In State ex rel. McGee v. Wilson,' it was held that an additional assessment to pay drainage bonds was valid; that notice to the property
owners of the additional assessment was not necessary; and that a prior suit
was not res judicata on the question of the alleged validity of the assessment.
In Barnes v. Kansas City,4 it appeared that on November 6, 1946,
Kansas City amended its charter whereby it enlarged its boundaries so as
to include 19 square miles in Clay County effective as of January 1, 1950,
and that on November 4, 1947, bonds aggregating over 41 million dollars
were authorized by the voters in Kansas City at an election in which the
residents of the annexed territory in Clay County were not permitted to
vote because the annexation did not become effective until 1950. It was held
that such residents of Clay County were not qualified electors on November
4, 1947; that the bond issue was valid; and that after the annexation was
effective, such residents of Clay County would have to pay their proportionate share of the taxes required to retire the bonds.
II. CoRioRAToN FRAcisE TAxEs
In Union Electric Co. v. Morris,5 it was held that a franchise tax
was not a property tax but an excise tax levied upon the right of the corporation to do business in the state; that the general public policy of the
state in levying corporate franchise taxes was to provide for a tax upon
the right to do business in accordance with the property actually used in
business in this state; and that the value of shares of stock of Illinois subsidiary corporations not engaged in business in Missouri should not be included in the franchise tax base.
III. ExEMPTioN FROM TAxAToN

In Bader Realty and Inn. Co. v. St. Louis Housing Authority,G it was
held that the St. Louis Housing Authority was created and has operated to
clear slums and to provide decent housing accommodations for low income
families at a price they can pay; that this is charity of a most practical
2.

358 Mo. 1237, 219 S.W. 2d 650 (1949).

3. 358 Mo. 1244, 220 S.W. 2d 6 (1949).

4. 359 Mo. 519, 222 S.W. 2d (1949).
5. 359 Mo. .64, 222 S.W. 2d 767 (1949).

6. 358 Mo. 747, 217 S.W. 2d 489 (1949).
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character; and that the property of this Housing Authority is used for
"purposes purely charitable" as required by the constitution and statutes
of Missouri in order to be exempt from taxation.
IV. LIBRAR TAXES
In State ex rel. Benson v. Union Electric Co.,7 it was held that the St.
Louis County Library District had the power to levy a tax upon the distributable property (poles, wires and trench) of the Union Electric Company; that the general statute covering the taxation of distributable property did not preclude such tax; and that the fact that such distributable
property is assessed and apportioned by the State Tax Commission does not
mean that this property is withdrawn from the county's taxing power.
V. SAEs AN UsE TAXEs
In State ex rel. St. Louis Die Casting Corp. v. Morris,8 an additional
sales tax assessment was held void because the required statutory notice
was not given. In State ex rel. De Weese v. Morris,9 an additional sales tax
assessment was set aside because it was based upon hearsay evidence,
speculation and conjecture.
0
the use tax act on motor
In State ex rel. Transport Mfg. Co. v. Bates,"
vehicles was held unconstitutional and void because it contained an arbitrary
and invalid exemption applying only to buses having a seating capacity of
ten or more passengers.
VI. SCHOOL TAXES
The supreme court held it did not have jurisdiction of two cases where
special elections increasing school taxes were attacked as being void. In
Young v. Brassfield,1 it was held that where the only issue was the insufficiency of the notice of the special election that the supreme court did
not have jurisdiction on any of the following bases: (1) that a constitutional
question was involved, or (2) that the school district was a political subdivision, or (3) that a construction of the revenue laws was involved, or (4)
that the county clerk or the clerk of the school district were state officers.
In Hurtgen v. Gascle,12 the court followed Young v. Brassfield, supra, and
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

359 Mo. 35, 220 S.W. 2d 1 (1949).
358 Mo. 1170, 219 S.W. 2d 359 (1949).
359 Mo. 194, 221 S.W. 2d 206 (1949).
359. Mo. 1002, 224 S.W. 2d 996 (1949).
223 S.W. 2d 491 (Mo. 1949).
223 S.W. 2d 493 (Mo. 1949).
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further held the one substantial constitutional issue raised by appellants
was not kept alive.
VII. TAx SALES AND TITLES
Two cases were decided under the Land Tax Collection Act applicable
to Jackson County. In Hatten v. Parcels of Land,1 it was held that the
trial court was justified in finding that $4,000 was the "adequate consideration" which must be paid by the purchaser, and that when the purchaser
refused to pay the $4,000, a judgment disapproving the sale was proper.
In Modern Home Co. v. Boyle,14 where the appraiser appointed by the
trial court appraised the wrong property and where the property was sold
for a grossly inadequate consideration, the judgment of the trial court
setting aside the tax sale was held to be correct.
In two cases, styled Brink, Tristee v. Kansas City,"- the supreme
court held that causes of action for amounts paid on fraudulent tax bills
accrued when the respective tax bills were paid; that claims for which
suit was filed more than five years after payment were barred by the statutes
of limitations; and that the statutes of limitations would be tolled on the
theory of duress or fiduciary relationship.
In Decker v. Evans,16 the defendant knowingly permitted the plaintiff
to redeem the lot in question from a tax sale and to thereafter pay taxes
thereon. The defendant made no effort to secure title to this lot until 1945
under a sheriff's sale made in 1937. After defendant recorded the sheriff's
deed, the plaintiff instituted this suit to cancel this deed. The supreme
court held that a sheriff's deed should be promptly secured and recorded so
as to give notice to innocent purchasers and that the failure of defendant
to take any action with respect to her claim to this lot for eight years fully
justified the trial court in setting aside the sheriff's deed upon the condition that plaintiff reimburse the defendant for her outlays with interest.
During 1949, two more decisions were rendered which held that the
considerations paid at the tax sales in question were so grossly inadequate
and unconscionable as to amount to fraud. In Liese v. Sackbauer,17 a consideration of $12.33 paid for a lot worth $1,500 was held to constitute a con13.
14.
15.
(1949).
16.
17.

358 Mo. 853, 217 S.W. 2d 511 (1949).
358 Mo. 1149, 219 S.W. 2d 346 (1949).
348 Mo. 845, 217 S.W. 2d 507 (1949); 359 Mo. 311, 221 S.W. 2d 490
221 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
222 S.W. 2d 84 (Mo. 1949).

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1

70

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1949

1950]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1949

405

structive fraud and to justify setting aside the tax deed. In Strohm v.
Boden, I a consideration of $28.70 for property worth $2,000 was held grossly
inadequate, but the sale was not set aside because the plaintiff was not a
purchaser for value and because the plaintiff delayed several years in
taking action while the property was increasing in value; however, the
plaintiff was given a money judgment for the amounts to which he was
,entitled.
In Harrisonv. Coomber Realty & Inv. Co.,19 a consideration of $549.55
paid for 40 acres of land was held not so inadequate as to constitute a fraud
in law.
In Binnion v. Clark,20 a voluntary grantor (who received no consideration from his niece, the grantee) was held to have no interest in a suit to set
aside a tax sale inasmuch as voluntary deeds are good as between the parties
and will not be set aside for that reason alone.
TORTS
GLENN A. MCCLEARY*
Each year in reviewing the decisions by the supreme court, the attention of the writer is called to the live places in the field of tort law, at
least so far as cases appealed. Railroad accidents and automobile collisions
supply the bulk of the situations. The liability of a possessor of land' for
injuries sustained on the premises by his business visitors is usually presented in several cases. An unusual number of situations during the year
under review was predicated on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. For adequacy
,of treatment, the cases having to do with the humanitarian doctrine are
discussed elsewhere in this issue by Mr. Becker.
I. NEGLIGENCE
A. Duties of persons in certain relations
1. Possessors of land
A case of unusual interest was Lentz v. Sckuenman Building & Realty
Co.2 However, the theory of the case was not developed in a way by the
plaintiff so as to bring before the court its full possibilities. This was an
18. 359 Mo. 573, 222 S.W. 2d 772 (1949).
19. 359. Mo. 862, 224 S.W. 2d 63 (1949).
20. 359 Mo. 202, 221 S.W. 2d 214 (1949).
*Professor of Law and Dean of the Law School, University of Missouri.
1. 220 S.W. 2d 58 (Mo. 1949) (en baw), noted in 15 Mo. L. Rnv. 97 (1950).
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action for damages for the wrongful death of the plaintiff's three year old
son and for hospital and medical expenses. The petition alleged that the
employees of the defendant, while building residences in a thickly populated
area in the City of St. Louis, were in the habit of building fires in the rear
of these residences, which were adjacent to the rear of the plaintiff's
residence, to bum waste materials. There was no fence or obstruction
between these partly constructed residences and the occupied residences. It
was also alleged that the defendant knew or should have known that small
children were in the habit of playing on the property where the defendant
was erecting homes; that small children were attracted to the premises for
the purpose of gathering small pieces of lumber and other refuse for their
play; and that defendant permitted small children to play and to take
materials from the rear of said buildings. The negligence alleged was in permitting a fire to burn and smolder, unattended and unguarded, at a place
where the defendant knew or should have known that small children were
likely to come into contact with the fire. The death of plaintiff's son was
caused by severe burns as a result of coming in contact with the fire and
ashes. On motion of the defendant, the plaintiffs' petition was dismissed
with prejudice and the plaintiffs appealed.
The theory of the plaintiffs case seemed to be based on the maintenance
of a dangerous nuisance. The supreme court en banc held that the fire in
this case could not be classified as a nuisance; that the fire was a very temporary condition; and that the failure to put it out or to guard it until it
went out could only be casual negligence. To constitute a nuisance, the
court said that "there must ... be a degree of danger (likely to result in
damage) inherent in the thing itself, beyond that arising from the mere
failure to exercise ordinary care in its use .... "
Although the plaintiffs on the appeal did not claim that the attractive
nuisance doctrine was applicable to the case, Judge Douglas believed that
the case should be retried to develop the facts fully so as to determine
whether the application of the doctrine should be reexamined in view of
the present living conditions in densely populated urban areas. The majority
of the court would "limit the attractive nuisance doctrine to instrumentalities and conditions which are inherently dangerous instead of applying it
to conditions in which danger has been created by mere casual negligence
under particular circumstances." It is to be regretted that this theory of
liability was not developed by the plaintiffs so that a full consideration might
have been made of the attractive nuisance doctrine as applied to a factual
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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situation such as this in a densely populated urban area. Such analysis
of this case is suggested by a note in 15 Missouri Law Review 97 (1950).
The duty of a proprietor of a place of public amusement to use care to
protect patrons from the activities of third persons which are dangerous
to the patrons, after the proprietor knows or by the exercise of reasonable
care could have known of them, was raised in Hughes v. St. Louis National
Baseball Club.2 The action was to recover for injuries sustained by the
plaintiff when boys, who had come to the defendant's ball park to secure
employment in picking up seat cushions following a game, engaged in horseplay and knocked the plaintiff down. There was evidence that the club's
employee in charge of seat cushions had authorized the admission of the boys
into the ball park near the end of the game as prospective employees, if
needed, to pick up the cushions, and that he knew that the boys on other
occasions had engaged in horseplay while waiting for him to appear and
employ them, but no attempt was made to supervise the boys on this occasion. The trial court -had rendered judgment for the defendant in accordance with a motion for a directed verdict after the jury had returned a
verdict for the plaintiff. On appeal by the plaintiff to the St. Louis Court
of Appeals, the judgment was reversed and remanded with directions to
reinstate the verdict for the plaintiff. The supreme court ordered a transfer
of the case to that court where the judgment was reversed by the court en
banc and the cause remanded for a new trial, on the ground that, although
a submissible case had been made out on evidence sufficient to show defendant's knowledge of usual activities of this particular group of boys which
assembled at this place after games, the instructions did not require a
finding that the defendant had knowledge of such conduct previously, or
that it had continued for such a period of time that the defendant in the
exercise of reasonable care should have known it.
Two cases involving the question of liability for injuries to patrons,
alleged to have been caused by defective conditions of passageways, were
predicated on contrasting physical conditions of the passageway. In Hyman
v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 3 the patron sustained injuries after a
fall in the vestibule entrance to the defendant's store. There was evidence
tending to show at the time and place of the fall that a small piece of ceramic
tile was lying on the floor about six inches from a clean spot, of about the
same size as the loose tile, and the only place where it appeared the loose tile
2. 224 S.W. 2d 989 (Mo. 1949) (en banw).
3. 225 S.W. 2d 734 (Mo. 1949).
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would fit. An expert witness on examination of the vestibule found other
pieces of tile missing or damaged. He had expressed the opinion that there
was not enough cement in the mixture and that no expansion joint, such as
a brass strip, had been inserted to allow for contraction and expansion in
cold and warm weather. He estimated that the condition had existed for
two or more years. There were soot and dirt in the loose ingredients which
he picked up there. The judgment in favor of the plaintiff was affirmed.
In the other case, Turner v. College Amusement Co.,4 the alleged injuries
were sustained by the patron who fell in the aisle of the balcony of defendant's theatre, while attempting to get to a seat during a motion picture
show. The negligence alleged was the failure to provide lights in the aisle,
permitting the carpet on the aisle floor to become worn, loose and disarranged, failure to warn of the worn and uneven condition of the carpet, and
failure to provide-an usher. However, there was no substantial evidence to
show a defective condition or obstruction. While the plaintiff said that
she caught her heel on some substance, she admitted that she did not know
what it was or whether or not the heel of her shoe hung on and was pulled
off by the edge of the step. The action of the trial court in directing a
verdict for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence was affirmed.6
2. Railroads and other carriers
A new question was decided in Griffith, v. Gardner' as to whether the
lessor of tracks, upon which the lessee railroad was operating a train at the
time the lessee's employee was killed, was liable under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for the death of the employee due to the negligence
of the lessee company, under Section 5163, Missouri Revised Statutes
(1939), providing that the railroad lessor shall remain liable for all acts and
liabilities of the lessee the same as if the lessor operated the road itself. The
supreme court en banc held that there was no employment relation between
the deceased and the lessor, therefore the lessor was not liable under the
Federal Act, and Section 5163 does not make it so. A companion decision
4. 217 S.W. 2d 504 (Mo. 1949).
5. In Hines v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 358 Mo. 782, 217 S.W. 2d
482 (1949), the action was for injuries sustained when plaintiff-pedestrian fell on
an icy crosswalk at an alley intersecting a busy street. The negligence of the
telegraph company, as a permissive user of the street, in permitting discharge of
water from one of its manholes located in the intersection, when temperatures were
alternating between freezing and nonfreezing, and in failing to warn of the consequent icy condition or to cause removal of water and ice, was for the jury. The
judgment based upon a directed verdict for the telegraph company was reversed.
6. 358 Mo. 859, 217 S.W. 2d 519 (1949) (en bane).
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which should be studied along with the instant decision is Graham v.
Thompson,7 decided by the court en banc in the preceding year.

In Cottonwood Fibre Co. v. Thompson," the action was for damages
sustained in fire at plaintiff's factory, aggravated by a train blocking the
crossing and delaying the arrival of the fire department. The crossing
blocked was the only street by which the fire department could reach the
scene of the fire. The trial court had submitted the case to the jury upon
the theory of defendants' negligence in blocking the city's fire trucks from
the fire, and also submitted the question of punitive damages. The jury's
verdict was for the defendants. On appeal by the plaintiffs, it was held
that no case was made for the jury, and that the defendants' motion for a
directed verdict should have been sustained. This was not a case of a
standing train blocking the crossing. The evidence showed that as soon
as the engineer and fireman learned of the situation the engineer increased
the speed of the moving train. The principal difference in the testimony
was as to the speed of the train and the time consumed in clearing the
crossing. The court on appeal recognized "that railroads are under a duty
to operate their trains with reasonable regard for the rights of public firemen
and private citizens to use public crossings and streets to reach a fire to extinguish it." But this duty "does not arise unless it is proved that those
operating the train had knowledge of the fire and knew that by operating the
train over the crossing the work of extinguishing the fire would be impeded
If any liability is to be imposed it must arise from something done or
...
left undone after those operating the train have knowledge of the existence
of the fire." The court was of the opinion that the jury took the view that
the trainmen did the best thing under the circumstances, when they pulled
on across the street crossing, rather than to try to stop and cut the train
at the crossing. There was no evidence to indicate that going ahead was
not the most expeditious way to clear the crossing.
In Tatum v. Gulf, Mobile & Ohio R.R.9 the plaintiff brought the action
under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for injuries sustained in the
course of his duties as rear brakeman or flagman on a freight train of the
defendant when he alighted in the nighttime from a caboose which had
stopped on a trestle. In alighting from the caboose he missed his footing
7. 357 Mo. 1133, 212 S.W. 2d 770 (1948) (en bane), commented on in the
annual survey of the work of the court for that year in 14 Mo. L. REv. 390 (1949).
8. 225 S.W. 2d 702 (Mo. 1949).
9. 223 S.W. 2d 418 (Mo. 1949).
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and fell to the creek below. The question was whether the evidence made it
a jury question as to whether the defendant negligently breached its duty to
furnish plaintiff with a reasonably safe place to work. According to the
plaintiff's evidence, the overhand of the steps of the caboose was such as
to leave only 2 to 2Y2 feet from the west edge of the bottom caboose step
to the west edge of the trestle. The defendant's evidence found it to be
32 inches. There was no catwalk, platform or guardrail on the trestle at
this point. On the opposite side of the trestle there was a ballasted platform extending something over 15 feet beyond the caboose steps. The
plaintiff testified that he had been taught to get off the right side of a
train so as to work on the engineer's side, and in order to give the engineer
a chance to see him. The supreme court on the appeal affirmed the judgment
for the plaintiff. 10
10. Other cases against railroads: In Lavender v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 358
Mo. 1160, 219 S.W. 2d 353 (1949), a railroad company was held not liable under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act, for the death of a dining car waiter who was
accidentally shot with a revolver held by another. such waiter, as a result of horseplay between him and a third waiter, while in dining car under the employer's
orders to sleep therein until time to arise on following morning to prepare for serving meals, in absence of showing that the waiters were doing anything in line of
their duty as a company's employees or in furtherance of its business at the time
of the shooting. Neither was there any basis for liability on a theory of assault as
the shooting was wholly accidental, nor was there a failure to furnish its dining car
waiter a safe place in which to work, as there was no duty to search each member
of the dining car crew and their baggage for a loaded revolver when they came to
work. There was no evidence that defendant, or any one for it, ever had actual or
constructive notice, until after the shooting, of any of this dining car crew having
or carrying a loaded pistol into that dining car. The mere fact that these young
Negro waiters sometimes engaged in wholly harmless pushing or slapping at each
other, when not at work serving meals, did not require the defendant to anticipate
any horseplay with guns. This action of the trial court in sustaining defendant's
motion for judgment, notwithstanding the verdict for the plaintiff, was affirmed.
In Hartgrove v. Chicago, B & Q. RR., 358 Mo. 971, 218 S.W. 2d 557 (1949),
a submissible case was made under the Federal Employers' Liability Act, where the
plaintiff employee sustained injuries when the boom of a derrick crane on a flatcar

jerked, during an operation of lifting rails, when the safety chains and boom were

loosed in such a way that the boom could be moved laterally as the hoisting power
was applied, causing an employee who was holding on to a rope attached to the

pulley end of the boom to be thrown to the ground.
Maxie v. Gulf M. & 0. R.R., 358 Mo. 1100, 219 S.W. 2d 322 (1949), was the
second appeal and raised no new questions not ruled on more fully on the first ap-

peal in 356 Mo. 633, 202 S.W. 2d 904 (1947), commented on in the survey of the
work of the court for 1947 in 13 Mo. L. REv. 404, 418 (1948).

In Smiley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 222 S.W. 2d 481 (Mo. 1949), a

violation of the Safety Appliance Act was held to support the action for injuries
received by a switchman while atempting to effect a coupling between two cars
by hand. A coal car had been kicked onto a track with sufficient force to couple
by impact to a boxcar, but which did not affect a coupling because the pin did not

drop. The Safety Appliance Act was held applicable, notwithstanding that the
coal car was not kicked onto the track with the intention to couple it by impact
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3. Automobiles
One of the most interesting cases decided during the year under review
to the boxcar, and notwithstanding that the movement of the car with the defective
coupler was not simultaneous with the switchman's injury.
In Rinderknecht v. Thompson, 220 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. 1949), the evidence
supported an inference which the jury might draw that the signal device at an
intersection of Big Bend Road in St. Louis County and the defendant's railroad
tracks was not working, and this was known to the train crew from the fact that
a brakeman was instructed to direct traffic over. the crossing. The court held
that evidence that a signal device did not function is not enough to show negligence.
There must, in addition, be evidence tending to show that the railroad company
knew the signal did not function or that it had been out of repair long enough before
the collision to impute knowledge to the company. On the issue of contributory
negligence in reliance upon a signalling device, the court reiterated its position
taken in Rhineberger v. Thompson, 356 Mo. 520, 202 S.W. 2d 64 (1947), commented on in 13 Mo. L. REv. 420 (1948), that one in the exercise of reasonable
care would not rely solely upon the signaling device and would use his own
senses, yet, a person, although exercising due care, doubtless would feel more secure
and would be less vigilant than if the implied assurance that the crossing could be
made in safety had not existed.
Willsie v. Thompson, 228 S.W. 2d 458 (Mo. 1949) (en banc), involved the
sufficiency of the evidence as to the failure of a signaling device at a crossing and
an erroneous instruction for failure to submit whether railroad had knowledge,
actual or constructive, of the defect in the signaling device in time to have made
necessary repairs before the accident. There was an dissent by Ellison, J., on the
ground that there was another specification of negligence founded on the failure
to sound statutory warning signals for the crossing by bell and whistle, and all assignments of negligence in plaintiff's main instruction were coupled together by the
conjunctive "and". He pointed out that, under the decisions of Missouri, even
though some of the conjoined assignments of negligence are unsupported by substantial evidence, yet if any of them are so supported and the jury returns a
verdict for plaintiff, the verdict will not be disturbed, on the theory that the jury
must have found for the plaintiff on all the assignments in obedience to instruction
and that their finding on any of the good assignments will sustain the verdict, even
though others of the assignments were not good. Therefore, he reasoned if that be
true of assignments which are unsupported by substantial evidence, it would seem
the same ought to be true of assignments whereon there had been a misdirection
in the instructions, for "in either case, on the hypothesis of the rule, there would
still be good assignments of negligence left on which the jury could base its verdict."
In Counts v. Thompson, 222 S.W. 2d 487 (1949), plaintiff had a verdict under
the Federal Employers' Liability Act for $165,000, which was reduced by remittitur
by the trial court to $140,000. The supreme court ordered a further remittitur of
$60,000, leaving the judgment stand for $80,000, otherwise the judgment was to
be reversed and the cause remanded for a new trial. The court said it did not
find that a judgment for personal injuries has ever been permitted to stand in this
state for more than $50,000, but because of the difference in costs, wage scales and
money value, a higher level of maximum damages is now warranted. The plaintiff,
while performing his duties as a brakeman, had lost both legs as a result of alleged
negligence when defendant's engine and tender, on which plaintiff was riding for
the purpose of giving the signals for coupling cars, were backed into standing cars
during a night switching movement at a speed sufficient to derail three of the cars.
Hen v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 SW. 2d 963 (Mo. 1949), was
an action for injuries resulting when the train of a lessee of the defendant railroad
struck the plaintiff's truck at a private crossing. Whether the crossing was peculiarly
dangerous and whether the terminal had exercised due care with respect to safety
of warning was for. the jury.
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is Dodson v. Maddox,"' where the defendant oil company was sued for
injuries sustained when the plaintiff was burned in an attempt to extricate
the driver of defendant's gasoline truck from the cab after the accident.
The gasoline transport went off the highway at night and crashed into the
embankment. The plaintiff was driving his automobile to his home and had
observed the gasoline truck following behind him at a distance of approximately a quarter of a mile. After the plaintiff had turned off the highway
at his home, he heard a noise of tires sliding. The transport had gone into
the ditch along the highway, the lights had gone out and the plaintiff heard
some one calling for help. The plaintiff got back in his automobile, so as
to have light, and drove back the quarter of a mile to find the transport
jack-knifed across the ditch and headed into the embankment. The trailer
had broken loose from the tractor, the tank had turned over on its side
in the road beside the tractor, and gasoline was spilling out of the side of the
road "right down where the tractor was setting." No one else was there
when the plaintiff arrived, except the driver, who was pinned in the truck.
He was asking for help and the plaintiff undertook to release him when the
gasoline caught fire. The fire spread rapidly and plaintiff's clothes, wet
with gasoline, took fire, causing the injuries complained of.
The most important question in the case is whether the defendant
owed a duty to the plaintiff, otherwise there could be no liability based on
negligence. The appellants-defendants contended that no duty was owed to
the plaintiff and that no case was made under the "rescue doctrine," because there was no proof that the defendants were guilty of any negligence
toward their truck driver, who was in peril when the plaintiff volunteered
to help him. The court agreed that no case was made under the "rescue
doctrine." It is true that the earlier cases involving the "rescue doctrine"
were situations where the defendant had been negligent toward a third
person and the plaintiff was injured while attempting to rescue the person
so threatened. Here the courts quite uniformly have held the negligent
defendant liable to the plaintiff rescuer. In recent years, however, another
type of rescue situation has appeared in the cases where the defendant has
placed himself in peril by his own negligence. The decisions seem to be
including this situation within the same concept that danger invites rescue,
and are holding that the effort of the rescuer is one of the foreseeable risks
by one who negligently has placed himself in peril. While the court does not
11.

223 S.W. 2d 434 (Mo. 1949).
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reason the case on this theory, it did find that the defendant "owed a duty
directly to the plaintiff, a duty to exercise ordinary care to avoid injuring
him, and that duty existed prior to the time the transport left the highway
and collided with the embankment. Plaintiff was in the immediate vicinity
when the transport left the highway and collided with the enbankmentHe saw and heard what took place, was attracted thereby and responded to.
the driver's calls for help and he was injured by the fire which broke out
in the wreckage." Since the plaintiff had turned off of the highway at his.
home before the transport left the highway, it is difficult for the writer
to see how the plaintiff was any longer in the zone of the risk from the operation of the transport, or where any duty owed by the defendant to the
plaintiff while the latter was using the highway any longer existed. Therefore, it would seem that any duty owing to the plaintiff would have to be
a new duty arising from the need for help which brings the case within the
second type of a rescue situation. The case reaches a desirable result. A
more complete analysis of the problem than is permitted in this survey
may be found in 11 Missouri Law Review 317 (1946), and in 12 Missouri
Law Review 471 (1947).12
A petition, alleging that the defendant corporation negligently parked
two van trailers near a street intersection, in a manner unnecessarily interterfering with and interrupting the free passage of vehicles on intersecting,
streets by obscuring the drivers' views of other such vehicles, and that the
driver of one of the automobiles, entering the intersection from the street
on which the vans were parked, swerved to his left to avoid a collision with
another automobile approaching from the right and struck plaintiff as she
stepped onto the sidewalk, was held in Domitz v. Springfield Bottlers,'3 to,
state a cause of action against the corporation for negligence in the parking
of the vans.
A judgment for the plaintiff, in an action for the death of the plaintiffs"
minor son as the result of having been run over by the defendant's truck,
was reversed in Wi!/i/te v. City of St. Louis, 4 where the supreme court
held erroneous an instruction that defendant was negligent if its truck was
passing on the right an automobile headed in the same direction at the time
12. The issue of proximate cause is also an interesting point in the case. There
was no direct evidence as to how, why or where the gasoline took fire, or as tohow soon it happened after the plaintiff arrived at the scene, but it did catch fire
before the driver was released from the cab.
13. 221 S.W. 2d 831 (Mo. 1949).
14. 224 S.W. 2d 956 (Mo. 1949).
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and place of the fatal accident. The accident happened on a city boulevard
which was wide enough for three lines of traffic bound in the same direction,
although at the time of the accident parked cars narrowed this so that only
two lines of traffic could move in that direction. A white line marked the
center of the boulevard. A car near the white center line was followed
at the right rear by the defendant's truck about in the center of their side
of the street. The plaintiff's son, six years of age, was standing on the
white line in the center of the street, apparently confused and frightened by
the heavy afternoon traffic. The driver of the other car slowed down and
then came to a stop with his left front wheel about where the boy was standing. As he did so, the boy walked in front of that car and then started to run
across the remainder of the street. The defendant's truck passed to the
right of the car which had stopped, striking the boy. The court, in disapproving an instruction, said that it is not always negligence as a matter
of law, under all circumstances, to pass another motor vehicle on the
right, even though Section 8385(e), Missouri Revised Statutes (1939),
provides that "An operator or driver of a vehicle overtaking another vehicle
going in the same direction and desiring to pass the same shall pass to the
left of the vehicle so overtaken." The court pointed out that the statute
itself contains an exception on highways where double lines of vehicles are
possible, or on highways where vehicles are obliged to move in one direction
only, or when any vehicle has slowed down, or stopped, and the operator or
driver thereof has signaled for making a left-hand turn. The court further
observed that "To stop suddenly (to keep from passing another vehicle
-which has suddenly stopped on a driver's left) in heavy traffic on such a
multiple lane street might be more negligent and cause more damage than
to proceed. The rules of the road, established by the statute, must be given
a reasonable construction and be reasonably applied to unusual or emergency circumstances."
In Wilkins v. Staecken,1 5 the plaintiff sought to recover damage for
injuries sustained in an automobile collision between a car, in which she
was riding and driven by her husband, and the defendants' truck. The car
and the truck were approaching from opposite directions and the collision
occurred when the driver of the truck made a left hand turn for the purpose
,of entering another road. The highway was straight from the point of the
-collision for almost one-quarter of a mile each way. Since the evidence
15. 225 S.W. 2d 131 (Mo. 1949).
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1

80

et al.: Work of Missouri Supreme Court 1949

1950]

WORK OF MISSOURI SUPREME COURT FOR 1949

415

showed that the defendant was guilty of negligence as a matter of law,
it was held that the trial court should not have given a sole cause instruction
hypothesizing the excessive speed of the plaintiff's husband in driving the
automobile and his duty and failure to turn aside to avoid the collision. A
judgment for the defendant in the trial court was reversed and the cause
remanded.1 6
4. Municipal corporations
In an action against the city for injuries resulting when the plaintiff
stepped into a hole in the sidewalk and curbing, an instruction directing a
verdict for the plaintiff if the hole existed, rendering the curbing and sidewalk unsafe, without reference to time in relation to plaintiff's injury, when
the city knew, or by reasonable care could have known of the existence of
the defect, was held, in McGarvey v. City of St. Louis,'7 not to constitute

reversible error, in view of evidence that the defect had existed for at least
four or five years prior to the plaintiff's injury and in view of another instruction given by the plaintiff. On the appeal, the defendant contended
that the instructions failed to tell the jury that the defendant was entitled
to a reasonable time after the reception of actual or constructive motive in
which to repair the defect, and that notice or knowledge, actual or implied,
must be brought home to the defendant a sufficient length of time in the exercise of ordinary care to make repairs prior to the date of the injury. The
court recognized this to be the rule and an instruction should be so worded,
where it is uncertain how long before the accident the defective condition
existed, or if there is evidence tending to show that it did not exist long
enough beforehand to give the city time both to learn of it and repair it. In
the instant case there was evidence that the defect had existed for four or
five years prior to the plaintiff's injury. The court ruled that where the
defect, such as this, has existed for such length of time that the city can be
16. Other cases involving collisions between automobiles: Filkin v. Snavely,
221 S.W. 2d 736 (Mo. 1949), was a wrongful death action of passenger in an automobile colliding on a curve with defendant's approaching trailer-tractor transport.
Evidence was held to warrant the granting of an instruction submitting the defense
of turning the tractor-trailer transport to the left in sudden emergency created
by the approach of the automobile on the transport's side of the highway. Yates
v. Manchester, 358 Mo. 894, 217 S.W. 2d 541 (1949), is a good case for instruction
on basic principles to be followed in drafting instructions in negligence actions.
In Hamilton v. Patton Creamery Co., 222 S.W. 2d 713 (Mo. 1949), conflicting
evidence made a submissible case on questions of whether truck driver negligently
attempted to make a left turn without passing to the right of center of intersection
and without giving required signal of intention to turn.
17. 358 Mo. 940, 218 S.W. 2d 542 (1949).
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said, as a matter of law, to have had reasonable time to learn thereof and
make the repair, it is not necessary that an instruction require a finding
that the city must have had a reasonable time to repair after learning of
the defect.
In Fletclher v. North Mehorney Furnitisre Co.,18 the plaintiff brought
the action against the above named defendant and the City of Kansas City
for injuries sustained by a fall on a sidewalk. Verdict and judgment went for
the plaintiff against both defendants, both of whom appealed. The alleged
negligence was that the defendant furniture company, under a permit from
the city, and with the approval of the city's inspectors, had constructed a
portion of the sidewalk in front of it's store with terrazzo, and that the reconstructed surface was wet and slippery at the time of the accident. The
court held on the appeal that, although an abutting property owner who
makes an extraordinary or special use of the public sidewalk for his own
convenience or purpose may be liable for injuries to a member of the public
from the conditions which he was instrumental in creating, the evidence in
this case was insufficient for the jury, in view of the evidence on behalf of
the owner and city that the terrazzo was of normal construction and was
commonly used for entrances.
5. Vendor-vendee relationship
While the cases are not numerous, it seems to be well settled in this
country that, absent an express agreement to the contrary, a seller of real
estate cannot be held liable for a defective condition of the premises which
causes injuries to the vendee. A vendor, innocent of conscious deception, is
entitled to expect that the vendee will discover a condition which would be
disclosed by such inspection as the vendee should make before buying the
property and before taking possession of it. The vendor is under no duty
to his vendee or those who may be expected to enter upon the property
in his right to inspect the property in order to discover its actual condition.
In Combow v. Kansas City Grouind Investment Co.,19 the plaintiff brought
the action for personal injuries caused by the fall of plaster upon her from
the ceiling of the living room which she and her husband had recently purchased from the defendant. The house was an old one which had recently
been remodeled. The purchasers had inspected it both inside and out. The
evidence is not entirely clear when the purchasers moved in, but it was at
18. 222 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1949).
19. 358 Mo. 934, 218 S.W. 2d ,539 (1949).
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least six days before the fall of the plaster. Under the contract of sale the
only written assurances were that a gas furnace would be installed as soon
as available, that the plumbing would be in operating condition, and that
bills for labor and materials in connection with remodeling the house had
been or would be paid. The court pointed out that the principle announced
in the landlord and tenant cases, to the effect that a landlord who gratuitously makes repairs is liable for negligence in doing so, was not applicable
since "the relation of landlord and tenant is a continuing one, while that of
seller and purchaser ceases upon the closing of the contract of sale." The
court further observed that if the defendant had warranted the condition
of the house, or had undertaken to repair the ceiling of the living room after
20
appellant had acquired title, a different question would be presented.
6. Humanitarian negligence
Due to the significance of the humanitarian doctrine in the Missouri
decisions, it has been thought desirable to give special emphasis to the
decisions predicated upon this doctrine in a separate topic to be found else2
where in this issue of the Review. 1

B. Res ispa loquitur
The principles of res ipsa loquitur are well settled, but their application
to new sets of facts provide the grist for a goodly number of appeals. In
Fitziokn v. Ozark Mountain Distilling Co., 2 2 the action was by the widow
of the foreman of a maintenance crew of the defendant distilling company
for the death of the foreman, when a tank used in the distillation of alcohol
exploded while the foreman was working with an acetylene torch on a
vapor line connected with the tank. The explosion occurred about 8 p. m.
on Sunday, the plant having been closed down the night before and all of
Sunday so that the deceased and his crew could make repairs. The deceased
at the time of the explosion was using an acetylene torch on the vapor line
and had been using the torch for about ten minutes before the explosion
occurred. There was no evidence as to the cause of the explosion. Since
the evidence must be such as reasonably to exclude the negligence of the
20. In Henderson v. Dolas, 217 S.W. 2d 554 (Mo. 1949), the landlord was not
obligated to keep the premises in repair but he had voluntarily made some repairs
to the railing on the porch of the leased premises. As a result of repairs negligently
made, the tenant's minor child fell from the porch when the railing broke.
21. Discussed by Mr. Becker.
22. 221 S.W. 2d 146 (Mo. 1949).
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injured as a contributing cause of the injury to make a prima facie case
under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, the court distinguished between masterservant cases where something happens to machinery or equipment to cause
injury to the one in charge, and where the installation, upkeep, and duty
to inspect and repair the machine and appliances are with the master, from
a case like the instant one where it was the duty of the injured servant to
repair and to see to it that the equipment to be repaired was put in a reasonably safe condition to repair. In the former situation it is the duty of the
owner of the machinery or equipment to know about its condition of safety;
in the latter this duty rests upon the one injured.
The doctrine was held inapplicable, in Maybacl

v. Falstaff Brewing

Corporation,2S because the control or right of control of the instrumentality
was not in the defendant brewing company at the time of the injury. The
plaintiff was injured by the explosion of two bottles of beer manufactured by
the brewing company, as she was removing them from a shelf in a Kroger
store. In the trial court the verdict went for both the brewing company and
the Kroger store and the plaintiff's motion for a new trial had been sustained against the brewing company. On the appeal by the company it contended that a new trial should not be ordered because, under the pleadings
and proof, the plaintiff had failed to make a submissible case under the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. The supreme court affirmed the ruling of the
trial court and held that no inference of negligence could be drawn on the
part of the brewer, so as to bring the case under the doctrine, on mere
proof of the explosion of the bottles when they were removed from the
shelf in the retail store and where at the time of the explosion the evidence showed that the bottles had been out of the brewer's control for over
seven days. Of particular importance is the partial limitation placed on the
case of Stolle v. Anleuser-Buscl, 24 which had held that a petition, similar
to that in the instant case, stated a cause of action under the res ipsa
doctrine. Of that decision the court in the instant case said: "We think
the result reached in sustaining the petition in the Stolle case is correct, because the petition states a cause of action for general negligence. But we
think the opinion extends the res ipsa doctrine too far and farther than we
have been willing to extend it in other cases." However, the court in the
23. 222 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. 1949).
24. 307 Mo. 520, 271 S.W. 497 (1924).
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instant case held that the petition charged general negligence with as much
25
particularity as should be expected.
Where all the facts connected with an accident fail to point to negligence
on the part of the defendant, but show a state of affairs where an inference
could be as reasonably drawn that the accident was due to causes other than
the negligent act of the defendant, then the plaintiff cannot rely upon the
res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Niklas v. Metz, 26 in an action for the wrongful
death of the plaintiff's husband, in a collision between a truck and a bus
on which he was riding as a passenger, the trial court directed a verdict for
the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence. This was upheld on
appeal since the evidence of the plaintiff conclusively repelled any inference
of negligence on the part of the operator of the bus. The bus operator,
traveling 35 miles per hour, saw an oncoming truck over the center line
350 to 400 feet away and, except for the left rear wheel, drove the bus off
of the pavement to the right. The truck struck the rear one-third of the
bus, tearing out the rear end and side. The operator of the bus stopped
within 15 feet after the collision. The court held that no inference of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be raised to establish
negligence concurring with that of the truck driver to cause the collision
and death of a fare-paying passenger. The court recognized that under
ordinary circumstances, when a public carrier vehicle and a truck traveling
in opposite directions on a highway wide enough for both and each sees the
other and yet they collide, there is some reason to suppose that something
most extraordinary has happened or the operator of one or both of the
vehicles has been guilty of negligence, at least from the viewpoint of an
innocent passenger. Such a case was presented in Hill v. St. Louis Public
Service Co. 2 7 The fact that the other vehicle was not under the carrier's
control did not prevent submission of the cause under the doctrine.
25. The petition did not mention the res ipsa rule. Among other allegations,
the court found the petition to state: "that the beer was manufactured, bottled,
sold and delivered by appellant to the other defendant, the Kroger Company; that
the bottles exploded and injured respondent while she, in the exercise of due care,
was removing them from the shelf of the Kroger Company; that the explosion was
the direct and proximate result of the negligence of the defendants in the manufacture, distribution and handling of the beer; that the beer is considered to be a
beverage not inherently dangerous; that the bursting of the bottles would not have
occurred if due care had been used by the defendants in its manufacture, distribution and handling; and 'that all the facts and circumstances concerning the manufacture, bottling, sealing and handling of said bottles are peculiarly within the
knowledge of the defendants."'
26. 222 S.W. 2d 795 (Mo. 1949).
27. 221 S.W. 2d 130 (Mo. 1949).
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One of the more troublesome problems in negligence is whether the
plaintiff submitted specific negligence so as to lose the benefit of predicating
his case on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Boulos v. Kansas City Public
Service Co.,2 8 the action was for injuries to a passenger while riding on the
defendant's bus. An instruction to find for the plaintiff if the bus driver
negligently caused the bus to lurch and jerk violently and suddenly and in
an unusual and violent manner and as a direct result thereof the plaintiff's
body was caused to be thrown upon the floor of the bus causing the injuries complained of was held not to submit specific negligence, so that
another instruction authorizing an inference of negligence under the doctrine was permissible. The operator's act or omission causing the bus to
lurch was neither submitted nor clearly shown by the plaintiff. The court
observed ihat he may have been constrained to slam on the brakes to avoid
striking a pedestrian, or to avoid colliding with another vehicle. If this were
so, it may have been due to his negligence in failing to keep a look out.
Or the unusual movement may have been due to his negligence in applying
the brakes too abruptly, or in carelessly manipulating the gears. The court
distinguishes this case where there is an unusual occurrence, insufficient in
itself to point to specific negligence, from those situations where "the acts
or conduct resulting in jury were so simple that, in each instance, the mere
statement of the acts or conduct causing the injuries in the pleaded or hypothesized situations was as nearly specific as could be expressed in words."
The court sets forth several sets of facts of the latter type. The case is
quite worth careful study on this difficult problem.
In Hill v. St. Louis Public Service Co.,2 9 where the plaintiff sought to
recover for personal injuries resulting from a collision between the named
defendant's bus, upon which she was riding as a passenger, and a truck operated by the other defendant, it was contended on appeal by the defendant
from a judgment for the plaintiff, that the case was tried on the theory and
that plaintiff's counsel and the truck driver's counsel had argued to the jury
that the bus was traveling at an excessive speed on the left side of the road
and therefore, the case could not be submitted on the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine. The court held that "in the absence of any facts tending to show
the direction, speed and location of operation of the other vehicle, or of the
circumstances attending the collision, such as to where and how the col28. 223 S.W. 2d 446 (Mo. 1949).
29. 221 S.W. 2d 130 (Mo. 1949).
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lision occurred, it cannot be said that respondent's evidence showed 'the
specific cause of the collision' or the specific negligence, if any, of the bus
operator which caused respondent's injuries. Even assuming that appellant
was negligent in the respects mentioned, respondent's evidence was insufficient to show that such specific negligence, if any, caused or directly contributed to produce the collision and injury." The case, therefore, was
properly submitted under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. Whether a speed
of 35 miles per hour upon a paved highway or whether the operation of a
the detailed facts attending such operation. The court quoted with approval
from an earlier Missouri decision: "When . . . the plaintiff pleads general
negligence and by the pleading invokes the aid of the res ipsa loq'uitur doctrine, he does not lose or waive the benefit thereof, and the right to rely
thereon in the submission of the case to the jury, by introducing evidence
tending to show specifically the cause of the accident if by the evidence the
cause is still left and remains in doubt or is not clearly shown. . .. "SO
30. The doctrine was applied in Dodson v. Maddox, 223 S.W. 2d 434 (Mo.
1949), to a situation where the tractor of a trailer tank which it was pulling turned
across the highway and headed into the ditch and bank. The court held this was
not a case where skidding was the sole factual cause so as to exclude the application
of the doctrine. In Stiebert v. May Department Stores Co., 358 Mo. 919, 218
S.W. 2d 113 (1949), the doctrine was applied in an action by a pedestrian against
the lessee of the first 13 stories of a 21-story building for injuries sustained when a
piece of lumber fell from one of the upper. stories and struck the pedestrian. The
evidence indicated that the piece of lumber did not come from any floor above
the 13th where no such work was being done. Work was being done on the 13th
floor where such lumber was used and waste pieces of it were falling on the floor.
in the debris. It was also on a summer day in August when the windows probably
would be open. In Hill v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 221 S.W. 2d 130 (Mo.
1949), where a passenger on a vehicle of a common carrier was injured because of a
collision between such vehicle and a vehicle operated by a third person, the fact
that such other vehicle was not under the carrier's control did not prevent the submission of the cause under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. In Payne v. Carson, 224
S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1949), the action was for injuries sustained by plaintiff while
being carried from an ambulance up the steps to a house when one of the defendant's
employees so carrying her permitted the cot and the plaintiff to be dropped and
to fall. The other employee of the defendant, who was also engaged in carrying
the cot, testified that the attendant turned his ankle and went down to his knees,
when his right foot went into a hole which was two or three inches deep, was
covered with grass and was not observable. The plaintiff submitted her main instruction under the res ipsa loquitur and the instruction hypothesized circumstances
from which negligence might be inferred. The defendant's instruction was that
the verdict should be in his favor if the dropping of the cot was directly and solely
caused by the fact that defendant's employee, without negligence on his part,
stepped into a hole. From a judgment on the verdict in favor of the defendant, the
plaintiff appealed on the ground that the defendant's instruction failed to define
negligence and hypothesize the evidence on which absence of negligence could be
predicated. The court on appeal held that the defendant's instruction need not
hypothesize more specifically, as it submitted the direct converse theory of the
plaintiff's instruction and was sufficient and proper.
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C. Defenses inNegligence Cases
Jacobs v. Gilleyleel was an action by the parents of a 15 year old
son Who was struck and killed by an automobile driven by the respondent,
after he had alighted from a westbound school bus when it had stopped on
the north side of the highway opposite the home of his parents. After the
bus and two following cars proceeded west, the boy apparently started south
to cross the highway when he was struck and killed by the respondent's
eastbound car. The respondent and his wife were the only eye witnesses
to the accident. Verdict and judgment were for the respondent. On appeal,
the supreme court reversed the judgment on the ground that an instruction
to the jury was erroneous, which charged that deceased was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law, if they found from the evidence
that he was south of the center of the highway when he was struck by defendant's automobile. The court said that "contributory negligence as a
matter of law can seldom be established by oral testimony offered solely
by the defendant. Usually it must appear in the plaintiff's case, or be
established by testimony on the part of the defendant which plaintiff concedes to be true, or by documentary evidence or proof of facts or circumstances by the defendant which leave room for no other reasonable inference." The jury was not required to believe respondent's testimony, and,
even though the jury believed the boy was south of the center line when hit,
it did not have to believe that he sprang directly in front of the car. It
might believe that the position, speed and distance of respondent's car,
when first seen by the boy, were such as reasonably to authorize him to
2
think he could safely cross the road.

31. 224 S.W. 2d 982 (Mo. 1949).
32. Other cases decided in this period involving the defense of contributory
negligence did not raise new or novel questions of fact or of law. In House v. Santa
Fe Trail Transportation Co., 217 S.W. 2d 382 (Mo. 1949), it was held that the
plaintiff, who had parked his truck so as to obstruct a portion of a state highway
on a dark foggy night, was guilty of contributory negligence as a matter of law,
precluding a recovery for. injuries allegedly sustained when his truck was hit from
the rear by the defendant's bus. The plaintiff testified that the right wheels were
off the blacktop and the left wheels were on the blacktop. The defendant's evidence
was to the effect that plaintiff's truck was parked, without lights, on the travel
portion of the highway, no part thereof being on the shoulder. Judgment for the
plaintiff was reversed. In Hamilton v. Patton Creamery Co., 222 S.W. 2d 713
(Mo. 1949), under conflicting evidence, it was held for the jury whether a motorcyclist was contributorily negligent, so as to preclude recovery for injuries sustained
in a collision with a truck making a left turn at an intersection, in attempting to
pass the truck in the intersection in violation of statute. In Montgomery v. Ross,
219 S.W. 2d 99 (Mo. 1949), it was held that defendant's contributory negligence
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol15/iss4/1
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D. Burden of Proof

v. Jones,3

the instruction on the burden of proof, in part, told
In Pdse
the jury that "before plaintiff can recover under the charge of negligence,
the charge must be sustained by the preponderance, that is, the greater
weight of the credible evidence to the reasonable satisfaction of the jury."

(italics the courts's). The court pointed out that it has criticized and
condemned the use of the words "to the satisfaction of the jury" upon the
theory that the quoted words perhaps could be construed to require proof
"beyond a reasonable doubt." However, in the instant case these words
are qualified by using the word "reasonable," and therefore "the words used
in the instruction require no more than that the jury believe that the
evidence adduced by plaintiff is more convincing than the evidence adduced by defendant. Such is the correct yardstick as to burden of proof
in a civil cause and we approve that language of instruction 1." The court
further observed for the benefit of the bar and the courts, although the
question was not before them for ruling, "that if the qualifying word
'reasonable' were omitted, such omission would be reversibly erroneous."
While the court, in Rasp v. Baumbac, 34 reaffirmed what it said in
Pulse v. Jones, supra, about the phrase "to the reasonable satisfaction of
the jury in a burden of proof instruction," the instructions in the instant
case contained another paragraph in the burden of proof instruction which
used the same words but omitted the qualifying word "reasonable." The
court, in this appeal from a judgment rendered for the defendant, affirmed
the judgment but approved an earlier holding: "'If a trial court should
grant a new trial and assign as a reason therefor the giving of such an instruction this court will sustain the ruling.' That is, if the trial court found
the use of both phrases so misleading as to be prejudicial in a particular
case we would defer to that ruling.'" In the instant case, the trial court
overruled plaintiff's motion for a new trial, therefore it was not held to be
reversible error. Furthermore, another instruction charged the jury that
"if you find and believe from the greater weight of the credible evidence
the facts to be as submitted in Instruction No. 1, then the plaintiff has met
instruction-in a death action was not prejudicial error regardless of whether it was
broader than the pleadings or evidence, where the plaintiffs' instructions conditioned recovery on decedents exercise of ordinary care for his own safety in the same
respects.
33. 218 S.W. 2d 553 (Mo. 1949).
34. 223 S.W. 2d 472 (Mo. 1949).
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and carried the burden of proof required of him under the law and under
the instructions herein." Reading the instructions as a whole, it was held
to have emphasized sufficiently the idea that the plaintiff's burden was to
sustain his charge by the greater weight of the credible evidence for the
jury so to understand.
II. WANTON AND REcKLEss MIscoNDucT
Cases predicated upon the theory that the defendant was liable for
wanton and reckless misconduct, usually to enable the plaintiff to avoid
the defense of contributory negligence or to obtain punitive damages, or
both, are not often found in the annual grist of the decisions of the court.
During the year under review, three decisions cover this phase of the law in
a manner to be of considerable help to one working on the problem. It is
true that two of the decisions deal with the law of other jurisdictions, but
on the nature and theory of the wrong they do not differ from the third
decision which is strictly a Missouri case.
In Lant v. Thompson,"5 the plaintiff was injured in a collision at night
between a westbound passenger train, on which she was riding as a passenger on a pass, when it collided with a freight engine tender which had been
erroneously switched from an auxiliary track toward the westbound instead of the eastbound mainline track. The mistake was discovered when
the tender had moved about 20 feet on the wrong lead. Reverse movement was had as soon as possible but, before the tender was in the clear,
it was sideswiped by the engine of the westbound passenger train which
was traveling between 20 and 30 miles per hour. The plaintiff submitted
her case on the hypotheses that the conductor of the freight train knew
that a passenger train was a superior train and was approaching, and with
such knowledge improperly lined the switch when by a proper inspection
he could have discovered that he had improperly lined it; that the freight
train crew could have done so, but failed to sound a whistle or give signals
or warning of the approaching passelger train; that the freight train crew
permitted the passenger train to approach without any warning of the position of the freight engine and tender; and that the engineer and fireman
of the passenger train failed to keep a constant and vigilant lookout ahead,
and failed to see the freight engine and tender in time to avoid colliding
with them. The case was submitted under instructions on the theory that
3.5. 221 S.W. 2d 834 (Mo. 1949).
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the above acts amounted to wilful and wanton misconduct. In a review of
several decisions on the subject, in which wilful misconduct has not been

too well distinguished from wanton and reckless misconduct, the court
quotes Section 500 of the Restatement of Torts, which defines reckless disregard of safety to another as follows: "The actor's conduct is in reckless

disregard of the safety of another if he intentionally does an act or fails to
do an act which it is his duty to the other to do, knowing or having reason
to know of facts which would lead to a reasonable man to realize that the

actor's conduct not only creates an unreasonable risk of bodily harm to
the other but also involves a high degree of probability that substantial
harm will result to him." In a special note to this section it is said that
the conduct so described is often called "wanton or wilful misconduct." In

reversing the judgment entered on the verdict in the trial court for the
plaintiff, the supreme court held that the acts of the employees of the defendant, although negligent, were not such as to make a submissible case
36
on the hypothesis that their conduct was wilful and wanton.
III.

DEFAmATioN

The one case of defamation, Creekmore v. Runnels, 7 raises the question as to whether it is libelous to charge a clergyman with heresy. The
decision is noted fully at another place in this issue. 8
36. Under an Illinois guest statute, a guest cannot recover from the operator
of a motor vehicle in which he is a passenger unless the accident is caused by the
wilful and wanton misconduct of the operator. In Boehrer v. Thompson, 222 S.W.
2d 97 (Mo. 1949), where the automobile host did not intend to turn off of an Illinois
road to the railroad roadbed and was unfamiliar with the road, and it was dark
and neither railroad crossing nor sign was illuminated by the automobile headlights
or otherwise, and the host kept a continous lookout ahead and was driving at the
rate of 5 miles per hour and stopped when he had traveled between 15 and 25 feet
on the roadbed, it was held there was no evidence to support the charge of wanton
and wilful misconduct. Also under Illinois law, the automobile guest who was
struck by the defendant's train at a point on the right of way some 15 to 25 feet
from the crossing was a trespasser. Under the law of the state, the duty of the
railroad was to refrain from wilfully or. wantonly injuring him and to use due care
to avoid such injury after he was discovered to be in peril. It was held that the
failure of the railroad to give the statutory signal to a trespasser on the railroad
did not render the railroad liable. The direction of a verdict for both defendants
was affirmed. Likewise, in Davis v. Wyatt, 224 S.W. 2d 972 (Mo. 1949), in an
action for injuries sustained by a toll bridge superintendent, when struck by the
trailor of tractor-trailer unit which passed the toll house without stopping, the
evidence was held insufficient to make a submissible case under Kansas law on the
issue of wanton recklessness so as to preclude the defense of contributory negligence.
37. 224 S.W. 2d 1007 (Mo. 1949).
38. See infra, p. 472.
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IV. DECEIT
The one case predicated on deceit raised no new legal questions. In
Ashton v. Buchholz, 0 the defendant fraudulently represented, in order to
induce the plaintiff to loan him money, that a named corporation, of which
defendant was president, owned mining property, and that the money
loaned by the plaintiff was to be used to employ additional men at the
mine and to purchase additional equipment to develop the mine, whereas
in fact the money loaned was raised to be paid, and was so paid, into
bankruptcy court to carry out a plan for reorganization. On appeal from
an adverse judgment, the defendant contended that the misrepresentation
of purpose could not be actionable because of its promissory nature. The
court ruled that a false representation of an existing purpose of a state
of mind is a representation of a material fact and actionable. However, the
case was reversed and remanded for the erroneous submission of other false
representations in the disjunctive and alternative, and on the ground that
the evidence did not support all representations which were alleged and submitted. The case is an interesting one on the facts as showing how widows
left with money, but with no business experience, are taken in.
WILLS, TRUSTS AND ADMINISTRATION
GEORGE W. SIMPKINS*

A discussion of the work of the Missouri Supreme Court in this field
logically falls into five subheadings: (I) Will Contests; (II) Probate Procedure; (III) Construction of Wills and Trusts; (IV) Constructive and
Resulting Trusts; (V) Miscellaneous Cases of Interest.
I. WLL CONTESTS

In Donati v. Gauddoni,' the court upheld the right of the trial judge to
grant a new trial in a will contest (based on alleged forgery of a purported
signature of the testator) on the ground that the trial judge believed that
the plaintiff's expert witness as to handwriting had committed perjury at
the trial.
Another unsuccessful will contest was Vaughn v. Vaughn, 2 where it was
held that the evidence of lay witnesses to various facts, most of which are
39. 221 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo. 1949).
*Attorney, St. Louis. A.B., Harvard, 1930; J.D., Washington University, 1933.
1. 216 S.W. 2d 519 (Mo. 1948).
2. 221 S.W. 2d 170 (Mo. 1949).
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relatively normal in older persons, did not constitute sufficient evidence to
make a case of mental incompetence.
In Norris v. Bristow,3 a will contest based on alleged mental incapacity
and undue influence, the court reversed a verdict upholding the will because
of its disapproval of an instruction that nephews, nieces, brothers, sisters
and other collateral relatives were not the "natural objects" of a childless
testator's bounty, adopting the rule that ordinarily the natural object of a
testator's bounty are those persons who would be testator's heirs-at-law if
there were no will. Thus, the court follows the majority rule rejecting the
4
contrary California rule.

In two cases the court held that the evidence as to general testamentary
disposition and alleged admissions did not constitute sufficient evidence to
prove a contract to devise. 5
On the other hand, Powers v. Mercantile Commerce Bank and Trst

Company6 upholds a decree of the trial court granting specific performance
of an oral contract to convey a house and lot in consideration of personal
services to an elderly woman. The court finds that the evidence measures
up to the high standards required in such cases and that the services were of
such character as not to be readily compensable in money.
II.

PROBATE PROCEDURE

7

Zeitinger v. Drewes, a suit for false arrest, upholds the power of a
probate court under Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 63-66 (1939), to issue a writ of attachment against any person alleged to be concealing assets of a decedent
and cause such writ to be enforced anywhere in the state. Despite the years

that those statutes have been the law of Missouri, it is a case of first impression as to the power of the probate court to issue such a writ enforceable in
another county.
In re Franz's Estate8 follows the well-settled rule that the probate court
has no jurisdiction to determine the rights to commissions of the trustees
of a trust estate created by a life tenant who purported to convey a fee to
3. 219 S.W. 2d 367 (Mo. 1949).
4. Page v. Phelps, 108 Conn. 572, 143 At. 890 (1928); In re Walther's
Estate, 177 Ore. 382, 163 P. 2d 285 (1945); contra: In re Nolan's Estate, 25 Cal.
App. 2d 738, 73 P. 2d 456 (1938).
5. Steere v. Palmer, 223 S.W. 2d 391; Fieden v. Gibson, 218 S.W. 2d 105

(Mo. 1949).
6. 217 S.W. 2d 375 (Mo. 1949).
7. 217 S.W. 2d 549 (Mo. 1949).
8. 221 S.W. 2d 739 (Mo. 1949).
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the trustees, holding that such issue could only be determined by a court
of equity in a suit in which the remaindermen were joined as parties.
III.

CONSTRUCTION OF WILLS AND TRUSTS

The court again considered the troublesome problem of the nature of a
future interest which can only arise if a contingent remainder fails. In
Tapley v. Dill,9 the court had before it a will creating two separate trusts
for the benefit of (1) testator's grandson and granddaughter, respectively,
for life with (2) a remainder to the heirs of their respective bodies, converted by Mo. Rev. Stat. § 3498 (1939), into a contingent remainder in fee
to the heirs of their respective bodies, (3) contingent cross-remainders to
the other trust, and (4) if all of these fail "then the trust estate shall go
and become the property of my son Joe Tapley." Joe Tapley survived the
testator but predeceased the two life tenants. The court held that on the
death of both life tenants, without issue, the property vested in the devisee
under the will of Joe Tapley, saying:
"Joe Tapley, upon testator's death, took an alternative or
substitutional contingent remainder, a remainder following the contingent remainder of a fee tail and subject to conditions precedent.
The authorities, as we read them, differ whether a remainder following a contingent remainder in fee may constitute a vested or
contingent future interest. It has been observed that most of the
cases holding a future interest after a contingent remainder in fee
to be a vested interest involved a residuary devise and held such devise passed the reversion. Missouri cases hold a residuary devise
passes testator's reversion. Lankford v. Lankford, 348 Mo. 1170,
159 S.W.2d 264, 265; Hobbs v. Yeager, Mo. Sup., 263 S.W 225, 227;
Davis v. Austin, 348 Mo. 1094, 1100, 156 S.W.2d 903, 905.
"The transfer of a remainder explicity or necessarily conditioned upon the donee surviving the contingency is of no effect when
said donee fails to meet said condition precedent by death prior to
the contingency. Such are respondent's cases. In Dickerson v.
Dickerson, 211 Mo. 483, 488, 110 S.W. 700, 702, the devise read:
'And at her death said farm to be equally divided between my surviving children.' In Eckle v. Ryland, 256 Mo. 424, 445, 450, 165
S.W. 1035, 1040, 1042[9], the title was to pass out of the trustee
and vest upon the death of the survivor of the beneficiary or the
settlor in the named beneficiaries 'or to their heirs, should they or
either of them be dead.' Again, in Norman v. Horton, 344 Mo. 290,
9. 217 S.W. 2d 369 (Mo. 1949).
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126 S.W.2d 187, 192, 125 A. L. R. 531, a deed provided that it was
'the title to the above described real estate' that passed at the death
of the life tenant of an estate tail without bodily heirs and not the
mere possession."
In Adams v. Conqueror Trust Company'0 the court followed the earlier
decision of In re Estate of Largune" in ruling that, under the circumsances
present in that particular will, a remainder interest created in 40 shares of
stock of E. I. du Pont de Nemours Company was a specific bequest and not
a general bequest and, hence, entitled the remaindermen to receive the
additional shares resulting from stock dividends and stock split-ups.
Jennings v. Newman.' 2 involved a will leaving a life estate in testator's
widow and at her death to be divided equally between her two children,
Albert M. Laswell and Fred L. Laswell, the court holding that this was a
devise to a class and hence that on the death of Albert M. Laswell prior
to the testator the whole remainder vested in Fred L. Laswell, instead of
the testator dying intestate as to one half of the remainder.
In Smitk v. Smit,1 3 the court ruled that the following provisions in a
will created a life estate in the widow with a power to consume and use up
the entire estate for her support.
"And lastly, all the rest, residue and remainder of my estate
whatsoever, real, personal and mixed, and wherever situate, of
which I may be possessed at my death, I give, devise and bequeath
to my beloved wife, Dora Smith, to have and to hold the same during her natural life, with full power and authority to sell any part,
or all of the real estate and execute a deed or deeds for same at any
time during her life, if she thinks best to do so, and use them unrestricted for her own use and support."

IV.

RESULTING AND CONSTRUCTIVE TRUSTS

In Rebel v. Lunsford,"4 the evidence showed that a father had in fact
borrowed the money to pay for a farm conveyed to his son, although the
son also endorsed the note. Even though there was no evidence as to who
paid the note, the court enforced a resulting trust against the son.
Padgett v. Osborne, 5 recognizes the general rule that the presumption
is that where a child furnishes the money to purchase real estate and title

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

217
267
221
220
216
221

S.W. 2d 476 (Mo. 1949).
Mo. 104, 183 S.W. 608 (1916).
S.W. 2d 487 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 10 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 68 (Mo. 1949).
S.W. 2d 210 (Mo. 1949).
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is taken in the name of the parents, there is a resulting trust in favor of the
child and that the presumption of gift or advancement does not arise. The
court upheld the reception of evidence as to oral declarations of the parent
as to who paid the money, saying:
"Logically, the existence of a resulting trust arising from the acts
of the parties is strengthened and fortified, not weakened and destroyed, by consistent oral expressions of the parties manifesting
their intentions, understandings and agreements that the grantee
is seized and holds in trust for the purchaser and true owner although the agreement be void and unenforceable as an express trust
because it relates to land and is not in writing. R. S. 1939, Mo.
R. S. A., sec. 3494. Stevens v. Fitzpatrick, 218 Mo. 708, 118
SW 51, 55 (4), a case involving somewhat similar facts; ...

2 Re-

statement, Trusts, secs. 440, 441, j. It has been considered (6 Mo.
L. R. 357) that observations to the effect that a resulting trust
arises only if not based upon an agreement of the parties in Ebert
v. Myers, 320 Mo. 804, 808, 9 S.W.2d 1066, 1067 [1-3], conflicts
with other Missouri holdings, some of which are cited supra. If so,
it should stand modified to the extent herein indicated."
Vardell v. Vardell" holds that no constructive trust as to title to land
arose where the evidence of the alleged agreement to convey, even believing
all the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses, was not sufficiently clear, cogent,
unequivocal and positive as to the existence and terms of the alleged oral
contract to convey.
A constructive trust as between a husband and wife was enforced in
Tkieman v. Thieman,1 holding that a husband's interest in property deeded
to him and his wife was held for the benefit of his wife where she paid the
full consideration and he falsely represented he would sell other property
owned by him and use the proceeds to pay off part of the mortgage.
V. MISCELLANEOUS CASES OF INTEREST

There were a number of cases concerning the question of the allowability and amount of fees to be paid out of trust estates.
In re Buder,"8 decided by the supreme court en bane, suspended the
licenses to practice law of G. A. Buder for one year because of representing
conflicting interests in the prolonged Franz Estate litigation. The case is of
general interest because of the strong indication of the court that it does not
16. 222 S.W. 2d 763 (Mo. 1949).
17. 218 S.W. 2d 580 (Mo. 1949).
18. 217 S.W. 2d 563 (Mo. 1949).
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consider that custom clearly sanctions trustees charging fees of 5% of the
corpus of the trust on the eventual termination of the trust. Judge Conkling, speaking for a unanimous court, ruled:
"In the absence of any express provision in the trust instrument fixing the trustees' fees or providing any basis for computing
the same, and in the further absence of any later contract upon the
matter, it is the general rule in Missouri that trustees' commissions
are based upon the amount of the yearly income received and paid
out by them [citing Kilpatrick v. Robert, 278 Mo. 257, 212 S.W.
884 and other authorities] ...In the absence of a statute fixing the
compensation of trustees (Missouri has no such statute) the courts
always allow trustees reasonable compensation, due regard being
had for the character of the services rendered. Absent a contract
and absent a provision in the trust instrument fixing the basis for
computing trustees' commissions, the allowance as a trustees' commission of a portion of corpus upon final distribution to the beneficiaries (or remaindermen) does not go as a matter of right but
is a matter wholly within the discretion of the court. There could
be circumstances, of course, of unuusual or extraordinary character
in the matter of the services rendered which would justify a court
in departing from the general practice of allowing trustees' commissions only out of the yearly income received and disbursed. That,
however is a question for the court to determine in each such case
before it. See cases last above cited."
In WanstratA v. Kappel,19 it was ruled that where a trust had been set
aside as to the widow of the trustor on the ground that the trust was in
fraud of her marital rights and that accordingly she was entitled to a child's
share of the whole property of the deceased, including that in the trust, she
was entitled to receive such share without there being deducted therefrom
anything on account of the fees and expenses of the trustees of the trust
either for administering the trust or for defending it against her attack. The
decision is an important limitation on the rule of Loud v. St. Louis Union
Trust Company.20 The court differentiates the two situations as follows:
"The Loud case is not controlling here and does not aid the
appellants for several reasons. In the Loud case it is apparent that
the court's decision was materially influenced by the fact that,
through a period of years, the plaintiff in that case had acquiesced
in defendant's administration of the trust and had in fact cooperated with the defendant trustee. It further appeared that the
19. 218 S.W. 2d 618 (Mo. 1949).
20. 313 Mo. 552, 281 S.W. 744 (1926).
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trustee had acted in good faith; that the will and trust was held on
a proposition of law, wholly independent of the acts of the parties;
and that, except for the exercise of the court's discretion, there was
no method provided under which defendant trust company would
be paid for its services and expenses. The court further held that
a trust had been created by the will and, in effect, existed de facto,
until held void for the reasons stated. This holding became the law
of the case in subsequent proceedings.
"We have a very different situation here, where the property
covered by the judgment had been obtained by defendant appellants by a transfer which amounted to a legal fraud on respondent,
and where respondent was entitled to take her statutory property
out of the trust estate and free from trust."
In Simmons v. Friday,21 another case involving the much litigated
Franz Estate, the court held that the statute of limitations barred a suit by
trustees of a trust estate for an approval of distributions made by them,
settlement of their accounts, and especially allowance of compensation to
them for their services, where the trustees had allowed twelve years to elapse
between the termination of the trust estate upon the death of life tenant and
the bringing of the suit.
Lang v. Mississippi Valley Trust Company22 involved the same will that
was construed in Brookings v. Mississippi Valley Trust Company.23 The
court held that under the terms of this will the life tenant was not entitled
to be reimbursed out of the proceeds from the sale of substantially unproductive real estate for loss of income and taxes and expenses charged to
income during the period when the property was unproductive. The court
again discussed the question of the allowability of attorneys' fees and indicated a rule somewhat more liberal than that laid down in other recent
cases, saying:
"The life tenant contends, since she raised the question of allocation and the ambiguity of the will concerning it, that the remaindermen and the trustee are not entitled to an allowance for
their counsel. Since the trustee was concerned only with the sale
and not with the immediate controversy between the life tenant
and the remaindermen it is argued that the trustee is not entitled
to counsel fees. In one sense the trustee was not concerned with the
merits of the controversy between the life tenant and the remainder-

21.
22.
23.

224 S.W. 2d 90 (Mo. 1949).
223 S.W. 2d 404 (Mo. 1949).
355 Mo. 513, 196 S.W. 2d 775 (Mo. 1949); 167 A. L. R. 1424.
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men. However, the trustee Was concerned with the preservation of
the estate and the proper administration of the trust and its interpretation. So far as this phase of the controversy was concerned
the trustee was a defendant and necessarily had to employ counsel. The situation is rather unique in some respects. The trustee
did not initiate either the original proceeding or this action. The
remaindermen rather than the trustee initiated the original proceeding when authority to sell the property was sought, Brookings
v. Mississippi Valley Trust Co., supra, and they filed the original
petition in this action asking that the offer of purchase be accepted. The life tenant and the trustee were defendants in both
actions. They were both agreeable to the trustee's authority to
sell and to acceptance of the offer of purchase and as we understand received counsel fees for their services in that connection. In
response to the remaindermen's proceeding the life tenant raised,
first, the incidence' of the burden of taxes and expenses and, second,
the question of allocation. In one sense the life tenant's action was
solely for her own benefit. Likewise the remaindermen's response
to the life tenant's action was for their sole benefit. Both parties,
so far as a mere construction of the trust is concerned could have
been represented by the trustee. In this respect the life tenant and
the remaindermen stand on an equal footing. It is doubtful that
any of the parties, including the trustee, were solely interested in
a mere abstract or hypothetical interpretation of the will and the
trust and yet the determination of this proceeding is beneficial to
the estate and to the parties and is necessary for the guidance of all
concerned. As we have said, the trustee did not initiate the proceedings but had it done so the remaindermen and the life tenant
would have been necessary parties with the right to be heard.
In the circumstances there was certainly an ambiguity as to whether allocation was proper and permissible, after the sale, under the
terms of the trust. In this regard the endeavors of all parties were
under the trust and its proper interpretation. This is not to be understood as approving allowances for counsel fees in all similar
cases to all the litigants but in the peculiar circumstances of this
case it is equitable that the trust fund should bear the expense of
its own administration, including the allowance of fees to all the
counsel...
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THE NEW GENERAL CODE FOR CIVIL PROCEDURE AND
SUPREME COURT RULES INTERPRETED'
CARL C.

WHEATON*

OBJECTIVES OF CODE

During the past year it has been held that the primary objective of
the code is to determine what are the controversial issues before trial be-

gins and to limit trial to them. 2 It has also been said that our new civil
code and rules are designed to cover civil actions and suits, whether at law
or equity, and to secure "just, speedy, and inexpensive" determinations of
controversies upon their merits. 3 Again it has been stated that Sections 35,
36 and 57 of the new civil code, while showing a clear intention of the
legislature to simplify pleadings generally, cannot be given the effect of
letting in evidence of special damage not pleaded, for there is another
section of the same new civil code which expressly provides: "When items
of special damage are claimed, they shall be specifically stated." 4
CASES COVERED BY THE CODE

The time and manner of taking an appeal from an order modifying a
divorce decree as respects the custody of a minor child are governed by the
provisions of the general civil code. 5
Ejectment actions are covered by the General Code for Civil Procedure
except as otherwise provided in the ejectment statutes.6
DISTINCTION BETWEEN NATURE OF CAUsEs

Generally, it is immaterial whether a cause is upon contract or in tort.
However, the nature of the cause may become important for some reasons,
including whether the particular cause is barred.
EXTENDING TIME FOR DOING SPECIFIED ACTS

Section 6(b) of the code expressly forbids a court to enlarge the time
for taking an appeal. Hence, if a court overrules a motion for a new trial,
*Professor of Law, University of Missouri. A.B. 1911, Leland Stanford University, LL.B., 1915, Harvard University. Draftsman for the Missouri Supreme
Court Committee on Civil Practice and Procedure.
1. These interpretations are based on Volumes 220 through 229 of Southwestern Reporter, second series.
2. Puckett v. Swift & Co., 229 S.W. 2d 713 (Mo. App. 1950).
3. Strohm v. Boden, 222 S.W. 2d 772 (Mo. 1949).
4. Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co., 225 S.W. 2d 798 (Mo. App. 1949).
5. Perr v. Perr. 227 S.W. 2d 490 (Mo. App. 1950).
6. Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, 221 S.W. 2d 471 (Mo. 1949).
7. Williams v. Illinois Central R. Co., 229 S.W. 2d 1 (Mo. 1950).
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it can not, by attempting to set aside such an order, extend the time to take
an appeal beyond that permitted by Section 129 of the code. 8
PARTIES

a. Proper and Necessary
Where the purchaser of a stock of merchandise who was Also to lease
certain premises from the seller repudiated -the contract the seller properly
proceeded against the bank which held an earnest money payment, on the
theory that the deposit was intended to provide liquidated damages in
event of a breach of the contract on the part of the buyer. 9
Where a petition seeks a decree compelling a drainage district and
other defendants to have repairs to a bridge made "at the expense of the
defendant Drainage District," the district is a proper and necessary party.
But as the district was named in the petition as a party defendant and was
joined in pertinent allegations thereof, and since the motion attacked the
sufficiency of the petition on its face, and the ruling purported to dispose
of the cause as to all defendants, the appellate court treated the district as a
party defendant. The motion dealt with the sufficiency of the petition, not
with service.1 0
b. Iterpleader
The object of a bill of interpleader is not to protect against a double
liability, but to protect a party against a double vexation in respect to one
liability. Therefore the alleged fact, that only one of the defendants in an
interpleader action could collect rent from plaintiffs, was immaterial, where
the other defendants were claiming the right to the rent and were threatening suit.1
Where a bank, which held money of a purchaser, was sued therefor
by the vendor on the ground that the money was to pay liquidated damages in case of a breach of contract, which had occurred, the bank could
12
require the vendor and purchaser to interplead for the fund.
8. Krummel v. Hintz, 222 S.W. 2d 574 (Mo. App. 1949).

9. Koelling v. Bank of Sullivan (Johnson third-party defendant), 220 S.W.
2d 794 (Mo. App. 1949).

10. New v. South Daviess County Drainage District, 220 S.W. 2d 79 (Mo.
App. 1949).
11. Buerger v. Costello, 226 S.W. 2d 610 (Mo. App. 1949).
12

Koelling v. Bank of Sullivan (Johnson third-party defendant), supra note
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c. Third-Party Practice
The granting of a motion to bring in a third party defendant is discretionary with the trial court. Hence a court of appeals cannot reverse an
order denying a motion to bring in a third party defendant, unless the
court of appeals finds that there has been a gross abuse of discretion."
Section 20 of the code permits a third-party petition to bring in a
party not already a party to the suit and is no authority for making a defendant a third-party defendant."
A master who is sued for an injury caused by his servant, where the
defendant's liability is based merely on his relation to the servant, may be
permitted to bring the servant into the suit as a third-party defendant, so
that the master may be indemnified for whatever he may be forced to pay
the plaintiff. The third-party petition need not show a matured demand
against the servant. 15
The supreme court has recently held that, where a third-party plaintiff's claim against a third-party defendant arose out of the same transaction as-that out of which the plaintiff's claim against the third-party plaintiff arose, a cross-claim may be stated by the third-party plaintiff against
the third-party defendant.' 6 This seems to be incorrect, since Section 77
of the code states that a cross-claim is a proceeding by one party against
a co-party. A third-party defendant not having been made a defendant
is not a co-party with the defendant who becomes the third-party plaintiff.
d. Substitution of
Section 22(a) (3) of the new code as corrected by Rule 3.08(a) is in
7
the nature of a statute of limitation.'
Where one party in suits died March 19, 1948, and other party died
July 15, 1943, and our present statute, which became effective January 1,
1945, provided that an action should be dismissed as to a deceased party
if a substitution or motion therefor is not made within one year after
death, but no suggestion of death or a motion to revive suits was made
until November 24, 1947, petitions for revivor were properly denied, though
under the statute in force at the time of the deaths, the right of revivor
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.

Stanley v. Ray, 220 S.W. 2d 75 (Mo. App. 1949).
Biggs v. Crosswhite, 225 S.W. 2d 514 (Mo. App. 1949).
State ex rel. Algiere v. Russell, 223 SW. 2d 481 (Mo. 1949).
Gabel-Lockhardt Co., v. Gabel, 229 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. 1950).
Hartvedt v. Maurer, 220 S.W. 2d 55 (Mo. 1949).
Ibid.
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would have existed. The shortening of time for revivor and substitution of
parties did not run counter to the retrospective provisions of the Constitution. 8

Where a corporation owning a hotel sold it to a partnership while a
suit in equity against the corporation was pending for reformation of a
lease of rooms in the hotel, and the corporation was dissolved, it was proper
for the suit to proceed to a final determination as against the partnership
and corporation.19
PLEADINGS

a. Petitions
A plaintiff should allege facts sufficient to inform the defendant of
the breach of duty with which he is charged and, if the facts are within
the plaintiff's knowledge, he should be required to state them with reasonable particularity. Negligence, however, is an ultimate fact which may be
pleaded as such, and not as a conclusion. The law does not require the impossible. Where, from the nature of the case, the plaintiff in an action
for damages for negligence could not be expected to know the exact cause
of the precise negligent act which became the cause of an injury, and
the facts were peculiarly within the knowledge of the defendant, the plain20
tiff is not required to allege the particular cause.
Where a petition charged that the defendant negligently drove into the
path of plaintiff's automobile and that the negligence was the direct and
proximate cause of the accident and the petition was not attacked by a
motion to make more definite and certain, it was not insufficient even
though it was indeed nebulous in its allegations of negligence.
A petition alleging that, in order to induce plaintiff to loan him money,
the defendant fraudulently represented that a named corporation of which
the defendant was president owned mining property and that the money
loaned by the plaintiff was to be used to employ additional men at the
mine and to purchase additional equipment to develop the mine stated a
cause of action for damages for fraud and deceit.22
Our procedure code requires that the petition contain a demand for
judgment for the relief desired. But the court is not bound in an equity
19. St. Louis 221 Club v. Melbourne Hotel Corporation, 227 S.W. 2d '764
(Mo. App. 1950).
20. Maybach v. Falstaff Brewing Corporation, 222 S.W, 2d 87 (Mo. 1949).
21. Lindsey v. Rogers, 220 S.W. 2d 937 (Mo. App.,,1949).
22. Ashton v. Buchholz, 221 S.W. 2d 496 (Mo. 1949).
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case by the prayer of the petition. However, the prayer of the petition is
not to be entirely ignored. When the allegations of fact are ambiguous
or susceptible of two constructions, the prayer may be looked to for the
purpose of ascertaining the intention of the pleader.23
b. Answers
A rule of a circuit court providing that an answer must be made within
30 days after the service of summons, even though a motion was made and
not passed on within the 30-day period, is void, since Section 65 of our
procedure code permits service of motions any time within the 30-day
period, and Section 58 provides that an answer may be filed within 10 days
24
after the ruling on a motion.
Defendant pleaded that it had operated and maintained the permanent
structure and equipment constituting the Bagnell Dam since October 16,
1931 "and that any cause of action plaintiff claims to have against the defendant by reason of such construction, maintenance and operation of said
dam is barred by the provisions of Section 1014, R. S. Mo., 1939 [Mo.
R.S.A.]." The respondent contended in the appellate court for the first
time that the defense of limitations was insufficiently pleaded; that "obviously" the theory of the defendant's answer was that the cause of action,
if any, arose at the time the lake was filled and not when the plaintiff first
sustained damages therefrom; that the answer failed to allege the date
when substantial damage occurred from which the injuries could be ascertained. Section 1014 bars actions of the kind described in the petition if not
brought within five years after accrual. Section 1012 provides that, for
the purpose of the limitation statute in question, the action shall not be
deemed to have accrued until the damage is sustained and capable of ascertainment. The answer was not attacked below for insufficiency in respect
to the plea of limitations. No objection was made at trial to questions
and answers pertaining to that defense, and, in fact, the plaintiff resumed
the stand to testify further regarding his damages in 1935, evidential to
meet the defense of the five year statute. Under the circumstances and
under the present code of procedure the defense of limitations was suffi2
ciently pleaded in the answer. 1
23. St. Louis 221 Club v. Melbourne Hotel Corporation, 227 S.W. 2d 764
(Mo. App. 1950).

24. Puckett v. Swift & Co., supra note 2.
25. Webb v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 223 S.W. 2d 13 (Mo. App. 1949).
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c. Replies

Statutes providing that there shall be a reply if the answer contains a
counterclaim and that, if a responsive pleading is required, all defenses or
objections not raised therein are waived, with certain exceptions, are mandatory, provided that the opposing party invokes their enforcement by timely
and proper action, and otherwise they may be waived. Hence, where the
defendants raised no objection to the failure of the plaintiff to file a reply
to their counterclaims, did not ask for a default judgment or for judgment
on the pleadings, tried the case as if replies had been filed, attempted to
prove the allegations of their counterclaims, and' submitted them to the
jury in their requested instructions, and the jury found the facts against
the defendants, the defendants waived the filing of a reply, and could not
6
successfully claim that allegations of their counterclaims stood admitted.2

d. Counterclaims
The objective of Section 73 "is to discourage separate litigations covering the same subject matter, and to require their adjudication in the same
action." The compulsory counterclaim provision [Federal Rule 13(a)] is
said to be a means of bringing all logically related claims into a single
litigation, through the penalty of precluding the later assertion of omitted
27
claims.
"Subject matter" as used in Section 73 is that of the opposing party's
claim. But it is the "transaction or occurrences" out of which the opposing
parties' claims may arise. The word "transaction" is a word of flexible
meaning. It may comprehend a series of many occurrences, depending not
so much upon the immediacy of their connections as upon their logical
relationship. The word "claim" and the word "transaction" are both of
broad meaning. The word "claim" does not refer to the form of the action
but to the underlying facts combined with the law giving a party a right
to a remedy of one form or another based on the claim. "Transaction" is
a word of still broader meaning. "Transaction" should be broadly construed to include all of the facts and circumstances which constitute the
foundation of a claim. It cannot be restricted to the simple statement of a
wrong complained of by the defendant, for it would seem to be impossible
28
that a claim could accrue to the plaintiff out of such a wrong.
26. Pleiman v. Belew, 227 S.W. 2d 733 (Mo. 1950).
27. Cantrell v. City of Caruthersville, .upra note 6.
28. Ibid.
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It is not essential that the claim which Section 73 requires to be stated
as a counterclaim should seek the same relief as the opposing party's
9

claim.2

Where, in action of ejectment, defendants, merely as a defense, claimed
title to the land involved by adverse possession and subsequently brought
an action to try title to the same land, the "subject matter of the action"
was title to the land within the statutes respecting affirmative pleas and
the filing of counterclaims, so that, where the defendants failed to interpose a counterclaim respecting the title to the land in the prior action, they
30
were barred from maintaining the subsequent action.
A partner cannot offset an indebtedness to the partnership against an
indebtedness of the individual partner. Thus, where a partnership of which
defendant was a member owned the building in which the plaintiff and
defendant operated a liquor store as partners, and the plaintiff sought to
recover on a note executed by the defendant for the purchase price of one-

half of the stock, the defendant could not offset a claim for rent allegedly
owing him and his partner for use of the building. 3 '
e. Joinder of Claims
The new code is intended to permit, and under certain conditions to
require, the joining of all claims existing between the parties in one action.
There may be an unlimited joinder of claims between the same parties.
Now independent claims may be joined in a petition or in a counterclaim.
They need not arise out of the same transaction or occurrence, or series
thereof, and a common question of law or fact need not exist. They may
include both contract and tort claims; may be legal or equitable, and may
2
be joined as independent or alternative claims.3

f. Exhibits Are Parts of a Pleading
Checks and letters attached to appellant's petition as exhibits, become
a part thereof.

33

g. Admittance of Averments in Pleadings
The allegations contained in a pleading which required a responsive

pleading stand admitted, if they are not denied in such responsive pleading

34

29. Ibid.,

30. Ibid.

31. Powell v. Downing, 225 S.W. 2d 952 (Mo. App. 1950).
32. White v. Sievers, 221 S.W. 2d 118 (Mo. 1949).
33. Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., 227 S.W. 2d 708

(Mo. 1950).
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h. Departure
In an action for an accounting, wherein the defendants filed a counterclaim on a note, and the plaintiff filed amended petitions seeking to recover
damages for alleged fraudulent conversion of collateral, it was held that
the rule against departure can no longer stand since a party may now state
s5
as many separate independent claims as he has regardless of consistency.
i. Construction
Courts are liberal in construction of pleadings after verdict where by
reasonable intendment and fair implication essential fact allegations are
present even by inference.3 6 In such a case the intendment is taken most
strongly in favor of the pleader.3 7 But the general rule has been that where
a pleading is ambiguous and doubt or confusion appears, it must on motion
be taken most strongly in its interpretation against the pleader.3 8
Ordinarily, a petition sounding both in tort and upon contract, would
have been construed as stating a tort action.39
j. Amendments to Pleadings
The new civil code permits a party to amend his pleading as a matter
of course at any time before a responsive pleading is filed and served. After
that time a party may amend his pleading only with leave of court or by
written consent of the adverse party.40 With leave amendments may be
filed at any time before judgment, if justice so requires.41
Since the effective date of the new civil code, amendments are unlimited in scope. An amendment may be based upon an entirely new theory
42
materially different from that originally pleaded and tried.
Under the new code a trial court may permit a plaintiff to file any
number of amended petitions if in the opinion of the court justice so re43
quires.
An application for leave to file an amended pleading may be viewed
34. Fair Mercantile Co. v. Union-May-Stern Co., 221 S.W. 2d 751 (Mo. 1949).
35. White v. Sievers, supra note 32.
36. Ashton v. Buchholz, supra note 22.
37. Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., supra note 33.
38. Ibid.
39. Williams v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra note 7.
40. White v. Sievers, rupra note 32.
41. Stone v. Kies, 227 S.W. 2d 85 (Mo. App. 1950).
42. Ibid. In White v. Sievers, supra note 32, the court said that courts should
be extremely liberal in permitting amendments.
43. White v. Sievers, supra note 32.
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as a motion under Section 60 of the new civil code, which says "an application to the court for an order shall be by motion," and where at the
time the court sustained the defendants' motion to dismiss a petition, it
granted plaintiff, in the same order of dismissal, time in which to plead,
this amounted to leave to file the next amended petition, and it was not
necessary for the plaintiff to obtain any additional leave before filing it."4
Where the only showing of prejudice or harm by delay in filing amended pleadings was the allegation that extensive depositions had been taken
and very substantial costs have been incurred on the basis of the pleadings
theretofore filed earlier, that was not a sufficient ground for the court
unconditionally to refuse leave to file an amended pleading if in its discretion the court found justice would be better served by permitting the
amendment. 45
If allowing an amendment would unjustly penalize a party because
of court costs already incurred under prior pleadings, the court in its discretion may grant leave to amend upon payment of such costs or upon
such terms as it deems just. And where the court grants leave to amend
on its own motion, it may impose such terms as are justified because of the
amendment when the amendment is filed.' s
Where the plaintiffs did not ask leave to amend their petition after
entry of an order sustaining the defendant's motion to dismiss the petition
but contented themselves with appeal from the order of dismissal, they
could not convict the trial court of error in failing to give them an oppor7

tunity to amend.4

By filing an amended petition a plaintiff usually abandons the prior
petition and all matters not restated in the amended petition.48
Where a petition fails to allege an essential element of a cause of action,
but evidence thereof is admitted without objection, the petition is treated
on appeal as having been amended to conform to the evidence." Similarly,
it has been held that where a petition charged general negligence, but no
objection to evidence of specific acts of negligence was made, the petition
would be considered as amended to conform to proof.5 0
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.

Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Cobb v. Aluminum Co. of America, 226 S.W. 110 (Mo. App. 1950).
Simmons v. Friday, 224 S.W. 2d 90 (Mo. 1949).
Waltermire v. Stuart, 222 S.W. 2d 945 (Mo. App. 1949).
Rinderknecht v. Thompson, 220 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. 1949).
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a. Functions of
The old demurrer has been abolished but a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted when the objection appears upon the face of the petition performs the same function heretofore
performed by demurrer. 51
b. Where Ground of Motion Must Appear
Under Section 61 of our new code lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter may be raised by motion whether or not the same may appear from
52
the pleadings or other papers filed in the cause.
Objections raised by motion to dismiss a petition for failure to state a
cause of action must appear on the face of the pleadings. "8
A defendant's motion to dismiss a case for the reason that the petition
failed to state a claim on which relief could be granted was not bad for
failing to state in what manner the petition was defective.54

c. Allegations Admitted
In ruling upon a motion to dismiss, all properly pleaded facts and all

inferences of fact that may fairly and reasonably be drawn therefrom must
be taken as true. But, of course, neither conclusions of law nor the conclusions of the pleader on the facts are admitted by such a motion.
A pleading must afford a reasonably sufficient fact foundation for the
further facts to be inferred.55 In such a case properly pleaded facts must
be construed broadly and most favorably to the party against whose

pleading the motion is directed.

6

d. Waiver of Objection Available by Motion
In an action where the defendant properly by motion challenged the
jurisdiction of the court over the subject matter and over the person of the
$I. Abbott v. Seamon, 229 S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. 1950). This same general idea
is expressed in Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., supra note 33,
as follows: "There is no practical difference between a 'failure to state a claim upon
which relief can be granted' when objected to by motion under Sec. 62 of our new
Civil Code, and under the former demurrer statutes."
52. Cobb v. Aluminum Co. of America, supra note 47. Compare Bruun v.
Katz Drug Co., 221 S.W. 2d 717 (Mo. 1949).
53. Abbott v. Seamon, 229 S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. App. 1950).
54. Ibid.
55. Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank and Trust Co., supra note 33;
Martin v. Ficklin, 227 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. App. 1950).
56. New v. South Daviess County Drainage District, 220 S.W. 2d 79 (Mo.
App. 1949).
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defendant, and the motion was overruled, the defendant did not waive the
objection to the jurisdiction of the court by filing an answer wherein the
7
defendant tendered money and costs into court
But one does waive the failure to plead fraud with particularity by
answering without questioning by motion the sufficiency of the pleading
of such an allegation58 Further, a defectively stated cause of action in a
fraud case is not subject to attack after verdict.59
e. When Motions Mst Be Made
A motion to set aside a stipulation for a judgment on the ground that
it was fraudulently procured must be made before the court loses control
over its judgment60
DISCOVERY

a. Interrogatories
In an action by a dishwasher employed at a lunch counter of a department store against the manufacturer of a washing compound for injury
to her hands from use of the compound, the dishwasher was entitled to know
by answer to interrogatories the ingredients and proportions used in the
compound so that the information could be submitted to experts for opinion, notwithstanding that the answer would allegedly divulge trade secret.
The court said: "To keep from her this information would prevent her
from making a prima facie case and it would do no good to divulge it secretly to the judge or to the plaintiff after the trial had proceeded and she had
failed to prove a causal connection between her injury and the washing
compound that she claims caused it.
"We know of no law that prevents a court from compelling the divulging of a trade secret under circumstances where it is as material as here
in ascertaining the facts." 61
The following interrogatories were asked by the plaintiff of the defendant in a recent case.
"First Interrogatory: What is the name and address for the purpose
of service of a subpoena of each person employed by your corporation as
an adjuster and who participated in the inspection, adjustment or inspec57.
58.
59.
60.
61.

Johnson v. Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia, 225 S.W. 2d 370 (Mo. App. 1949).
Jackson v. Merz, 223 S.W. 2d 136 (Mo. App. 1949).
Ashton v. Buchholz, .spra note 22.
Kidd v. Kidd, 229 S.W. 2d 270 (Mo. App. 1950).
Putney v. DuBois Co., 226 S.W. 2d 737 (Mo. App. 1950).
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tion of the property of the above named plaintiff following the fire occurring
on February 16, 1949 whereby her property located at 127 North Main
Street, Cape Girardeau, Missouri, was damaged?
"Fifth Interrogatory: Were any agent adjuster, investigator or other
person directed by the above defendant or by its agents, servants or employees to make inquiry regarding the above named plaintiff in Williamson
County, Illinois, and if so, for what purpose and what instructions were
extended such persons regarding such investigation or inquiry and what
persons were interrogated by such person or persons?
"Sixth Interrogatory: What are the names and addresses of all persons
interviewed by any and all investigators, appraisers, adjusters, agents or
servants employed by the above named defendant to investigate, appraise,
adjust or inquire into the fire occurring on February 16, 1949 whereby
property owned by the above named plaintiff was damaged at 127 North
Main Street, Cape Girardeau, Missouri?"
In connection therewith, the supreme court said:
"We see nothing wrong with the First Interrogatory. The adjusters,
who participated in the investigation, adjustment or inspection of plaintiff's property following the fire, would certainly be competent witnesses as
to the amount of the loss which was one of the important issues in the case.
They may have also observed conditions on the premises tending to show
the origin of the fire. Plaintiff had the right to take the depositions of
these adjusters to find out what their testimony would be.
"However, the Fifth Interrogatory (as does the Sixth Interrogatory)
asks for the names of the persons interrogated by relator's agents, investigators or adjusters after the fire.
names of persons whose connection
would only have become known to
uniformly held beyond the scope of

Thus, these questions called for the
with the case and knowledge of facts
its agents by hearsay. This has been
our discovery practice.

"Nothing else is involved in the Sixth Interrogatory. However, the
Fifth Interrogatory also improperly calls both for subjective purposes and
for intracompany instructions given to relator's agents about the preparation of its defense. The United States Supreme Court held in Hickmina v.
Taylor, 329 U. S.495, 67 S.Ct. 385, 91 L. Ed. 451, that, even under the
broader discovery provisions of the Federal Rules, it was not proper to
require the disclosure of the thoughts, mental processes and work product
of lawyers in the preparation of the defense of a case. We hold that under
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950
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our Code this principle also applies to such preparation by parties and
their adjusters or investigators. Relator relies on State ex rel. Ctvmmings
v. Witthaus, 358 Mo. 1088, 219 S.W. 2d 383, but that case involved an
order for production of documents under Sec. 86 of the Code, Sec. 847.86,
Mo. R. S. A. The documents which we ordered produced therein were
specifically designated in the application and order. They were found to
be material and admissible as evidence in the case. It is not authority for
these parts of the Fifth Interrogatory we have held to be improper."' -,
b. Depositions
Section 142 of the General Code for Civil Procedure does not in express words require that the "documentary evidence" mentioned be relevant and material to the issues in the pending cause, but the supreme court
has construed the section as making that requirement.
Under the last clause of this section it was not necessary for the
application for the order to allege the relevancy and materiality of the
documentary evidence sought to be produced, or for the application to be
verified. The issue of relevancy and materiality of any documentary evidence may be determined by reference to the allegations of the petition
and other pleadings on file in the court in the cause in which the depositions are to be taken.
It is apparent that the second part of Section 142 is supplemental to
or in lieu of the subpoena mentioned in the first part of this section; and
that no prior notice to the opposite party should be required for the issuance of a subpoena or an order under this section.
Section 142 is not unconstitutional nor void by reason of any failure
to provide for prior notice to a party to the suit, or for any failure to require by express words that the documentary evidence be relevant and
material to the issues in the pending cause.
Section 142 does not require the application for such an order to be
in writing, or to be filed in the cause or verified. It would be judicial legislation for the court to impose requirements the legislature did not see fit
to impose. Nor does the section require a specific designation in writing of
such documentary evidence as a condition precedent to the court's jurisdiction to enter an order for the production by a party, on the taking of depositions, of relevant and material documentary evidence in his possession.
62. State v. Caruthers, 226 S.W. 2d 711 (Mo. 1950).
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Further, the documentary evidence required to be produced by a party
upon the taking of depositions in a pending cause must be designated in
the order with sufficient description to specifically advise the party or witness of the documentary evidence required to be produced and reasonably
to exclude evidence which is not relevant or material to the pending cause.
An order requiring one of the defendants to produce, at a designated
time and place, all letters, manuscripts, other documents, or copies thereof
in his possession, written by a named person, since deceased, on the taking
of depositions in a suit to enjoin the unauthorized publication of such
person's unpublished letters, was invalid as an excessive, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of judicial authority beyond the circuit court's jurisdiction, too general, and an unreasonable invasion of the defendants' right
of privacy.
Section 86 of the civil code has to do with discovery. It was intended
to serve a totally different purpose from Section 142. Different procedure
has been provided. However, a party may not escape the provisions of
Section 86 by attempting to use Section 142 to accomplish the same
purpose. 63
CONTINUANCES
a. Grantingwithin Discretion of Court

The granting or refusal of a continuance rests in the sound discretion
of the trial court.64
b. Counsel Member of General Assembly

Allegations in an affidavit of an attorney for the defendants that the
attorney was immediately employed after a change of venue was granted,
that the attorney had been in actual attendance at the session of state
legislature since the change of venue was granted and therefore had no
time to prepare for trial or to participate therein, were statements of facts
and not mere conclusions and were sufficient to support an application for
a continuance.""
RIGHT TO TRIAL BY JURY

In a strictly equitable action, the verdict of a jury is only advisory.66

63.
64.
65.
66.

State ex. rel. Clemens v. Witthaus, 228 S.W. 2d 4 (Mo. 1950).
Lambert v. Lambert, 222 S.W. 2d 544 (Mo. App. 1949).
Mueller v. Burchfield, 224 S.W. 2d 87 (Mo. 1949).
Newlfork Life Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 229 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1950).
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DIsMIssALs
Section 99 of the General Code for Civil Procedure allows dismissal
without prejudice at any time before submission "and not afterward."
Section 101 of the code provides that any voluntary dismissal which the
plaintiff is not entitled to take without prejudice shall be with prejudice.
Therefore, after a full hearing and final submission, the defendants are
entitled to a final determination of the case and a dismissal thereafter is
with prejudice,67 unless the trial court's order provides otherwise.08
Where a railroad employee sued his railroad and a terminal association
for injuries, dismissed both actions, later sued both again for the same
injury, again dismissed as to the terminal railroad, the record not showing
whether the second dismissal was with or without prejudice, and continued
the action against the railroad, the railroad could not raise the question
of res judicata for the first time on appeal on the ground that the dismissal
as to the terminal was a dismissal as to the railroad, the liability of the
railroad being based solely on the action of the terminal railroad association.
The evidence showed that, during the trial, the railroad knew that the
plaintiff claimed that the terminal association was acting for the railroad
in switching cars out of the railroad's yard. Hence, if the railroad wished
to claim a second dismissal as to the terminal association it should have
done this at the trial. Further, there was evidence that the defendant's
liability, if any, might be based on its own acts. If this was true, dismissal as to the association would not automatically be a dismissal as to
the railroad.
A second dismissal after a jury has been impaneled is with prejudice
where there is no stipulation for a dismissal without prejudice or an order
of court made on special motion permitting a dismissal without prejudice.0o
If a case is dismissed because the court has no jurisdiction, it cannot
be dismissed with prejudice, since that involves an exercise of jurisdiction.
A dismissal with prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits. A
court which lacks jurisdiction is without power to dispose of the case on its
70

merits.

The trial court has inherent power to dismiss a cause for failure to
prosecute with diligence.7 1
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Gruet Motor Car Co. v. Briner, 229 S.W. 2d 259 (Mo. App. 1950).
Raze v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co., 227 S.W. 2d 687 (Mo. 1950).
Ibid.
Royal Loan Co. of St. Louis v. Darr. 220 S.W. 2d 787 (Mo. App. 1949).
Limpus v. New York Life Ins. Co., 226 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1949).
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Section 103 of the code does not mean that a counterclaim cannot be
dismissed or settled by agreement. It merely means that it shall not be
dismissed merely because the petition is and for that reason alone. Other
72
reasons may justify its dismissal.
If an order is one of dismissal the trial court is without power to re78
instate the cause or to make any order touching it.
The motion to dismiss, in a nonjury case, takes the place of the demurrer to the evidence under the practice prior to the effective date of the
7
new code. '
If the court uses the term "dismissed" its meaning is clear, and the
cause is thereafter pending. A cause may be dismissed by use of another
word than "dismissed" but, if other words are used, their meaning and
intended effect may be open to judicial interpretation. However, if the
words used indicate a clear intention to dismiss the action, such effect will
be given to them. Where a petition had been filed and the defendant's
demurrer and certain motions were pending and undisposed of, and the
judge at the time maintained more than one docket, and the defendant
failed to raise the question of dismissal prior to filing of its answer more
than eleven years after entry, a docket entry reciting that matter was to
"pass off docket" did not effect a dismissal.75
In absence of an order of dismissal, an action is automatically con7

tinued.

6

INSTRUCTIONS

In order to preserve any point for appeal on instructions given or refused, under the statutes as they now stand and under the rule of the
supreme court, objections must still be made as provided by Sections 105
and 122, although the grounds therefor need not be stated.YT
If the law of the case is properly declared in both form and substance,
it is the jury's duty to hear them, read them and consider them as the law
of the case. Where the given instructions concisely, understandably and
correctly declare the law as to the proper field for instruction in the particular case, they may not either be speculated to have been or held as a
72. England v. Yellow Transit Co., 225 S.W. 2d 366 (Mo. App. 1949).
73. Limpus v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 71.
74. Shafer v. Hatfield, 223 S.W. 2d 396 (Mo. 1949).
75. Limpus v. New York Life Ins. Co., supra note 71.
76. Ibid.
77. Lindsey v. Rogers, 220 S.W. 2d 937 (Mo. App. 1949); Louisiana Lumber
Co. v. Burbridge, 220 S.W. 760 (Mo. App. 1949).
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1950

115

Missouri Law Review, Vol. 15, Iss. 4 [1950], Art. 1

MISSOURI LAW REVIEW

[Vol. is

matter of law to have been confusing or burdensome to the jury merely
for multiplicity.7
The court should never give long, numerous and argumentative instructions. Such instructions tend to confuse the jury. In most cases a
multiplicity of instructions "is not to be commended," and, where possible,
a multiplicity of instructions should be avoided. Where the issues are few
and simple a court is justified in refusing to give a multiplicity of instruc79
tions.
Instructions which refer the jury to other given instructions are not
80
therefore erroneous when the referred to instructions are correct.
T

ARGUMENT TO JURY

Under the decisions, it is not permissible for counsel in his argument
to the jury to comment on the failure of the adverse party to produce a
witness if said witness is one who is equally available to both parties81
MOTION FOR A DIREcTED VERDICT

In testing the sufficiency of the evidence to make out a case submissible
to a jury upon motion for a directed verdict as formerly upon a demurrer to
the evidence or a request for a peremptory instruction, now abolished by the
civil code of Missouri, the plaintiff's evidence must be considered true, and
the plaintiff given the benefit of every inference of fact which can be reasonably drawn therefrom. Consideration should be given to only so much
of the defendant's evidence as tends to prove the plaintiff's case and dis2
regard all evidence in favor of the defendant.
Whether the plaintiff made a case for the jury as against a codefendant
must be decided upon the strength of the plaintiff's own evidence unaided
by the evidence brought forward by codefendant in his own defense where
the defendant stood on its motion for a directed verdict at the close of the
78. Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., 223 S.W. 2d 383 (Mo. 1949).
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Fisher v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. of Boston, Mass., 229 S.W. 2d
246 (Mo. App. 1950).
82. Hoock v. S. S. Kresge Co., 222 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. App. 1949); Knost v.
Terminal R. Ass'n. of St. Louis, 222 S.W. 2d 593 (Mo. App. 1949); New v. Kansas
City School of Watchmaking, 222 S.W. 2d 966 (Mo. App. 1949); Woolf v. Holton,
224 S.W. 2d 861 (Mo. App. 1949); Neely v. Freeze, 225 S.W. 2d 144 (Mo. App.

1949); Burnis v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 226 S.W. 2d 743 (Mo. App. 1950);
Martin v. Ficklin, 227 S.W. 2d 69 (Mo. App. 1950).
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plaintiff's case and thereby did nothing to waive its right to challenge the
action of the court at that stage of the proceeding s s
Where the defendants moved for a directed verdict at the close of
plaintiff's evidence and proceeded thereafter to introduce evidence to sustain
their defenses, they were not in a position on appeal to claim that the
court erred in refusing to sustain their motion.84
VERDICT
A verdict cannot be impeached by evidence of the jurors.8 5
Where action against husband and wife was dismissed by plaintiff as
to wife, but counterclaims of both husband and wife remained in the case,
verdict stating that jury found in favor of the plaintiff and assessed plaintiff's damages in certain amount, and that jury found in favor of plaintiff
on counterclaims, was not objectionable, on ground that it was insufficient
because it failed to name the defendant or defendants against whom it was
found. The husband was the only remaining defendant against whom the
jury could find as to the plaintiff's cause of action. 86
MOTION FOR JUDGMENT IN AccoRDANcE WITH MoTIoN
FOR DiRtcTaD VERDIcT
Where the plaintiffs failed to make a submissible case for the jury,
denial of the defendant's motion for a directed verdict was error, and, upon
the defendant's timely motion, the trial court properly set aside verdict and
judgment for plaintiffs and entered judgment for the defendant.87
A trial court has jurisdiction to consider and sustain the defendant's
motion to have the verdict and judgment entered thereon set aside and
judgment entered in accordance with the defendant's motion for a directed
verdict, though the motion was entitled a "motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict," which motion has been abolished in civil cases.8s
When a court believes that a motion to set aside should be sustained
but also finds error in instructions, it would be best for it to sustain the
motion to set aside and also sustain the motion for a new trial, making its
ruling thereon in the alternative (specifying its grounds for granting a new
83.
1949).
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Rothweiler v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 224 S.W. 2d 569 (Mo. App.
Walthermire v. Smart, 222 S.W. 2d 945 (Mo. App. 1949).
Lloyd v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 227 S.W. 2d 460 (Mo. 1950).
Pleiman v. Belew, supra note 26.
Croskey v. Shawnee Realty Co., 225 S.W. 2d 509 (Mo. App. 1949).
Ibid.
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trial) to be effective in the event its judgment entered on sustaining the
motion to set aside be reversed.89
Under Supreme Court Rule 3.24 if a motion for a new trial is disposed
of, a motion to set aside a verdict and judgment, if not ruled on, is deemed
overruled as of the same date that the new trial motion is passed on.")
It is the duty of the court to pass on all after trial motions. Hence,
after sustaining a motion to set aside a verdict and judgment, it should
also pass on an existing motion for a new trial."'
CAsEs TRIED WITHOUT A JURY

a. Findings of Court
The provision of the new code that the court trying facts without a
jury shall dictate or prepare and file such a statement if requested by any.
party before final submission does not exclude the court's right to make
92
such a statement of its own volition.
Under the new code the court's findings, even if requested, are not
conclusive, but, instead, the appellate court is none the less required to
review the case upon both the law and the evidence as in suits of an
equitable nature. As a matter of fact, a special finding under the new code
serves no particular purpose except that, in a situation where the evidence
is conflicting and close, the appellate court may be expected to defer to it
because of that court's regard for the superior opportunity of the trial court
to judge the credibility of the witnesses.98
Fact issues on which findings are not made are deemed found in accordance with the result reached. 9 '
b. Amending Judgment
Where a bill in equity was dismissed and the plaintiff moved .for a new
trial and, in the alternative, to set aside the judgment and enter a new
judgment for the plaintiff, the court did not lose jurisdiction to set aside
the judgment by overruling the motion for a new trial.9 5
89. Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club, Inc., 224 S.W. 2d 989
(Mo. 1949).
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Pudiwitr v. Soloman, 224 S.W. 2d 562 (Mo. App. 1949).
93. Ibid. See, in accord as to procedure in appellate court, Jackson v. Merz,
223 S.W. 2d 136 (Mo. App. 1949).
94. Decker v. Evans, 221 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1949).
95. Strohm v. Boden, 222 S.W. 2d 772 (Mo. 1949).
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c. Duties of Appellate Court
In an equity case the court reviews the evidence, determines its weight
and value and reaches its own conclusions, but where there is conflicting
verbal testimony upon essential fact issues, it is the rule to defer to the
chancellor's findings because of his better opportunity to judge of the
credibility of the witnesses, unless the weight of the. evidence is clearly contrary to such findings.98
This is also true in ordinary law cases97 and in divorce actions', tried
without a jury. This law applies also to cases referred to and tried by a
referee.91
In an equity case the appellate court will consider only such evidence
as it deems admissible without regard to the trial court's rulings in that
connection.100
NEw TRiALs

a. Necessity for
Although Supreme Court Rule 1.04 abolishes the distinction between
the "record proper" and the "bill of exceptions" in the preparation of the
transcript of the record, it does not do away with a motion for a new trial
as a prerequisite to appellate review of matters outside the record proper.10 '
96. Rich v. Williams, 222 S.W. 2d 226 (Mo. 1949). In accord: Reasor v.
Marshall, 220 S.W. 2d 111 (Mo. 1949); Binnion v. Clark, 221 S.W. 2d 214 (Mo.
1949); Wallace v. Shanks, 221 S.W. 2d 873 (Mo. 1949); Scheer. v. Gerleman, 221
S.W. 2d 875 (Mo. 1949); Compton v. Vaughan, 222 S.W. 2d 81 (Mo. 1949);
Strohm v. Boden, 222 S.W. 2d 772 (Mo. 1949); Heath v. Heath, 222 S.W. 2d 778
(Mo. 1949); Steere v. Palmer, 223 S.W. 2d 391 (Mo. 1949); Williams v. Diederich,
223 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. 1949); Roberts v. Clevenger, 225 S.W. 2d 728 (Mo. 1950);
Cazel v. Alledine, 226 S.W. 2d 729 (Mo. 1950); Union Nat. Bank of Wichita,
Kansas v. Lamb, 227 S.W. 2d 60 (Mo. 1950); In re Priest's Estate, 227 S.W. 2d
474 (Mo. 1950); McCoy v. McCoy, 227 S.W. 2d 698 (Mo. 1950); New York Life
Ins. Co. v. Feinberg, 229 S.W. 2d 531 (Mo. 1950); Cosentino v. Heffelfinger, 229
S.W. 2d 546 (Mo. 1950); Thomas v. Milfelt, 222 S.W. 2d 359 (Mo. App. 1949);
Ewalt v. Hudson, 223 S.W. 2d 132 (Mo. App. 1949); Zorensky v. Wellston Clothing
Co., 223 S.W. 851 (Mo. App. 851); Johnson v. Durest, Inc., 224 S.W. 2d 611 (Mo.
App. 1949); Brannan v. Cruce, 225 S.W. 2d 374 (Mo. App. 1949); National Life
Ins. Co. v. Blair, 225 S.W. 2d 806 (Mo. App. 1949); Krueger v. Fitzpatrick, 229
S.W. 2d 255 (Mo. App. 1950); Marshall v. Callahan, 229 S.W. 2d 730 (Mo. App.
1950).
97. Gabel-Lowther v. Hays, 225 S.W. 2d 708 (Mo. 1950); Lockhart Co. v.
Gabel, 229 S.W. 2d 539 (Mo. 1950); Prestigiacamo v. American Equitable Assur.
Co. of New York, 221 S.W. 2d 217 (Mo. App. 1949); Redden v. Bohmer, 223 S.W.
2d 121 (Mo. App. 1949); Paasche v. Frame, 225 S.W. 382 (Mo. App. 1949).
98. Kleinhammer v. Kleinhammer, 225 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. App. 1949).
99. Nieberding v. E. M. Stivers Co., 227 S.W. 2d 462 (Mo. App. 1950).
100. Simmon v. Marion, 227 S.W. 2d 127 (Mo. 1950).
101. State v. Cave, 220 S.W. 2d 45 (Mo. 1949).
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b. Grounds for
New trials may be granted for good cause.10 2
Generally, a challenge to the array, based on illegality in the selection
of a jury panel, must be made in writing prior to the trial and verdict, except that such a challenge is timely if made on a motion for a new trial
upon a showing that the party aggrieved had no knowledge before trial of
the irregularity complained of and was not chargeable with such knowledge.
Thus, where irregularity in the selection of a jury panel occurred on Monday morning and the case was tried on Tuesday and Wednesday in a
county in which there are many divisions of court and the defendant did
not learn of the illegality of the procedure until after the trial was completed, the defendant was not chargeable with knowledge of the illegality,
so that challenge made to the panel on the defendant's motion for a new
trial was timely.1 8

Conduct of the judge who was in charge of jurors and in instructing the
deputy sheriff to call roll of jurors and to release anyone who did not want
to serve on the jury was ground for a new trial as a violation of a statute
requiring the judge to hear and determine all excuses of jurors.104
Giving an improper instruction is a ground for a new trial10 5
The mere fact that the judge communicated with the jury by messenger, on a matter pertaining to the evidence, even though the messenger was
the deputy sheriff in charge of the jury, was sufficient to sustain the court's
order granting a new trial.100
The trial court may grant a new trial because it believes the verdict
is against the weight of the evidence, and even where there is some substantial evidence to support a jury's verdict.10 7
The granting of a new trial on the ground that the verdict is equivalent
to the granting of a new trial on the ground that the verdict is against the
weight of the evidence. The supreme court has so stated the law.10 8
New trials are sometimes granted on the ground of newly discovered
102. Berger v. Podolsky Bros., 227 S.W. 2d 695 (Mo. 1950).
103. Doran v. Ross, 221 S.W. 2d 756 (Mo. App. 1949).
104. Ibid.

105. Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 226 S.W. 2d 599 (Mo. 1950);
Stupp v. Fred J. Swaine Mfg. Co., 229 S.W. 2d 681 (Mo. 1950).
106. Lloyd v. St. Louis Service Co., supra note 85.
107. Albert H. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 227 S.W. 2d 499
(Mo. App. 1950); Hoefel v. Hammel, 228 S.W. 2d 402 (Mo. App. 1950); Hogsett
v. Smith, 229 S.W. 2d 20 (Mo. App. 19$0).
108. Wormington v. City of Overland, 224 S.W. 2d 590 (Mo. App. 1949).
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evidence. However, motions for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence are not favored; such motions should be examined with caution, and
a motion for a new trial based on alleged newly discovered evidence is
properly refused where there is no showing of diligence to secure such evidence in time for the trial.1 9

That a trial court may reach a conclusion contrary to that reached by
a counsel upon the trial strategy question of what was to "the best interest"
of the counsel's client is no legal ground upon which a new trial may be
granted. Questions of policy in the trial of a case (which necessarily includes when and upon what subject to speak and when and upon what
subject to stand mute) are for the litigant and his counsel. Court proceedings are conducted under the vigilant and unbiased direction of the trial
judge. The trial court's sole jurisdiction in the instant respects is to see
that all litigants exercise their rights in only a proper manner and at all
times within the law110 A trial court has no legal ground to set aside the
jury's verdict merely because one defendant chooses to incur the risk involved in making a forthright statement to the jury as to its insurance
coverage, while the other exercises its legal right to make no such statement to the jury. No court has any right to compel a litigant to make to
the jury any such prejudicial admission. That one defendant stands upon
that matter is but a trial incident that has no possible effect on the
merits of the case. And, too, it clearly falls within that class of incidents
the entire control of which by Supreme Court Rule 4.24, is reposed in counsel.11 Further, the determination of what is "an outright attempt to gain
favor with the jury" is purely a matter of trial tactics within the sole determination of litigant and counsel. Most litigants attempt to gain the
jury's favor. The law does not prohibit that. A wholly proper "attempt
to gain favor with the jury" is not a legal ground for the granting of a new
trial.112 Neither can a new trial legally be granted because two litigants,
jointly sued, exercise their legal prerogative to be represented by separate
counsel."

8

c. Specification of Errorin Motion
Assignment in a motion for a new trial that the trial court erred in
giving a certain instruction because it authorized the jury to speculate upon
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.

In re Priest's Estate, supra note 96.
Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., supra note 78.
Ibid.
Ibid.
Ibid.
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and to consider matters not mentioned in the evidence and that it was in
effect a roving instruction and did not limit the jury to a consideration of
the issues made by the pleadings and evidence was sufficient. The civil code
and rules require only general objections to instructions. The policy of the
courts of this state, touching specifications of error in motions for a new
11
trial, especially in civil cases, is very liberal. 4
d. Unverified Motion
Where no evidence is introduced in support of the grounds for an unverified motion for a new trial, such grounds may not be considered."15
e. Time Within Which to Grant Motion
A trial court may not, after the time during which he is given control
over his judgment, set aside his earlier order overruling a motion for a new
trial and reinstate that motion for further action upon it.110
The fact that the plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial after the time
allowed by statute and the fact that it was stricken by the court has no
bearing on the right of the court of its own motion to set aside the verdict
as against the weight of the evidence. This discretionary right is vested in
the court and may be exercised regardless of whether or not a motion for
a new trial has been filed. Where the trial court had all of the evidence
before it at the time the verdict was entered, and within the time allowed
by statute set a verdict aside on the ground that it was against the weight
of the evidence presented, the trial court's action on its own initiative was
without error.17
f. Discretion of Court
There is an hypothesis that the order of a trial court sustaining a
motion for a new trial is presumptively correct. It is the settled law that
a trial court has a wide discretion in passing on a motion for a new trial,
and where such a motion is sustained the appellate court will be liberal in
upholding the trial court's action11 This discretionary power relates only
to questions of fact and matters affecting the determination of issues of
fact. 19 Where the reason for granting a new trial and the judicial act of
114. Cunningham v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, 221 S.W. 2d 758 (Mo.
App. 1949).
115. Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., supra note 78.
116. Krummel v. Hintz, supra note 8; Perr v. Perr, supra note 5.
117. Albert H. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 107.
118. Wormington v. City of Overland, supra note 108.
119. De Maire v. Thompson, 222 S.W. 2d 93 (Mo. 1949); Mavrakos v.
Mavrakos Candy Co., supra note 78; Berger v. Podolsky Bros., .rwpra note 102.
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granting it is directed solely to a question of law, and the act is erroneous,
it does not fall within the rule of the exercise of sound judicial discretion,

120
for there is no discretion as to the law.

Granting a new trial for misconduct or indiscretion on the part of
jurors, lawyers, and a trial judge, occurring prior to the rendition of a
verdict, rests largely within the discretion of a trial court. 12'

This is also true when the ground for a new trial is newly discovered
evidence,122 or that the verdict was against the weight of the evidence.1 2

However, such discretion should not be exercised in an arbitrary or unreasonable manner; and, in determining whether the trial court properly
exercised its discretion in awarding a new trial on such ground, the appellate court will examine the record to ascertain if there was sufficient substantial evidence to justify the submission to the jury of the case of, or to
sustain a verdict for, the party to whom the new trial was granted 24
g. GrantingNew Trial on Court'sInitiative
Under the statute providing that not later than 30 days after the entry
of judgment the trial court of its own initiative may order a new trial for
any reason for which it might have granted a new trial on motion of a
party, it is immaterial whether the motion for a new trial is filed or not 1

25

h. Stating Reasons for Granting Motion
A statement by a trial court that, where a master and servant are sued
jointly in an action dependent solely on the doctrine of respondeat superior
and based on a tortious act of the servant and the servant is acquitted, there
can be no recovery against the master, was a sufficient statement of the
ground for setting aside the verdict against the employer and granting a
new trial1

26

i. Wken Motion for New Trial Deemed Overruled
Where the transcript does not show any ruling by the trial court on a
refiled motion for a new trial, if the motion had any effect, it was deemed
2
overruled for all purposes after 90 days.

7

120. Mavrakos v. Mavrakos Candy Co., supranote 78.
121. Lloyd v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 85.
122. In re Priest's Estate, supra note 96.
123. Graves v. Atchison, T. U. S.F. Ry., 227 S.W. 2d 660 (Mo. 1950); Albert
H. Hoppe, Inc. v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 107; Hoefel v. Hammel,
supra note 107.
- 124. Graves v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 123.
125. DeMaire v. Thompson, supra note 119.
126. Berger v. Podolsky Bros., supra note 102.
127. Rozell v. Rozell, 229 S.W. 2d 700 (Mo. App. 1950).
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j. Effect of Riding on Motion
The motion for a new trial is the basic after trial motion under our
code to preserve trial errors for appellate review; and, when disposed of,
128
makes the judgment against which it is directed final.
Where a trial court sustains defendant's motion for a new trial unless
the plaintiff makes a remittitur, the defendant is entitled to a new trial on
29
the whole case.1

CONTROL OF COURT OVER JUDGMENT

Under Missouri Supreme Court Rule 3.24, a judgment becomes final at
the expiration of 30 days after its entry except when a timely motion for a
new trial is filed, in which event the judgment becomes final at the expiration of 90 days after the filing of such motion or, if such motion is
passed on at an earlier date, then at the date of the disposition of said
motion. Rule 3.25 of that court provides that the trial court retains control over judgments during the 30 day period after entry of judgment and
may re-open, correct, amend or modify its judgment for good cause within
that time. So that, where a motion for a new trial had been overruled and
no appeal taken, and more than 30 days had elapsed since the entry of the
judgment, the court then lost its power and authority to change or modify
the judgment. Terms of court having been abolished by the present code,
the lapse of the 30 day period has the same effect as the lapse of the term
under the old code. Rule 1.17 of the supreme court, which permits an appellant to withdraw his appeal in the trial court at any time prior to the
filing of the transcript on appeal in the appellate court, does not extend
the time within which the judgment becomes final.180
After the court loses control over a judgment, it cannot modify such
judgment even by agreement of the parties.1 8'
EXCEPTIONS TO RULINGS OFt A COURT

The rule that objections to rulings of courts must be taken to save
those objections for appeal has been applied during the past year to rulings
128.
129.
1949).
130.
131.

Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club, supra note 89.
Crews v. Sikeston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 225 S.W. 2d 812 (Mo. App.
State v. Wilcox, 224 S.W. 2d 392 (Mo. App. 1949).
Rozell v. Rozell, supra note 127.
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83

instructions,'1' the form of verargument of counsel,
on evidence,
13 6
5
dict, ' and to the report of a referee.
An appellant is not permitted to broaden the scope of his objection on
7
I
appeal beyond that made in the trial court.
Where a motion for a directed verdict is considered, and the issues
are fully understood by the court, before the motion is overruled, the upper
court will pass on the question raised at the trial, since the court knows the
action which the moving party wishes taken and the grounds therefor, even
if the general language of the motion was insufficient under section 122 of
8
the code to preserve the issue for review. 1
An objection to the ruling of a trial court on the introduction of evidence was held unnecessary to save the ruling for hearing on appeal, where
the court, in admitting the evidence, put the burden of allowing the evis9
dence to go to the jury "squarely on the shoulders of the Court."
APPEAL

a. Righzt Statutory
The right of appeal is given by statute, and, unless the person who
feels aggrieved by the action of the trial court is given the right of appeal
by the statute, he has no such right.U
b. Aggrieved Party
Generally speaking, a party or person is aggrieved by a judgment,
order, or decree whenever it operates prejudicially and directly upon his
4
property, pecuniary, or personal rights.' '
A party to a law suit is not entitled to an appeal from a judgment
therein merely because of a decision in favor of the other party. One cannot
appeal from a decision which is correct so far as his interests are concerned,
132. Hill
v. Nowotny,
Light Co. v.
S.W. 2d 360

1950).

133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.

v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 221 S.W. 2d 130 (Mo. 1949) Reger
226 S.W. 2d 596 (Mo. 1950); State ex rel. Kansas City Power &
Gould, 222 S.W. 2d 940 (Mo. App. 1949); Borgman v. Boten, 225
(Mo. App. 1949); Montana v. Nenert, 226 S.W. 2d 394 (Mo. App.

Reger v. Nowotny, supra note 132.
Johnson v. Lea, 229 S.W. 2d 717 (Mo. App. 1950).
Pleiman v. Belew, supra note 26.
Nieberding v. E. M. Stivers Co., supra note 99.
Borgman v. Boten, supra note 132.
Ashton v. Buchholz, supra note 22; Pudiwitr v. Soloman, supra note 92.
DeMaire v. Thompson, supra note 119.
Brannan v. Cruce, supra note 96.
Schumacher v. Schumacher, 223 S.W. 2d 841 (Mo. App. 1949).
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or which does not affect his interests, however erroneous and prejudicial it
42
may be to the rights and interests of some other party or person.
The necessity that the prospective appellant be aggrieved applies no
less to an intervener or one denied the right to intervene than it does to an
143
original party to the case.

While one whose application to intervene has been denied may obviously not appeal from the final judgment on the merits of the case, he
may appeal from the order denying his application, if the order is otherwise
appealable, and he is aggrieved by it. The latter conditions are met whenever, on the face of the proceeding, his rights can be preserved in no other
way than by intervention, and the order denying his application finally de1 44
termines the case so far as he himself is concerned.
The fact that an appellant is interested, if he is not a direct party,
must be made apparent on the record and if he does not make it clear that
he is interested, but leaves the matter doubtful, the court must decide
against him. Otherwise a meddler with no legal interest in the judgment
could appeal and subject the real parties and those affected by the judgment to expense and delay against their will. The absurdity of such a situation is at once apparent. 45
However, the statute giving aggrieved parties the right to appeal from
an offending judgment does not require a showing that the judgment is
erroneous. 46
c. Judgments and Orders Appealable

A judgment must ordinarily dispose of all parties and all issues in the
case to be a final judgment for the purposes of appeal.

4

T

Thus it is clear that the reference in the cases to an order of distribution
in defining a final judgment in a partition suit can only mean an order of
final distribution, an order which distributes all the proceeds, because otherwise the order would not finally dispose of the case. On the other hand an
order of partial distribution leaves part of the proceeds undistributed and
retained by the court subject to its further order. Such an order is an inter142.

Brannan v. Cruce, supra note 96; Dickinson v. Gault, 229 S.W. 2d 283

(Mo. App. 1950).
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Schumacher v. Schumacher, supra note 141.
Ibid.
Schappacher v. Smith's Estate, 223 S.W. 2d 121 (Mo. App. 1949).
Ibid.
White v. Sievers, supra note 32.
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locutory order entered on an intermediate motion made before final judgment. The very purpose of the motion contemplates the postponement of
final judgment. 148
An order of a circuit court denying a motion by intervenor to be set
aside its prior order, entered ex parte, directing the magistrate to enter an
appeal to the circuit court after the time for appeal had expired, was an
appealable order.',"
An order sustaining a bill of interpleader was appealable. 50
Where the circuit court held that the report and order of the Public
Service Commission were invalid and unlawful and remanded the cause so
that the commission could promulgate a valid and lawful report upon which,
if reviewed, the circuit court could review the proceedings on the merits,
there was no finality of disposition of the proceedings by the reversal and
remand which gave the objecting county the right to appeal therefrom.' 51
An order dismissing a mechanic's lien suit as to defendant property owners
only, without disposing of the case as to defendants contractor, mortgagee
1 52
of property, and trustee for mortgagee, was not appealable.
An order modifying a divorce decree as respects the custody of a minor
child of the parties is an appealable order.'53
A dismissal of an action with prejudice operates as an adjudication of
the merits. The code defines a dismissal with prejudice, in part: ... and
any involuntary dismissal other than one for lack of jurisdiction or for
improper venue shall be with prejudice unless the court in its order for dismissal shall otherwise specify."
An order dismissing a petition because no cause of action was stated
may be a dismissal of the plaintiff's action with prejudice, as distinguished
from a dismissal merely of the pleading. Unless the trial court shall otherwise specify, an order dismissing a petition is held to be a dismissal of the
plaintiff's action rather than a dismissal of the pleading only. When the
court dismisses plaintiff's action, the order of dismissal is ordinarily a final,
appealable judgment.
However, there is no fixed or formal phrase which must be used to
148.
149.
150.
151.
1 (Mo.
152.
153.

England v. Poehlman, 221 S.W. 2d 742 (Mo. 1949).
Bowen v. Mossman, Magistrate, 226 S.W. 2d 404 (Mo. App. 1950).
Buerger v. Costello, supra note 11.
State ex rel. St. Louis County v. Public Service Commission, 228 S.W. 2d
19.0).
Braun v. Graham, 211 S.W. 2d 494 (Mo. App. 1948).
Perr v. Perr, slipra note 5.
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specify that the dismissal of a petition is not intended as a dismissal of the
plaintiff's action. If the order shows in any way that the court did not
intend the dismissal of the petition then and there to put an end to the
plaintiff's action, it amounts to a dismissal of the petition only and not of
the action.
When an order in a case dismissing the plaintiff's petition contained
the provision: "Now plaintiff is by the court given thirty days in which to
plead herein," it is clearly evident that the court did not intend the order
to be a dismissal of the action, but intended that only the pleadings or parts
of them be dismissed. In granting time to file further amended petitions in
the still pending action the trial court sufficiently "specified" that the orders
of dismissal were intended to affect the pleadings only, and not the action
itself.
It is only when the court sustains a motion to dismiss a petition without
stating anything in the order of dismissal to indicate the action is to continue, that the action itself is dismissed.
When the court indicates in the order of dismissal that the plaintiff's
action is to continue by including permission to file amended petitions, the
order of dismissal affected merely the offending pleadings and does not
dismiss the action. Accordingly, such an order is not a final judgment.",
It is not within the province of appellate courts to decide abstract,
hypothetical, or moot questions, disconnected from the granting of actual
relief, or from the determination of which no practical relief can follow, and,
although there are decisions to the contrary, it is held in a number of jurisdictions that the fact that the questions involved are of public importance
does not change the rule. The appellate court may receive proof or take
notice of facts appearing outside the record for the purpose of determining
the moot character of a question presented to it. 1,
d. How Taken
1. Notice of Appeal
(a) Necessity for
It is now settled law that the vital step for taking an appeal is the
timely filing of a notice of appeal, which is referred to as being jurisdictional
154. White v. Sievers, supra note 32.
155. Hurtgen v. Gasche, 227 S.W. 2d 494 (Mo. App. 1950).
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in the sense of being the one procedural step outlined by statute which
must be literally complied with if the appeal is to be "effective."86
(b) Time for Filing
For an appeal to be effective, absent a special order by the appropriate
appellate court, the notice of appeal must be filed not later than ten days
5
after the judgment or order appealed from becomes final.3 7
Thus, notice of appeal from an order modifying a divorce decree as
respects custody of a minor child given more than 10 days after entry of an
order overruling a motion for a new trial was too late to make the appeal
effective, and it must be dismissed, and the mother's motion for suit money
and attorney's fees for prosecution of appeal denied. 158
Filing of a trustee's motion to set aside dismissal of an action for
trustee's commissions within ten days after dismissal postponed the finality
of the judgment and permited an appeal within 30 days from the date on
which the court overruled the motion. 5 '
The circuit court erred in issuing its rule and attachment directing a
magistrate to enter an appeal to the circuit court from a judgment for the
plaintiff, and to certify the proceedings, merely because the judgment was
entered without notice to defendants of entry of judgment on the date to
which the cause had been continued under agreement of the parties, where
no timely appeal had been taken. "0
Where the movant did not receive actual notice that her motion for a
new trial had been overruled until after expiration of the time for taking a
regular appeal, her remedy was to apply to the appellate court for a special
16
order permitting her to file a notice of appeal. '
(c) Form of Notice
A notice of appeal is sufficient in respect to its description of the judgment appealed from if the notice can reasonably be construed as evidencing
an attempt in good faith to appeal from a judgment which is appealable.62

156.
1$7.
158.
159.
221 S.W.
160.
161.
162.
163.

Perr v. Perr, supra note 5.
Krummel v. Hintz, supra note 8.
Perr v. Perr, supra note 5.
Simmons v. Friday, 224 S.W. 2d 90 (Mo. 1949); In. re Franz' Estate,
2d 739 (Mo. 1949).
Bowen v. Mossman, supra note 149.
Perr v. Perr, supra note 5.
Krummel v. Hintz, supra note 8.
Montana v. Nenert, supra note 132; Pudiwitr v. Soloman, supra note 92.
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2. Separate Appeals
Where a judgment was rendered against several defendants and each
one took separate appeals, and separate notices of appeal were filed by the
clerk of the court of appeals under separate docket numbers, there was still
but one case in the court of appeals, as in the court below 10 3
3. Transcript of the Record
Where the appellant fails to furnish an abstract of the record showing
all the evidence presented to the trial court, the appellee may furnish all
the evidence in an additional abstract or may file an additional, but incomplete, abstract, showing that appellant's abstract is incomplete and may
decline to furnish a complete abstract. 64
Where the respondent does not agree to a shortform transcript and does
not agree that the necessary evidence is shown by the transcript filed in a
case by the appellant, there is nothing left for the court to do except to
dismiss the appellant's appeal.165
Where the evidence presented on a motion to bring in a third-party
defendant did not appear in the transcript, and the order denying the
motion did not set out the reason or reasons for the court's ruling the court
of appeals could not reverse the order.'66
Where objections to instructions appear in a transcript which is certified by the trial judge to be correct, "including the Bill of Exceptions taken
and saved on behalf of the defendant herein" and, as so certified, the transcript is signed by the trial judge, and filed, the fatal weakness of a contention that no objections were made to the instructions is that objections to
the instructions affirmatively appear in the transcript. The court cannot go
behind the showing of the transcript. The statute, Mo. Laws 1947, Vol. II,
p. 219, 220, provides that, if the correctness of any transcript is disputed by
a party, "the transcript shall be settled and approved by the trial court."
When it is so settled and approved, the court is bound by the transcript as
67
settled and approved.1

Where a declaration of law, though requested, is not set out in the
transcript, it is assumed on appeal that no point is made of its refusal. 1 8
164.
1949).
165.
166.
167.
168.

In re Adoption of Forshey's Minor Children, 225 S.W. 2d 816 (Mo. App.
Walker v. Missouri White Motors, 227 S.W. 2d 762 (Mo. App. 1950).
Stanley v. Ray, 220 S.W. 2d 75 (Mo. App. 1949).
Ashton v. Buchholz, supra note 22.
Chamberlain v. Grisham, 229 S.W. 2d 14 (Mo. App. 1949).
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4. Brief
Where the statement of facts in the brief was merely a recitation of
the filings of the pleadings in the case, the date the court rendered its
judgment, the date of filing the motion for new trial and the ruling of the
court thereon, the date of filing petitioner's notice of appeal, the appeal
bond, the date of the filing of the transcript, and the reference to pages of
the transcript where the pleadings may be found, the court held that the
appellant wholly failed to make a fair and concise statement of the facts in
the case of his statement, brief, and argument as required under Supreme
Court Rule 1.08.169 However, a statement containing a fair and concise
statement of the facts without argument complies with the rule and does
7
not warrant dismissal. 0
Assignments of error not carried forward and developed in appellant's
brief will be deemed abandoned. 1 71 Thus where the appellant claimed that
the court erred in giving an instruction, but no grounds were assigned and
the point was not directly argued in his brief, the court of appeals was not
required to consider the point.172
Where practically all of the statements of facts in the plaintiff's brief
on appeal were in the form of the plaintiff's conclusions, and ignored the
evidence presented on behalf of the defendant, the rule requiring the appellant's brief to fully and concisely state the facts relevant to the questions
presented for determination was not substantially complied with and the
appeal would be dismissed under the rule on defendant's motion where no
good cause for not dismissing the appeal was shown and the interests of
justice did not require retention of the appeal. 1' But even though the apel-

lant has failed to make a fair and concise statement of the facts and it
contains conclusions and argument, though the assignment of errors is not
stated clearly and concisely, and the points, authorities, and arguments are
intermingled, the court, in a recent case, decided that the interests of justice
demanded that it decide the case upon its merits and, for that reason, the
4
motion to discuss was overruledY.1

169. In re Adoption of Forsley's Minor Children, supra note 164.
170. Swenson v. Swenson, 227 S.W. 2d 103 (Mo. App. 1950).
171. Geisendorfer v. Geisendorfer, 227 S.W. 2d 470 (Mo. App. 1950). Compare
Smith v. Gerhardt, 220 S.W. 2d 85 (Mo. App. 1949) where it was held that a
point not mentioned in the argument was held to have been abandoned.
172. Martin v. Ficklin, supra note 55.
173. Kleinhammer v. Kleinhammer, 225 S.W. 2d 377 (Mo. App. 1949).
174. City of Overland v. Ranft, 220 S.W. 2d 746 (Mo. App. 1949); Le Compte
v. Sanders, 229 S.W. 2d 298 (Mo. App. 1950).
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Where the appellant cited a large number of cases, the court of appeals
1 75
presumed that the three strongest cases were cited first.
e. Judgment on Appeal
1. If No Controversy
In the absence of a controversy, the appeal will either be dismissed or
the cause will be remanded with directions to vacate the judgment and
17
dismiss or grant other appropriate relief.
2. When Court Has No Jurisdiction
An appellate court inay not consciously disregard a record showing that
its jurisdiction has not been properly invoked, and, when it appears that
the necessary steps have not been taken to make an appeal effective, the
1 7
appellate court has no alternative but to so rule.
3. Matters Considered On Appeal
Though a motion for a new trail is filed below, an appellate court will
not consider questions not presented in such motion to the trial court
because of Supreme Court 3.23 which provides: "Allegations of error, in
order to be preserved for appellate review, must be presented to the trial
court in a motion for a new trial." Therefore, it must determine only those
matters as to which the rules governing appellate procedure have been
complied with.18
This rule has, during the past year, also been applied to an order
appointing a guardian for an infant, 79 to instructionse sO and to pleadings.",However, the appellate court may consider everything preserved in the
record to determine the proper disposition to be made of the case.182
4. Errors Not Prejudicial
If a plaintiff has not made out a submissible case, errors in instructions
1 83
are immaterial upon appeal.
175. National Life Ins. Co. v. Blair, supra note 96.
176. Hurtgen v. Gasche, supra note 155.
177. Perr v. Perr, supra note 5.
178. State v' Cave, supra note 101.
179. Montana v. Nenert, supra note 132.
180. Cass v. Pacific Fire Ins. Co., 224 S.W. 2d 40$ (Mo. App. 1949); Moehle
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 229 S.W. 2d 285 (Mo. App. 1950); Marshall v.
St. Louis-San Francisco Ry., 229 S.W. 2d 724 (Mo. App. 1950).
181. Cosentino v. Heffelfinger, supra note 96; Buchanan v. Cabiness, 221 S.W.
2d 849 (Mo. App. 1949).
182. Hughes v. St. Louis National League Baseball Club, supra note 89. In
accord State v. Cave, supra note 101.
183. Graves v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., supra note 123.
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The improper admission of merely cumulative evidence has been held
not- to be reversible error.3'8
Admitting an answer to a hypothetical question which it was claimed
did not contain sufficient facts to make the witness' opinion of value was
held to be harmless, where both parties were given opportunity to include
any other matters in question and the witness stated that he did not understand the question.' s5
The giving of a nonverdict emergency instruction, requested'by a bus
company sued by a bus passenger for injuries sustained when the bus slackened speed and the passenger fell from a standing position in the aisle, was
not prejudicial error, notwithstanding that the passenger submitted a case
on res ipsa loquitur doctrine, where the emergency instruction had some
material bearing on the issue of sole cause.""'
Where judgment was entered on a verdict for the defendant, errors
assigned that the giving of the instruction requested by the defendant, on
exclusion of evidence offered by the plaintiff, and on the action of the trial
court in sustaining an objection to the argument of the plaintiff's counsel
for the jury were not prejudicial to the plaintiff if he did not make a case
for the jury.18 7
In an action by an owner against a contractor for damages from delay
or abandonment of work wherein the contractor counterclaimed for the value
of materials furnished which were taken over and used by the owner, the
court's oral statement to the jury before it retired that it might find for both
the plaintiff and the defendant and might find for the plaintiff on the counterclaim, was unnecessary, but it was not prejudicial, and in any evrent, it
was an accurate statement. 8 8
5. Pleadings
Ii has been said that a pleading should be construed on appeal with
reasonable liberality to prevent entrapment unless it wholly fails to state a
cause of action, but, where a petition was challenged for insufficiency to state
a claim upon which relief could be granted in the trial court, and the trial
court sustained the challenge and the petitioner refused to plead further, the
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.

Louisiana Lumber Co. v. Burbridges, 220 S.W. 2d 760 (Mo. App. 1949).
Cunningham v. Union Electric Co. of Missouri, supra note 114.
Jarboe v. Kansas City Public Service Co., 220 S.W. 2d 27 (Mo. 1949).
Wilson v. Miss Hulling's Cafeterias, Inc., 229 S.W. 2d 556 (Mo. 1950).
Smith v. Gerhardt, 220 S.W. 2d 85 (Mo. App. 1949).
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petitioner could not complain on appeal of entrapment after the trial court
dismissed the petition. 18 9
In determining the sufficiency of the plaintiff's petition to state a cause
of action, it is the duty of the appellate court to treat all facts well pleaded
in the petition as the facts in the case. 90
6. Evidence
(a) When Not Reviewed
Where the abstract of the record furnished by the appellant not only
fails to set out the full testimony of the many witnesses, either in narrative
form or by questions and answers, sufficient to advise the court of the import
thereof, but wholly fails to set out any of the evidence offered in the case
upon which the trial court bases its findings, the appellate court cannot
review the evidence presented to the trial court. Not having been furnished
a fair and concise statement of the facts relative to the questions at issue in
the case, the appellate court cannot convict the trial court of error.19 '
(b) Most Favorable Evidence Doctrine
When an appellate court is called upon to pass on the sufficiency of
evidence of a party, it must consider only that evidence most favorable to
the case of the party whose evidence is claimed to be insufficient and must
ignore any contradictory evidence offered by his opponent and it must draw
t2
every reasonable inference therefrom in favor of the former.'
(c) Weighing
Where there is conflicting testimony on the issues being tried, and where
there is substantial evidence to support a verdict, an appellate court will not
weigh the evidence or interfere with the findings of the jury. But, where there
is no evidence whatsoever to support a verdict and the verdict is not responsive to the issues, nor to any testimony in the case, a judgment based on
such a verdict will be reversed. 93
189. Therrien v. Mercantile-Commerce Bank & Trust Co., supra note 33.
190. Abbott v. Seamon, supra note 53.
191. In re Adoption of Forshey's Minor Children, supra note 164.
192. Costello v. M. C. Slater, Inc., 220 S.W. 2d 947 (Mo. App. 1949); Weber
v. Jones, 222 S.W. 2d 97 (Mo. App. 1949); Coleman v. Ziegler, 226 S.W. 2d 388
(Mo. App. 1950); Twine v. Norris Grain Co., 26 S.W. 2d 415 (Mo. App. 1950);
Geisendorfer v. Geisendorfer, supra note 171.
193. Wormington v. City of Overland, supra note 108; Whitaker v. Terminal
R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 224 S.W. 2d 606 (Mo. App. 1949); Albert H. Hoppe, Inc.
v. St. Louis Public Service Co., supra note 107; Hoefel v. Hammel, supra note 107;
Hogsett v. Smith, supra note 107; Fisher v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., supra
note 81; Johnson v. Lea, supra note 134.
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(d) Credibility of
An appellate court as a matter of law passes upon the matter of substance and not of credibility. In other words, an appellate court may say
that particular evidence is substantial if the triers of the facts believe it to
19
be true.2
7. Amount of Damages
It is the settled law of this state that an appellate court should not
interfere with the amount of a judgment for damages for personal injuries
which has been allowed to stand by the trial court unless the amount is so
grossly excessive or unmistakably beyond the bounds of reason and, in determining whether the jury's verdict was grossly excessive, the appellate court
must consider the evidence and inferences favorable to the verdict and disregard conflicting testimony. Furthermore, in measuring the money value of
damages for personal injuries, each case must be judged on its own facts and
consideration must be given to the economic conditions prevailing when the
jury's verdict was returned. Also, due regard must be given, to the maintenance of reasonable uniformity of awards for similar injuries. 195
8. Trial Theory
Where the plaintiff denominated his cause of action as a petition for a
declaratory judgment but it was tried upon the theory that it was an action
in the nature of a bill of interpleader, and the parties adopted that theory,
the appellate court did likewise.""'
9. Judgment Given
An appellate court may reverse or affirm or give such judgment as a
97
trial court ought to have given.
Such a court has discretion to remand where it seems that the ends of
justice would be subserved by so doing- 98
Where there is no dispute as to the fact, where both sides in their testimony agree to them, the questions to be decided are legal and it is the duty
of the appellate court to order the trial court to enter such judgment as it
194. State v. Public Service Commission, 220 S.W. 2d 61 (Mo. 1949).
195. Williams v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., supra note 7; Prince v. Kansas City
Southern Ry. Co., 229 S.W. 2d 568 (Mo. 1950); Moehle v. St. Louis Public Service
Co., supra note 180.
196. Le Compte v. Sanders, supra note 174.
197. Straube v. Bowling Green Gas Co., 227 S.W. 2d 666 (Mo. 1950).
198. Buchanan v. Cabiness, supra note 181; Larson v, Crescent Planning Mill
Co., 227 S.W. 2d 485 (Mo. App. 1950).
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thinks it should have entered, and, unless justice requires otherwise, it should
dispose of the case to the end that litigation may not be unduly prolonged 0l
Where the trial court erred in failing to withdraw from the jury items
of damage not within the pleadings, and such action was the only error
which appeared, the appellate court ordered a new trial only as to question
of damages.

20 0

If a respondent makes no submissible case and therefore is not entitled
to any damages, he should not be granted a new trial solely on the ground
that the verdict in his favor is inadequate. If the evidence was insufficient
to submit the question of appellant's liability, a verdict for the respondent
in any amount would be excessive, regardless of the extent of his injuries.
In cases where new trials have been granted for erroneous instructions, the
supreme court has frequently examined the evidence as to liability and has
refused to sustain the granting of a new trial to a plaintiff where no sub-

20
missible case was made. 1

Aso where evidence as to damages was improperly admitted in an action
to recover for, injuries sustained in an automobile collision and highly conflicting evidence as to the manner in which the collision occurred made it
practically impossible to try fairly and justly the question of damages separately from the question of liability, the appellate court, in granting a new
trial, was not required to confine the issues on new trial only to the question
of damages but the entire case both as to liability and damages could be
ordered retried.

20 2

Though the giving of one of plaintiff's instructions was error materially
affecting the issue of the plaintiff's contributory negligence, and for that
reason the judgment could not stand, since there was no claim in the appellate court that the verdict was excessive, or that the error in the instruction
had any effect on the issue as to the amount of damages recoverable, there
20 3
was no need for a new trial on that issue.

The supreme court has held that a judgment may be modified to accord
with the evidence.

20 4

An appellate court may reverse a judgment as to one tort-feasor and
affirm it as to others. 0 5
199. Le Compte v. Sanders, supra note 196.

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.

May v. Hexter, 226 S.W. 2d 383 (Mo. App. 1950).
Nelson v. Kansas City, 227 S.W. 2d 672 (Mo. 1950).
Ziervogel v. Royal Packing Co., -pra note 4.
Woods v. Chinn, 224 S.W. 2d 583 (Mo. App. 1949).
Chapman v. Schearf, 229 S.W. 2d 552 (Mo. 1950).
Lemonds v. Holmes, 229 S.W. 2d 552 (Mo. 1950).
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Appellate courts are more liberal in upholding an order granting a new
trial than in reversing and remanding a cause, especially in instances where
the order involves the exercise of a judicial discretion on the part of the
208
trial court.
Where the plaintiff appealed from a judgment in favor of two defendants
but did not complain of, or appeal from, her judgment against two codefendants, who also appealed, the plaintiff was entitled to hold the amount of
the verdict about which no question was raised. 0 7
10. Plain Error
Where remarks and question of the trial court caused manifest miscarriage of justice and prejudiced the defendant before the jury, the appellate
court considered an assignment with respect to such remarks and questions
even though there were no exceptions to such remarks and questions during
0
the trial.2
Where defandant's motion for a directed verdict made at the close of
the evidence was overruled and plaintiff recovered a verdict and judgment,
defendant should have renewed his request for a directed verdict or should
have moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, in order to preserve
for review on appeal the question of sufficiency of evidence to make a submissible case. However, under Supreme Court Rules 3.27 and 1.28 allowing consideration of plain errors not properly preserved for review, judgment
remanding the cause and directing entry of judgment in favor of defendant
was rendered.

200

Under the rule providing that plain errors affecting substantial rights
may be considered on appeal though defectively raised or preserved in the
trial court, where there was much merit in the defendant's assignment on the
overruling of its motion for directed verdict, the supreme court ruled the
assignment without ruling on challenged sufficiency of the motion.21o

206.
207.
208.
1949).
209.
210.

Venditti v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 226 S.W. 2d 599 (Mo. 1950).
Lemonds v. Holmes, supra note 205.
Fleetwood v. Milwaukee Mechanics Ins. Co., 220 S.W. 2d 614 (Mo. App.
Nelson v. Kansas City, supra note 201.
Fletcher v. North Mehornay Furniture Co., 222 S.W. 2d 789 (Mo. 1949).
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